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This Article presents evidence of racial discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty in the United States Armed Forces from
1984 through 2005. Our database includes military prosecutions in all
potentially death-eligible cases known to us (n = 105) during that time
period.
Over the last thirty years, studies of state death-penalty systems have
documented three types of evidence of racial disparities in the treatment of
similarly situated death-eligible offenders. The most common disparity or
“race effect” is that capital charging and sentencing decisions are applied
more punitively in cases involving one or more white victims than they are
in similar cases with no white victims. These disparities are generally
viewed as evidence of “race of victim” discrimination in the system. The
next most common race-based disparity is the more punitive treatment of
cases involving a black or minority defendant and one or more white
victims compared to the treatment of cases involving all other similarly
situated defendant/victim racial combinations. These disparities are viewed
as evidence of “minority-defendant/white-victim” discrimination in the
system. The least common racially based disparity is the more punitive
treatment of cases involving black and minority defendants compared to the
treatment of similarly situated white-defendant cases, regardless of the race
of the victim involved in the case. These race effects are usually referred to
as evidence of “independent” or “main effect” racial discrimination.
The data in this study document white-victim and minorityaccused/white-victim disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes that
are consistent with these findings. The data also document independent
minority-accused disparities of a magnitude that is rarely seen in state
court systems.
The principal source of the white-victim disparities in the system is the
combined effect of convening authority charging decisions and courtmartial panel findings of guilt at trial—decisions that advance deatheligible cases to capital sentencing hearings. The principal source of the
independent minority-accused disparities in the system is the deathsentencing decisions of panel members in capital sentencing hearings.
The evidence in the sixteen cases with multiple victims, which are the
principal source of the race effects in the system, supports Supreme Court
Justice Byron White’s hypothesis that in death-eligible murder cases, the
greatest risk of “racial prejudice” exists in highly aggravated minorityaccused/white-victim cases.
There is, however, little or no risk of racial prejudice among the small
group of cases that constitute the most aggravated military cases—those
with substantial military implications because they involve lethal attacks on
United States troops or commissioned officer victims.
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Limiting death eligibility to death-eligible murders with substantial
military implications could substantially reduce or entirely eliminate the
risk of racial bias in the administration of the military death penalty.
Without regard to the race of the defendant and victims, those cases
uniformly receive more punitive treatment than “civilian-style” murder
cases that have no military implications. This has particularly been the
case between 1990 and 2005. Militarily implicated cases have accounted
for 75% (6/8) of the military death sentences imposed during that period.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article presents the results of an empirical study of racial
discrimination in the administration of the death penalty in the United
States Armed Forces between 1984, the year military law was brought into
conformity with the requirements of Furman v. Georgia (1972), and 2005.1
A main theme of this paper is the difference between the military system
and the civilian systems that have been similarly studied in the operation,
outcomes, racial disparities, and the sources of those disparities.
Our military evidence takes two forms. The first is evidence of
systemic racial disparities in the charging and sentencing decisions of
convening authorities and court-martial members that non-racial case
characteristics do not explain.2 The second is quantitative and qualitative
assessments of the risk of racial discrimination in each case in which a
minority accused was sentenced to death.
Our database includes military prosecutions for all “potentially deatheligible” murder cases known to us (n = 105), including all “factually deatheligible” murder cases that resulted in a capital murder conviction (by plea
or at trial) with one or more statutory aggravating factors found or present
(n = 97).3 The sentencing dates of these cases range from July 16, 1984, to
October 13, 2005. Fifteen of these cases resulted in a death sentence.
Part I of the Article identifies death-eligible offenses under military
law, including premeditated and felony murder, which are the focus of this

1
408 U.S. 238 (1972). As discussed below, an executive order brought the system into
conformance. Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3169 (Jan. 24, 1984).
2
Jurors are known as “members” in military courts.
3
See infra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of death eligibility and our method of identifying
cases for inclusion in our study. Of our 105-case sample of “potentially death-eligible”
cases, we removed eight cases in which the convening authority capitally charged the
accused but guilt trial members acquitted him. This reduced the sample of “factually deatheligible” cases to 97. Our analysis of the charging decisions of the convening authorities is
based on the 105-case sample of “potentially death-eligible” cases, while our analysis of the
members’ death-sentencing decisions is based on the 97-case sample of “factually deatheligible” cases.
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study. Part II describes the military capital charging and sentencing process
for death-eligible murder cases. Part III explains our methodology. Part IV
presents evidence of systemic racial disparities. Part V assesses the risk of
racial discrimination in ten cases in which a minority accused received the
death sentence. Part VI contrasts the findings of racial disparities in deatheligible capital cases with the evidence of racial disparities in non-capital
sentencing outcomes among the sixty-six death-eligible murder cases that
did not advance to a capital sentencing hearing.
Part VII presents our conclusions and policy recommendations. We
found compelling evidence that the race of the accused and of the victim
has influenced charging and sentencing decisions in the processing of
death-eligible murder cases in the system since 1984. There is, however, an
important distinction between the decisions made in the processing of these
cases. The risk of racial prejudice is confined entirely to the decisions of
convening authorities and members that lead up to and include the
members’ death-sentencing outcomes. Among the sixty-seven cases that
did not advance to a capital sentencing hearing, the first sentencing issue
was whether a life sentence or a term of years would be given. In the cases
where an individual was sentenced to a term of years, the second issue was
the duration of that sentence. There is no evidence of systemic racial
effects in either of these decisions.4
Among the 105 cases in our study that potentially implicate the death
penalty, there is evidence of a substantial risk of three forms of racial
prejudice: white-victim discrimination, minority-accused/white-victim
discrimination, and independent minority-accused discrimination. There is
a risk of all three forms of prejudice in the imposition of death sentences
among all death-eligible cases.5 Closer scrutiny reveals that the source of
the white-victim and minority-accused/white-victim effects in the
imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible cases is convening
authority decisions seeking death sentences6 and the guilt trial decisions of
court-martial members that advance cases to a capital sentencing hearing by
a unanimous verdict on the accused’s liability for capital murder.7 The
combined effects of these two decisions produce a substantial and
statistically significant white-victim disparity in the rates that cases advance
to a capital sentencing hearing.8 The evidence further suggests that the
principal source of the independent minority-accused racial disparity

4
5
6
7
8

Infra note 200 and accompanying text.
Infra note 118 and accompanying text.
Infra Part IV.C.
Infra Part IV.C.2.
Infra Part III.
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documented in the imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible
cases is members’ life/death decisions in capital sentencing hearings.
Specifically, in white-victim cases, which constitute 97% of capital
sentencing hearing cases, minority accused face a significantly higher risk
of a death sentence than do similarly situated white accused.9
Our evidence also supports the hypothesis propounded by Justice
Byron White that the risk of racial prejudice is greatest in highly aggravated
minority-accused/white-victim cases, which are illustrated in this study by
sixteen multiple-victim cases.10
Finally, our findings suggest that the risk of racial prejudice in the
administration of the military death penalty for death-eligible murder would
be greatly reduced if death sentencing in such cases were limited to cases
with significant military implications in which the risk of the imposition of
a death sentence has been low to non-existent since 1984.
A. DEATH-ELIGIBLE OFFENSES UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE

There is a long tradition of the use of capital punishment in the United
States Armed Forces. There are currently fifteen death-eligible offenses in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).11 All but two of them
currently relate to crimes with important national security or military
implications that have no counterparts in civilian death-penalty systems.
Mutiny, sedition, and espionage are in the first, national security category.12
There are also eight death-eligible offenses with serious military
implications that apply only “in time of war” or during combat operations
against a foreign power.13 In addition, two other offenses have important
military implications but no “time of war” requirement.14 These are longstanding offenses that to our knowledge have not been applied since the
Korean War.15
The fourteenth and fifteenth death-eligible offenses are murder

9

Infra Part IV.A.
Infra Part IV.G.
11
10 U.S.C. §§ 801–940 (2006).
12
§ 894 (mutiny and sedition); § 906A (espionage).
13
§ 895 (desertion); § 890 (assaulting or willfully disobeying a superior commissioned
officer); § 899 (misbehavior before the enemy); § 900 (subordinate compelling surrender);
§ 901 (improper use of countersign); § 904 (aiding the enemy); § 906 (spies); § 913
(misbehavior of a sentinel).
14
§ 902 (forcing a safeguard); § 910 (willfully hazarding a vessel).
15
The Court of Military Appeals treated the Korean and Vietnam conflicts differently.
Compare United States v. Bancroft, 3 C.M.A. 3 (1953), with United States v. Averette, 19
C.M.A. 363 (1970).
10
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(premeditated and felony murder)16 (Section 118) and rape17 (Section
16

Article 118 of the UCMJ as adopted in 1950 reads as follows:

Any person subject to this code who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human
being, when he –
(1) has a premeditated design to kill; or
(2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; or
(3) is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to others and evinces a wanton disregard
for human life; or
(4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery,
or aggravated arson;
is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if
found guilty under paragraph (1) or (4) of this article, he shall suffer death or imprisonment for
life as a court-martial may direct.

Pub. L. No. 81-506, art. 118, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 918).
17
The UCMJ authorizes the death penalty for rape. Article 120(a) of the UCMJ as
adopted in 1950 reads as follows: “Any person subject to this code who commits an act of
sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, by force and without her consent, is guilty of
rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.”
Art. 120, 64 Stat. at 140 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 920(a)).
The current UCMJ also defines rape as an offense punishable by death: “Any person
subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without
consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a courtmartial may direct.” 10 U.S.C. § 920(a). The only service member executed for rape since
1950 was Pvt. John Bennett (convicted of rape and attempted murder and executed in 1961).
Since then, the United States Supreme Court held in Coker v. Georgia that the death penalty
is unconstitutional as excessive punishment for the rape of an adult woman. 433 U.S. 584,
599 (1977). Military courts have held that Coker applies to military law, at least when
applied to the rape of an adult woman. See United States v. McReynolds, 9 M.J. 881, 882
(A.F.C.M.R. 1980) (holding that rape of an adult woman is not a capital offense); United
States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 380 (C.M.A. 1983). Moreover, a state’s use of the death
penalty as punishment for the rape of a child under twelve years of age was invalidated by
the United States Supreme Court in 2008. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008).
However, unknown to the Court, the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act had amended
military law to redefine sexual assault as adult rape and child rape, and to authorize the death
penalty for child rape. Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552, 119 Stat. 3136, 3257 (2006). On a
motion for a rehearing in Kennedy based on this amendment and the executive order
intended to implement it, the parties sharply disagreed with respect to the new law’s
authorization of the death penalty for child rape. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 2
(2008) (statement of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer denying
rehearing) (stating that “[t]he parties disagree on the effect of Congress’ and the President’s
actions” with respect to the death penalty for child rape). The Court took no position on this
dispute, writing “[i]t is unclear what effect, if any, that reclassification worked on the
availability of the military death penalty.” Id. However, the Court held that that even if the
new law were deemed to authorize a military death penalty for child rape, it would have no
bearing on the original Kennedy holding that such an execution by a U.S. state would violate
the Eighth Amendment. Id. (“[A]uthorization of the death penalty in the military sphere
does not indicate that the penalty is constitutional in the civilian context.”). No current
member of the military death row has been convicted of rape alone. See The U.S. Military
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120(a)) committed by U.S. military personnel during peacetime anywhere
in the world.18 A murder conviction is the basis of all of the military death
sentences imposed since 1960. With one exception, murder and rape are
the most recently established death-eligible military offenses, having been
enacted by the UCMJ in 1950.19
Death eligibility for murder requires no connection between the
murder and military interests or functions. Military status alone makes the
statute applicable to military personnel and gives courts-martial
jurisdiction.20 In terms of the definition of capital murder, therefore, the
UCMJ mirrored the provisions of typical 1950s civilian death-penalty
statutes that defined first-degree and felony murder as capital offenses.
Like the civilian systems of that era, the UCMJ also vested in the
sentencing authority complete and untrammeled discretion to decide
whether a sentence for capital murder should be death or life imprisonment.
This second feature of the military death-penalty system became
important after Furman v. Georgia (1972), which held that the unguided
discretion of sentencing authorities in civilian jurisdictions violated the
cruel and unusual punishments provision of the Eighth Amendment to the

Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/us-militarydeath-penalty (last visited July 28, 2011).
18
Courts-martial were first granted jurisdiction to try murder and rape cases during the
Civil War when these acts were “committed by persons who are in the military service of the
United States” during times of “war, insurrection, or rebellion.” Articles of War, ch. 75,
§ 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736 (1863). In 1916, an amendment to the Articles of War added, “no
person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical
limits of the States of the Union and the District of Columbia in time of peace.” Pub. L. No.
64-242, art. 92, 39 Stat. 619, 664 (1916). These provisions, which denied courts-martial
jurisdiction to try murder and rape offenses when committed within the geographical limits
of the United States during times of peace, survived many revisions to the Articles of War,
including the Elston Act in 1948. Pub. L. No. 759, § 235, 62 Stat. 604 (1948). It was not
until the adoption of the UCMJ in 1950 that courts-martial were granted the jurisdiction to
try crimes of murder and rape committed in the United States during peacetime. Pub. L. No.
81-506, arts. 118, 120, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 918).
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have affirmed that courts-martial have jurisdiction to
prosecute a capital offense in peacetime under the UCMJ. Owens v. Markley, 289 F.2d 751,
752 (7th Cir. 1961); Burns v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141, 142 (10th Cir. 1959). No other circuits
have considered the issue.
19
It appears that Congress has added one other capital crime—espionage—since 1950.
Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, § 534,
99 Stat. 583, 634 (1985) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 906A).
20
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court found that courts-martial had jurisdiction to try
servicemen only when the crime had a service connection. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258, 272 (1969). However, in 1987 the Court abandoned the “service connection”
requirement, holding that court-martial jurisdiction was established by one factor—the
military status of the accused. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987).
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United States Constitution.21 Furman facially applied only to state deathpenalty systems. Nevertheless, the military procedures in place in 1972
were identical to the civilian death-penalty procedures condemned in
Furman. More than a decade passed, however, before a military court
acknowledged the relevance of Furman to the military system.
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Gregg v.
Georgia (1976) and Proffitt v. Florida (1976)22 that the adoption of
statutory lists of aggravating circumstances comparable to those found in
the Model Penal Code23 and the use of bifurcated guilt and penalty trials
satisfied the requirements of the Eighth Amendment because they
materially reduced the breadth of capital charging discretion. In the Court’s
view, these reforms limited death sentences to the most aggravated cases,
thereby eliminating the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination in the
administration of capital punishment.24
In 1983, eleven years after Furman, military courts ruled that Furman
v. Georgia did apply to the military death-penalty system and that existing
military procedures did not meet the requirements of Furman and Gregg.25
To cure this defect, President Reagan issued a 1984 executive order that
limited death eligibility to capital cases in which the fact-finder determined
that one or more statutory aggravating circumstances were present in the
case and “any extenuating or mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by any aggravating circumstances.”26
The aggravating
circumstances, known as aggravating “factors” in current military parlance,
embrace a number of situations with distinct military and national security
implications27 that facially apply to all death-eligible offenses, but in
21

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
23
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (withdrawn 2009).
24
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191–96; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258–61.
25
A June 1983 Air Force Court of Military Review ruling was the first to hold that
Furman’s requirements applied to courts-martial and that the courts-martial system was not
in compliance with those requirements. See United States v. Gay, 16 M.J. 586, 602
(A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (en banc). In fact, the Navy–Marine Corps Court of Military Review had
held that the military’s capital punishment system met Furman’s requirements without
amendment. See United States v. Rojas, 15 M.J. 902, 927–30 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983). In
October 1983, the Court of Military Appeals (C.M.A.) settled the conflict between the lower
military courts, ruling that Furman did apply to courts-martial. See United States v.
Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 379–80 (C.M.A. 1983). In 1984, the appeal in Gay reached the
C.M.A., which affirmed the decision. United States v. Gay, 18 M.J. 104 (C.M.A. 1984).
26
Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3169 (Jan. 24, 1984) (amending MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, para. 75(g)(2)(d)(ii) (1969)).
27
Id. (amending MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para. 75(g)(3)(b)) (“[The accused had
intent to] (i) cause substantial damage to the national security of the United States; or (ii)
cause substantial damage to a mission, system, or function of the United States” if such
22
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practice have no applicability to “civilian-style” premeditated and felony
murders, which constitute the vast majority of death-eligible murders
committed by military personnel in peacetime. Another distinctly military
aggravating circumstance applies to murder and rape “committed in time of
war”—a condition that has not existed since the Korean War.28
The executive order does, however, specifically exclude from murder
offenses two omnibus aggravators with significant military implications.29
In fact, only one of the omnibus aggravators applicable to all death-eligible
military offenses (grave risk to non-decedent victims) has frequent
relevance to murder cases.30
The executive order also defines, for premeditated murder cases under
Article 118(1) of the UCMJ, an extensive list of distinctly civilian-style
aggravating circumstances.31
These aggravating circumstances were
inspired by the typical state death-penalty statute whose aggravating
circumstances are modeled after those found in the Model Penal Code.32
The focus of the executive order on civilian-style aggravating
damage “would have resulted had the intended damage been effected.”); id. (amending
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para. 75(g)(3)(e)) (“[T]he accused committed the offense
with the intent to avoid hazardous duty.”)). See infra note 62 and accompanying text on the
distinction between “militarily implicated” and “civilian-style” murders within the military
criminal justice system.
28
Id. (amending MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para. 75(g)(3)(f)) (stating that a crime
is committed “in time of war” when the United States or an ally is an “occupying power” or
United States forces were “then engaged in active hostilities”). The current Manual for
Courts-Martial defines a “time of war” to be “a period of war declared by Congress or the
factual determination by the President that the existence of hostilities warrants a finding that
a ‘time of war’ exists for the purposes [of this manual].” MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES, RCM 103(19) (2008). See supra note 15 and accompanying text for a
discussion of “in the time of war” and the military courts’ construction of the phrase.
29
Exec. Order No. 12,460 § 1 (amending MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, para. 75(g)(3)(a) (1969)) (excluding cases where the crime was “committed before
or in the presence of the enemy”); id. (amending MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para.
75(g)(3)(c)) (excluding cases where “the offense caused substantial damage to the national
security of the United States, whether or not the accused intended such damage”).
30
Id. (amending MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para. 75(g)(3)(d)) (“[T]he lives of
persons other than the victim, if any, were unlawfully and substantially endangered.”).
31
Id. (amending MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para. 75(g)(3)(g)) (listing the following
aggravating circumstances for premeditated murder: (i) accused under confinement for
thirty-plus years, (ii) felony murder, (iii) pecuniary motive, (iv) compulsion or contract
murder, (v) escape or avoid apprehension, (vi) victim an important federal official, (vii)
victim a commissioned or noncommissioned officer knowingly killed “in the execution of
office,” (viii) obstruction of justice, (ix) infliction of substantial pain and suffering (7G), and
(x) multiple victims). The executive order also defines one aggravating circumstance limited
to felony murder alone: “the accused was the actual perpetrator of the killing.” Id.
(amending MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para. 75(g)(3)(h)).
32
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) (withdrawn 2009).
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circumstances for premeditated murder was understandable, given that six
of the seven murder cases in which a death sentence had been imposed in a
military court between 1979 and 1984 involved a distinctly civilian-style
murder with no special military implications.33
In fact, only one part of one of the premeditated murder aggravating
circumstances in the executive order is uniquely tailored to military
circumstances. This aggravator (7G) classifies as death-eligible the
premeditated murder of a “commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or
petty officer of the armed services of the United States” killed “in the
execution of office” when the accused had knowledge of the victim’s
status.34 The balance of the 7G aggravating factor reflects an effort to
provide special protection for law enforcement and corrections officers that
is found in most civilian jurisdictions.35
The 1984 executive order does not list specific mitigating
circumstances, which means under the Eighth Amendment that defense
counsel may present any mitigating factor bearing on the circumstances of
the offense or the character of the accused.36
The drafters of the executive order likely shared the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) that the limitations which the
military aggravating factors place on the exercise of discretion by
sentencing hearing members would significantly reduce the risk of
arbitrariness and racial discrimination by limiting death eligibility to the
most highly aggravated murder cases. Additional protections in this regard

33

The exception is United States v. Gay, which involved two victims, one of whom was
an officer killed in the line of duty. 16 M.J. 586 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983). The civilian-style
death sentences included: United States v. Redmond, 21 M.J. 319 (C.M.A. 1986) (defendant
convicted of killing his friend’s fiancé); United States v. Mustafa, 22 M.J. 165 (C.M.A.
1986) (defendant convicted of raping and killing an acquaintance); United States v. Artis, 22
M.J. 15 (C.M.A. 1986) (wife victim); United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983)
(defendant accused of rape and robbery); United States v. Rojas, 15 M.J. 902 (N.M.C.M.R.
1983) (defendant convicted of robbery and premeditated murder of an acquaintance); United
States v. Hutchinson, 15 M.J. 1056 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983) (defendant convicted of robbery and
premeditated murder of an acquaintance).
34
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, RCM 1004(c)(7)(G) (2008). See
also supra text accompanying note 31, which lists all of the aggravating factors tailored to
premeditated murder.
35
Although the text of 7G protects all “officers” (i.e., commissioned, noncommissioned,
and police officers), within military culture, as reflected in the cases studied here, an “officer
victim” case is strictly perceived to be one with a commissioned officer victim—whether or
not the officer was acting in the “execution of office” and whether or not the accused knew
that the victim was a commissioned officer so acting.
36
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that the fact-finder may not be
precluded from considering any mitigating factor bearing on the circumstances of the offense
or the character of the accused).

2012]

RACE AND THE MILITARY DEATH PENALTY

1237

are provided by the UCMJ’s two important predicates for the imposition of
a military death sentence: (a) a unanimous finding of liability for capital
murder by the court-martial members,37 and (b) a unanimous finding by
court-martial members “beyond a reasonable doubt” that one or more
“aggravating circumstances” exist and that “any extenuating or mitigating
circumstances are substantially outweighed by any aggravating
circumstances.”38
However, in spite of these protections, there are good reasons for
concern about the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination in the
administration of the military death penalty. First is the breadth of
discretion exercised by senior commanders (“convening authorities”) who
make capital charging decisions in the system. Second, the discretion of the
officers and enlisted personnel (the “courts-martial members”) who
determine capital murder liability and impose life and death sentences in
capital sentencing hearings is also very broad.
In addition, there are historical and cultural grounds for concern that
the 1984 executive order may have fallen short of its intended effect. First,
there is historical evidence of racial disparities in the administration of the
military death penalty. Most striking are Professor Lilly’s studies of
military executions in Europe during World War II, suggesting that black
soldiers accused of rape and murder of white victims were
disproportionately executed for their crimes.39 Race relations and attitudes
within the Armed Forces and within U.S. society generally have changed
dramatically since then. Nevertheless, a 1970s Pentagon-sponsored study
of the military justice system documented continuing race disparities at a
number of levels.40
Second, the literature from 1980 through 2008 documents race effects

37

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 845(b) (2006). Military judges are not authorized to impose
death sentences and an accused may not plead guilty to capital murder. § 845(b).
38
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, RCM 1004(b)(4)(C). The rule uses the phrase
“aggravating factors” in most instances. In this section, “aggravating circumstances” include
the aggravating factors discussed above.
39
J. Robert Lilly & Michael Thomson, Executing US Soldiers in England, World War II:
Command Influence and Sexual Racism, 37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 262, 280–83 (1997).
During World War II, the Armed Forces stationed in England employed policies to segregate
African-American soldiers from European white women after violence was anticipated and
reported between African-American soldiers and white soldiers who objected to having
African-American soldiers appear socially with white women. Id. at 282–83.
40
DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES 17 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1972) (“The Task Force
believes that the military system does discriminate against its members on the basis of race
and ethnic background. The discrimination is sometimes purposive; more often it is not.”).
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in the administration of comparable civilian death-sentencing systems.41 In
terms of the scope of the discretion of civilian prosecutors and sentencing
authorities, the state systems are comparable to the current military system.
There is a risk, therefore, that the racial attitudes that commanders and
court-martial members bring to the military from civilian life may similarly
affect their decisions in the military justice system.42
Another concern is that the military justice system lacks the
transparency of civilian systems. The capital charging decisions of civilian
prosecutors operating in multiracial communities are often subject to close
scrutiny.43 So also are the decisions of civilian juries in highly visible
cases.44 In contrast, the decisions of commanders and courts-martial
members typically receive little scrutiny either within or outside the
military.45 The main exceptions are highly aggravated murders that
implicate the authority and effectiveness of the military command.46

41
The literature from 1980 to 1990 is reviewed in DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE
WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 254–67
(1990). The post-1990 literature is reviewed in David C. Baldus & George Woodworth,
Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the
Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL.
194, 215–26 (2003).
42
DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 40, at 38 (“It is clear to us that many white individuals
entering the military service come with severe disabilities resulting from being raised in a
racist society.”).
43
Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema
Verité and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 452 (1996) (noting that
the prosecutor’s role involves consideration of public opinion, among other things, when
making charging decisions); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide
Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1589 (2010) (noting
that most prosecutors are conscientious public servants who pay attention to public opinion,
among other things, as part of their jobs).
44
Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass
Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 656–60 (1991) (discussing the role of jurors and the value
of jurors who are aware of events in the community).
45
See generally Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(2002) (discussing in part the limited engagement of civilians and scholars with the military
system).
46
Capital prosecutions of soldiers for the murder of their officers in combat situations
(“fragging”) attract substantial attention in the civilian media. See, e.g., Soldier Gets Death
Penalty
for
Killing
Officers
in
Kuwait,
MSNBC
(Apr.
29,
2005),
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7667169 (reporting that Hassan Akbar murdered two officers in
Kuwait in 2003 and was sentenced to death); see also Hema Easley, Court-Martial to Begin
in Suffern Captain’s Slaying, J. NEWS, Oct. 22, 2008, at 7A; Sergeant Is Acquitted of Killing
Two Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, at A32 (reporting that Alberto Martinez was
acquitted on capital murder charges in connection with the deaths of two officers in Iraq in
2005).
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II. DECISIONMAKING IN DEATH-ELIGIBLE MURDER CASES
The following Section presents an overview of decisionmaking in the
U.S. military capital punishment system by documenting how the cases in
the study move through different decision points.
A. CAPITAL CHARGING AND SENTENCING DECISIONS

Under military law and practice, the death-penalty statute is applied in
a three-stage process by two decisionmakers—the convening authority and
the court-martial members.
Figure 1
Capital Charging and Sentencing Outcomes Among Death-Eligible Cases:
United States Armed Forces, 1984–200547
Stage 1
1

Case Advances to a Capital Court-Martial

1A

Yes
42% (41/97)

1B

No
58% (56/97)

Stage 2
2

Case Advances to a Capital
Sentencing Hearing after a Unanimous
Capital Murder Conviction
Yes
2B
No
73%
27%
(30/40)
(11/41)

2A

Stage 3
3
3A

Capital Sentencing
Hearing
Death
3B
Life
50%
50%
(15/30)
(15/30)

4

Death-Sentencing
Rate Among All
Death-Eligible Cases
15%
(15/97)

A capital prosecution in a death-eligible case is commenced by the
“convening authority,” normally a general or admiral in the accused’s
command, who has total discretion whether or not to seek a death sentence
in a death-eligible case. A decision to seek a death sentence in the case is
known as a “capital referral,” a decision that is heavily influenced by the
“advice” letter of the commander’s staff judge advocate (SJA), his chief
47
See Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2, pp. 1249–1252 for a description of the death-eligible
cases. The cases of eight accused but acquitted of capital murder by members are not
included in this figure. However, their cases are included in the analysis of convening
authority charging decisions.
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legal advisor.48
At stage one, if a case is capitally charged and the capital referral is not
withdrawn by the convening authority, the case advances to a capital courtmartial with the government seeking a death sentence.49 As shown in
Figure 1, at stage one, the capital referral and plea bargaining decisions of
the convening authority took death off the table in 58% of the death-eligible
cases (Box 1B). The remaining 42% advanced to a capital court-martial
with the government seeking a death sentence. This rate is comparable to
the 39% rate in the eight civilian jurisdictions on which post-Furman data
are available from the 1970s and 1980s,50 but it is higher than the civilian
rates in most jurisdictions since 1990.51 However, since 1990, the military

48
The “R2” between the SJA’s recommendation and the commander’s referral is .74.
This statistic means that 74% of the variation in the capital referral decisions of the
convening authorities is explained by the SJA recommendations. Advice letters take a
variety of forms. Some provide an explicit recommendation in the letter. Often, however,
the letter makes no mention of a capital referral but the SJA prepares a charge sheet with the
choice indicated and informs the commanding officer that his or her signing the sheet will
implement the SJA’s recommendation. In a few cases, the letter tells the convening
authority what must exist factually to justify a capital referral with no suggestion of what the
referral should be.
49
In many cases that are not charged capitally, the decision of the convening authority
not to bring a capital case is based on a pretrial agreement (PTA) in which the accused
pleads guilty in exchange for the convening authority’s waiver of the death penalty. In
capitally charged cases, the capital charge is often withdrawn by the convening authority in
exchange for a guilty plea to the crime charged or a less serious offense, in which event the
accused escapes the risk of his or her case advancing to a capital sentencing hearing with the
government seeking a death sentence. In contrast to civilian courts, a military accused’s case
may not advance to a capital sentencing hearing on the basis of a guilty plea. If the
government seeks a death sentence, the case must be tried and sentenced by members.
A crucial feature of the military system distinguishing it from its civilian counterparts
is that plea bargains are strictly within the authority of the convening authority rather than
the judge advocates who prosecute the cases on behalf of the government or the military
judges who try the cases. Military prosecutors may on their own motion initiate plea
negotiations leading to a waiver of the death penalty and may propose such an agreement to
the convening authority, but no plea bargain involving a waiver of the death penalty can go
forward without the personal consent of the convening authority.
50
BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI, supra note 41, at 233 (Georgia 52%; Maryland
41%; Dallas County, Tex., 14%; Cook County, Ill., 30%; California, 51%; North Carolina,
33%; Mississippi, 65%; New Jersey, 23%).
51
For example, a study in Maryland found that prosecutors advanced to trial seeking a
death sentence in 27% of the death-eligible cases (353/1,311). Raymond Paternoster et al.,
Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland,
1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 24 (2004). Similarly, a
Virginia study of cases prosecuted between 1995 and 1999 found the state sought a death
penalty 30% of the time during that period. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMM’N
OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA’S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 51
tbl.17 (Jan. 2002), available at http://jlarc.state.va.us/reports/rpt274.pdf.
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capital charging rate has declined sharply,52 as it has in many civilian
jurisdictions.53
Since November 18, 1997, the military life-sentence option has
included a life sentence without possibility of parole (LWOP), and four
such sentences have been imposed in non-capital sentencing hearings
during the period of this study.54 The availability of LWOP may also have
contributed to an increase in the frequency with which convening
authorities have waived the death penalty in death-eligible cases by
declining to charge them capitally or withdrawing a capital charge, usually
as part of a plea bargain.
At stage two, a unanimous finding of liability for capital murder by the
court-martial members will advance the case to a capital sentencing
hearing.55 Death came off the table for 27% of those found guilty of premeditated or felony murder by virtue of a non-unanimous finding of guilt
(Box 2B). The remaining thirty cases with a unanimous guilty verdict
advanced to a capital sentencing hearing.
At stage three, court-martial members consider the aggravating factors
and mitigating circumstances and make a life or death determination. At
this stage, members sentenced 50% of the accused to death (Box 3A). This
rate is also comparable to the 53% penalty trial death-sentencing rate in the
twelve civilian jurisdictions on which data are available from the 1970s and
1980s,56 but it is higher than the average civilian penalty trial rate since
1990.57 In that regard, since 1984, panel members’ death-sentencing rates
have steadily risen, although the number of capital sentencing hearings
during that time has been small.58
52
In the roughly five-year intervals since 1984, the rates at which convening authorities
have sought death sentences have declined from 63% (22/35) (1984–1989), to 43% (12/28)
(1990–1994), to 20% (4/20) (1995–1999), and to 14% (2/14) (2000–2004).
53
See, e.g., DAVID WEISBURD & JOSEPH NAUS, REPORT TO SPECIAL MASTER DAVID
BAIME: APPLYING THE RACE MONITORING SYSTEM TO MAY, 2005 PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
DATA 7–9 tbls.B1 & B2 (Nov. 9, 2005) (on file with author) (reporting the rate as 56% from
1983 to 1988 and 11% from 2000 to 2004).
54
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.A. § 856a(a) (2006).
55
RCM 1004(a)(2) makes a condition precedent for the imposition of a death sentence
the accused’s conviction of capital murder “by the concurrence of all the members of the
court-martial.” MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2008).
56
BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI, supra note 41, at 233 (Georgia, 55%; California,
48%; Colorado, 36%; Cook County, Ill., 64%; Dallas County, Tex., 100%; Delaware, 25%;
Florida, 74%; Louisiana, 49%; Maryland, 42%; North Carolina, 50%; New Jersey, 36%; and
Mississippi, 60%).
57
Id. at 215–25.
58
Since October 1984, the death-sentencing rates of members have risen from 41%
(7/17) (1984–1989), to 50% (4/8) (1990–1994), to 67% (2/3) (1995–1999), and to 100%
(2/2) (1995–1999). However, during that same period, the rates at which convening
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Overall, the death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases since
1984 is 15% (15/97). This rate is higher than comparable figures in most
states on which we have data both before59 and after 1990.60 However,
because of the increasing selectivity of convening authorities in pursuing
capital punishment, the overall death-sentencing rate in all death-eligible
cases has remained quite stable in recent years (despite the members’ rising
death-sentencing rate), declining from 20% (7/35) during the first period
(1984–1989) and holding thereafter at 14% (4/28) (1990–1994), 10% (2/18)
(1995–1999), and 14% (2/14) (2000–2005).61
B. THE DEATH-SENTENCED ACCUSED

Table 1 lists the fifteen cases that resulted in the imposition of a death
sentence between 1984 and 2005, classified by the year of the sentence and
the status of the murder as a “civilian-style” or “militarily implicated”
murder (Column D). This “crime type” distinction is based on compelling
evidence that in terms of criminal culpability and deathworthiness, military
decisionmakers perceive murders that threaten important military interests
to be more aggravated than civilian-style murders that do not.62
authorities have sought death sentences have steadily declined.
See supra text
accompanying note 52.
59
BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI, supra note 41, at 254–65.
60
Compare Connecticut (4.8%), Maryland (5.8%), Nebraska (16%), New Jersey (9%),
North Carolina (6.5%), and Virginia (11%). JOHN J. DONOHUE III, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
CONNECTICUT, 1973–2007: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION FROM 4600 MURDERS TO ONE
EXECUTION 100 (2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/55/; ISAAC
UNAH & JOHN CHARLES BOGER, RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN
EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS:
1993–1997,
at
24
tbl.2
(2001),
available
at
http://www.unc.edu/~jcboger/NCDeathPenaltyReport2001.pdf; WEISBURD & NAUS, supra
note 53, at 6 (New Jersey); JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMM’N OF THE VA. GEN.
ASSEMBLY, supra note 51, at 17 fig.7; David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis
of the Nebraska Experience (1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 545 (2002); Paternoster et
al., supra note 51, at 52 fig.1 (Maryland).
61
Among the branches of the Armed Forces, there is substantial variability in the rates
that death sentences are sought and imposed. The convening authority capital charging rates
are highest in the Air Force (66%, 6/9) and Marine Corps (54%, 14/26) and lowest in the
Army (35%, 18/51) and Navy (25%, 3/12). Death-penalty rates in capital sentencing
hearings are comparable in the Army (50%, 6/12) and Air Force (40%, 2/5), higher in the
Marine Corps (70%, 7/10), and lowest in the Navy (0%, 0/3). The death-sentencing rates
among all death-eligible cases are highest in the Marine Corps (27%, 7/26), followed by the
Air Force (17%, 2/12), the Army (13%, 6/46), and the Navy (0%, 0/12). The Coast Guard
appears to have had no death-eligible homicides during the period of this study.
62
For detail on the military/civilian-style murder distinction, see Catherine M. Grosso,
David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, The Impact of Civilian Aggravating Factors on the
Military Death Penalty (1984–2005): Another Chapter in the Resistance of the Armed
Forces to the Civilianization of Military Justice, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569 (2010). See
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Militarily implicated cases involve lethal attacks on United States
troops while on duty, any cases where the victim is a commissioned
officer,63 and other murders that directly threaten the authority or
effectiveness of the military mission.64 The following research note
provides an example of a militarily implicated case involving a lethal attack
on U.S. troops on duty and one or more officer victims:
At night in Kuwait four days before the 2003 United States led invasion of Iraq,
Hassan Akbar, a 31-year-old Army E5 with 4 years of military service, feigned an
attack on his unit by rolling live hand grenades into three tents with sleeping officers
and opened fire on the occupants as they fled their tents. He killed one officer with a
shot in the back. A second officer died of 87 shrapnel wounds. He also injured 14
65
other military victims, many seriously.

The following note exemplifies a case with fewer significant military
implications:
Motivated by a perceived racial attack on a black marine by white marines, Kenneth
Parker, a 21-year-old Marine Corps E3 with 3 years of military service, and five
military co-perpetrators kidnapped, robbed and killed with a shot to the heart the first
white person they encountered who happened to be a fellow marine. Parker was the
shooter. On another occasion he killed the male spouse of a fellow marine’s
paramour with a shotgun blast to the chest at request of the follow marine.

id. at 609 tbl.3 for a classification of all of the cases in this study in terms of their status as
“military implicated” and “civilian-style” murder. As of November 2010, the military death
row also included a case not included in the study or listed in Table 1. Master Sgt. Timothy
Hennis, a white male, was sentenced to death April 15, 2010, for a multiple-victim civilianstyle murder committed in 1985. See From Military Times: Death Sentence for Master Sgt.,
MARINE CORPS TIMES, May 3, 2010, at 28.
63
In Table 1, Akbar and Kreutzer involved attacks on U.S. troops on duty, while Akbar,
Kreutzer, Curtis, and Quintanilla involved commissioned officer victims. Note, in this
footnote and throughout this paper, we reference the cases of individual defendants by citing
their last name in italics in the footnotes. For example, the case of Hassan Akbar is
referenced here as Akbar. These references point to the case files, coding materials, data
collection instruments, and narrative summaries on file with the author. The process for
collecting and preparing these materials is explained in Part III.A.3 below. The cases of
those defendants who received a death sentence are also summarized briefly in Table 1 and
Appendix B.
64
In Table 1, Parker, Walker, and Simoy otherwise threatened the military mission.
65
This research note, and the others that follow in this Article, are taken from the
narrative summaries on file with the author. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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Table 1
Death-Sentenced Accused Listed by Year of Sentence and Type of
Offense: United States Armed Forces, 1984–2005
A
1
2
3

4

5

6
7

8

66

B
Thumbnail Sketches
Dock, Todd A.
Dock robbed a cab driver and then murdered him
with multiple stab wounds.
Turner, Melvin
Turner murdered his own 11-month-old daughter
with a razor blade.
Murphy, James T.
Three victims. Murphy bludgeoned his wife with
a hammer and then drowned her in the bathtub.
He then drowned his 5-year-old stepson who had
tried to intervene, and finally drowned his own 21month-old son.
Curtis, Ronnie A.
Two victims. Curtis robbed and stabbed to death
his commanding officer and the officer’s wife for
perceived racial slights.
Gray, Ronald A.
Gray abducted, raped, sodomized, beat, and fatally
shot an Army private four times. Two and a half
weeks later, Gray raped, sodomized, bound,
gagged, beat, and fatally stabbed a cab driver. He
also raped and attempted to kill an Army private,
stabbing her in the neck and side multiple times
after tying her hands behind her back.
Thomas, Joseph L.
Thomas killed his wife with a tire iron to collect
insurance proceeds.
Loving, Dwight J.
Loving robbed and fatally shot two cab drivers in
the head in one evening and later attempted to kill
a third.
Gibbs, Curtis A.
Gibbs killed and nearly decapitated a female
drinking companion with a sword.

C
Year of
Sentence
1984

D
Crime
Type66
C

1985

C

1987

C

1987

M

1988

C

1988

C

1989

C

1990

C

“C” denotes “civilian-style” murder while “M” denotes “militarily implicated” murder,
which are described supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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10

11

12

13

14
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B
Thumbnail Sketches
Simoy, Jose F.
The accused and four co-perpetrators robbed
individuals delivering proceeds to a bank on an
airbase and in the process killed a police officer
with pipe blows to the head and nearly killed
another person. The accused was not the trigger
person.
Parker, Kenneth G.
Two victims. Motivated by a perceived racial
attack on a black marine by white marines, the
accused and five co-perpetrators kidnapped,
robbed, and killed with a shot to the heart the first
white marine they encountered. The accused was
the shooter. The second victim was the male
spouse of the paramour of a marine friend. The
accused killed the second victim with a shotgun
blast to the chest.
Walker, Wade L.
Two victims. The accused was a co-perpetrator of
Kenneth Parker in both of his murders. Walker
prevailed upon Parker to kill the spouse of
Walker’s paramour and was part of the group of
marines who participated in the killing of the first
white marine they could seize and kill. The
accused, Walker, was not a trigger person in either
of these murders.
Kreutzer, William J.
Kreutzer fired a rifle on his unit while it was in an
outdoor drill formation on an Army post; the
ambush wounded several others, including at least
one officer.
Quintanilla, Jessie A.
In retaliation for perceived discriminatory
treatment, the accused killed his executive officer
with a shot in the back. The accused also
attempted to kill his commanding officer with a
nearly fatal shot to his chest.
Witt, Andrew
Two victims. Witt stabbed to death an airman and
the airman’s wife after they repeatedly phoned
him, alleging sexual misconduct. Witt also
stabbed but did not kill another airman on the
premises.
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Sentence
1992

D
Crime
Type66
M

1993

M

1993

M

1996

M

1996

M

2005

C
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B
Thumbnail Sketches
Akbar, Hassan K.
Two victims. At night in wartime, the accused
feigned an attack on the unit by rolling live hand
grenades into three tents with sleeping officers and
opened fire as the occupants fled their tents. The
accused killed one officer with a shot in the back.
A second officer died of eighty-seven shrapnel
wounds. The accused injured fourteen other nondecedent military victims.

[Vol. 101
C
Year of
Sentence
2005

D
Crime
Type66
M

In contrast, civilian-style murders involving family and acquaintance
victims67 or stranger victims in felony murders68 pose comparatively little
threat to military discipline and control and the effectiveness of the military
mission. The following research notes provide good examples of strictly
civilian-style murders:
In 1987, to collect a life insurance payment, Joseph Thomas, a 28-year-old field wireman
(Marine Corps E5) with 10 years of military service, along with an accomplice, killed his white
wife with a tire iron. They moved the body into Thomas’ car and drove the car off a cliff and set
it on fire.
Todd Dock, a 19-year-old armor crewman (Army E3) with 3 years of military service, stabbed a

67

In Table 1, Gibbs, Murphy, Turner, Witt, and Thomas exemplify this type of civilianstyle murder.
68
In Table 1, Dock, Loving, and Gray exemplify this type of civilian-style murder.
These de facto distinctions between types of murder since 1984 are reminiscent of traditional
limitations in American and British courts-martial jurisdiction to “military crimes” as
distinguished from “civilian crimes.” A “military crime” in this context is a crime that has a
“reasonably direct and palpable” impact on “good order and military discipline.” WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 723 (2d ed. 1920); see also Robert D. Duke &
Howard S. Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of CourtMartial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REV. 435, 435 (1960). This might include some crimes
that could also be recognized in civilian courts, but if the circumstances in which they
occurred “directly affect military relations and prejudice military discipline” they may be
considered military crimes. WINTHROP, supra at 724. The limitation of jurisdiction to
military crimes followed naturally from the perception that the main function of courtsmartial jurisdiction, including its most severe punishments, was to maintain military
discipline, control, and authority. This rationale was hard to defend when, in 1950, the
jurisdiction of military courts-martial jurisdiction, including the use of the death penalty, was
expanded to cover both military and civilian murders committed anywhere in the world
during both war and peace. The vast bulk of murders committed by military personnel have
no military implications and consequently little relevance to the courts-martial goal of
maintaining military discipline, control, and authority. Highly aggravated homicides with
significant military implications comprise only a small proportion of death-eligible military
murders that have been committed since 1950 and more specifically since 1984.
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German taxi driver in the neck until he lost consciousness. After the cab came to a stop, Dock
dragged the driver’s body from the car. At that point, the driver regained consciousness and
attempted to grab Dock’s arm. Dock then repeatedly stabbed the victim in the abdomen and
chest until he died. Dock stole the victim’s wallet and fled.

Fifty-three percent (8/15) of the cases in Table 1 involve civilian-style
murders that are reminiscent of the civilian-style death-sentenced cases that
immediately antedated the adoption of the 1984 executive order.69
However, since 1990, 86% (6/7) of the death sentences have been imposed
in cases with military implications. These data suggest that since 1990
there has been a de facto presumption against the use of capital punishment
in civilian-style murders. The only death sentence imposed in a civilianstyle murder since 1990 is Witt,70 a brutal two-victim case with five
aggravating factors, which plausibly could overcome this presumption. The
nearly complete absence of death sentencing for civilian-style murder since
1990 is not explained by the absence of highly aggravated civilian murders
since then. Rather, what explains the decline is a substantial shift by
convening authorities and members away from death sentencing in civilianstyle murders.71
C. THE APPELLATE REVIEW PROCESS

The appellate review process following the imposition of a military
death sentence commences with the accused’s request for clemency by the
convening authority, who has complete discretion to reduce both the crime
of conviction and its punishment.72 No comparable authority exists in
civilian courts. Convening authorities disallowed the death sentence in two
of the fifteen death-sentenced cases in this study.
For death sentences approved by the convening authority, appeals lie
to the branch-specific courts of military review, the Court of Appeals of the
Armed Forces (CAAF), and the United States Supreme Court.73 Table 2
classifies appellate outcomes in the fifteen death sentences imposed since
1984 in terms of their risk of execution.
Rows 1 and 2 identify the cases with no continuing risk of execution.
Melvin Turner and Curtis Gibbs in Row 1 are the two cases in which the
convening authority exercised its clemency authority to overturn the death

69

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See Case 14 in Table 1.
71
See Grosso, Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 62, at 609 tbl.3 (documenting the
extreme brutality of many civilian-style murders).
72
Convening authorities also had the power to reduce a life sentence to a term of years
throughout the time period of this study.
73
In addition, the Supreme Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction over CAAF’s
decisions. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2006).
70
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sentence. In Row 2, death was taken off the table for seven accused by an
appellate military court decision, a decision on remand by the convening
authority, or court-martial members in a second capital sentencing hearing.
Table 2
Death-Sentenced Accused Listed by Risk of Execution: United States
Armed Forces, 1984–2005
NO. OF
CASES
1

2

3
4
5

No risk because death sentence was disapproved by
Convening Authority (Turner and Gibbs).
No risk because death sentence was vacated on appeal and
judicial action or a subsequent decision of the convening
authority or members removed the risk of reinstatement
(Curtis, Dock, Kruetzer, Quintanilla, Simoy, Thomas, and
Walker).
Continuing risk because judicial and federal habeas
appeals are not exhausted or death sentence was vacated
subject to reimposition (Akbar, Gray, James Murphy,
Kenneth Parker, and Witt).
High risk because military and civilian direct appeals have
been exhausted (Loving).
Total Cases

2

7

5
1
15

Row 3 identifies five cases with a continuing risk of execution because
military judicial appeals have not been exhausted, the case is in federal
habeas corpus proceedings, or the death sentence was vacated subject to
reimposition. Row 4 identifies one accused with a high risk of execution
because he has exhausted his military and direct appeals to the United
States Supreme Court.74
74
Gray v. United States, 532 U.S. 919 (order denying cert.), reh’g denied, 532 U.S. 1035
(2001); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). President George Bush approved
Ronald Gray’s death penalty on July 28, 2008, as required under the UCMJ. 10 U.S.C.
§ 871(a) (requiring that a death sentence be approved by the President before execution).
This decision exhausted Gray’s direct appeals and allowed him to initiate habeas corpus
proceedings in federal courts. See Steven Lee Myers, Execution by Military Is Approved by
President, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A13. However, before Gray filed his first federal
habeas petition, the Secretary of the Army scheduled an execution date for early December
2008. Gray then sought and obtained a stay of his execution in federal court with leave to
file his first habeas petition, which he subsequently did. See Execution Stayed for Ex-Soldier
Who
Murdered
Women,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
2,
2008,
2:35
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-12-02-execution-stay_N.htm.
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III. METHODOLOGY
This Part presents the methodology supporting the substantive racial
findings presented in Parts IV through VI of this Article.
A. THE UNIVERSE AND SAMPLE

The universe of death-eligible cases between 1984 and 2005 is
indeterminate because no branch of the military maintains a record of the
death-eligible cases processed through its courts, and no military authority
is responsible for tracking such information throughout the system.75 To
identify death-eligible cases we conducted an exhaustive search of every
identified data source with information on military homicides.
1. Identifying Potentially Death-Eligible Cases
The first step was to search for the names of all accused who were
prosecuted in the military criminal justice system and convicted of a
homicide whose cases may have been factually death-eligible. For this
purpose, we consulted all reported military court homicide decisions,
appellate briefs of counsel in capital military appeals since 1985, a list of all
offenders incarcerated for homicide at Fort Leavenworth as of June 2004,
all Army homicide convictions from 1986 to 2004 maintained by the Army,
and all Army unreported homicide decisions from 1984 to 2004. We also
screened the Army Times, Navy Times, Marine Corps Times, and Air Force
Times since 1984 for the names of accused in reported homicides. Finally,
the judge advocates with whom we have had contact during the course of
this research brought to our attention several cases based on their personal
experiences. This search produced a master list of 440 homicide cases.
2. Collecting Data to Assess the Death Eligibility of Accused in Homicide
Cases
The second step in our search for death-eligible cases was to obtain
sufficient information on each homicide on our master list to determine the
likelihood that the accused was death-eligible. We sought access to the
complete military file for each case we deemed likely death-eligible and
consulted judicial opinions concerning the accused and their coperpetrators. We also obtained the full files of co-perpetrators (where
appropriate) and media reports of the accused’s crimes through extensive
online searches.
To bring a case into the study, our standard was “factual” death
75

The closest approximation to such information is a record maintained by the Army of
its murder cases that advanced to a capital court-martial.
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eligibility. This required strong evidence that (a) a case that was not
capitally charged would, if it had been so charged, have supported a
conviction of capital murder and a finding of one or more aggravating
factors in the case, and (b) both of these findings would have been sustained
on appeal if the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the death eligibility
of the case had been challenged. We limited the application of this rule by
what we describe as the “controlling fact finding” rule. This rule holds that
if a case advances to a court-martial on a capital murder charge but the
members find the accused not guilty of the capital offense, the case will not
be viewed as death-eligible, even though the evidence would have
supported a capital murder conviction on appeal had the members returned
a unanimous capital murder verdict. Unless the decision of acquittal on the
capital charge appears to have been a clear case of member nullification
(and we found no such case), we treated such a judgment as a factual
finding that the elements of death-eligible murder were not present in the
case.
We identified eight cases that appeared to be factually death-eligible in
the eyes of the convening authority where the defendants were charged with
capital murder, but the members acquitted on the capital charge and instead
found liability for a lesser-included non-capital form of murder or
manslaughter.76 Because we saw no evidence of jury nullification in those
cases, they were excluded from the portion of the study that focused on the
death-sentencing outcomes. However, we included these cases in our
analysis of convening authorities’ charging decisions.77 For those analyses,
therefore, our sample of cases included 105 cases.
We excluded one factually death-eligible case that was committed
abroad in a country that would not surrender custody of the accused until
the United States agreed that the case would not be referred capitally. 78 We
76
For example, five were found guilty of non-capital murder under Article 118(2) of the
UCMJ (Burkes, Chrisco, Groveman, Shelton, and Tarver). 10 U.S.C. § 918(2). There are
eleven other cases in the study that might have been implicated by the controlling factfinding rule. In these cases, the members found the accused guilty of capital murder under
Article 118(1), but the guilt finding was not unanimous and lack of unanimity precludes a
death sentence. 10 U.S.C. § 918(1). We decided, for the purposes of this study, that the
capital murder conviction distinguishes these cases from those convicted of lesser offenses
and supports a finding of death eligibility.
77
Four of the eight cases (Burkes, Chrisco, Hamilton, and Tarver) advanced to a guilt
trial with the government seeking a death sentence.
78
United States v. Youngberg, 38 M.J. 635 (A.C.M.R. 1993), aff’d, 43 M.J. 379
(C.A.A.F. 1995) (finding that the German authorities refused to release jurisdiction of
Lawrence Youngberg until the death penalty was waived in writing); see generally Kathryn
F. King, The Death Penalty, Extradition, and the War Against Terrorism: U.S. Responses to
European Opinion About Capital Punishment, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 161 (2003)
(discussing Youngberg); John E. Parkerson, Jr. & Carolyn S. Stoehr, The U.S. Military Death
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also excluded approximately four cases that, on the basis of news reports,
appeared likely to be factually death-eligible under military law, because
the military authorities deferred to the jurisdiction of civilian authorities
who sought to prosecute them. All of these crimes were committed off the
accused’s military facility, had no military implications, and normally were
sufficiently aggravated to attract substantial attention in the civilian
community in which they were prosecuted.79 Because none of these cases
resulted in a criminal prosecution by U.S. military officials, they were
excluded from our sample of death-eligible cases.80
Appellate courts vacated three of the death sentences in our sample on
appeal, and convening authorities then prosecuted the cases a second time.
Because of the first prosecution and death sentence, there is legitimate
concern about the independence of the second charging decision.81 Due to
our small sample size, we included these three cases in our primary
analyses of charging decisions. We replicated the final analysis without
these three cases, and their elimination had no impact on the results.

Penalty in Europe: Threats from Recent European Human Rights Developments, 129 MIL. L.
REV. 41 (1990) (same).
79
For example, Sgt. Cedric Ramon Griffin, the only one of four Fort Bragg soldiers
accused of killing their wives in less than six weeks who did not commit suicide, was
prosecuted in state court. These murders garnered widespread national attention. News
Breaks: Bragg Sergeant Indicted in Stabbing, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at 5, available at
http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/0-ARMYPAPER-1443024.php; see Jane McHugh,
Emotional Wounds Still Raw One Year After Bragg Slayings, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003, at
18 (discussing a widely reported series of spousal murders at Ft. Bragg in North Carolina
and noting that Cedric Ramon Griffin, a cook with the U.S. Army XVIII Airborne Corps,
was being prosecuted by the Cumberland County district attorney for stabbing his estranged
wife, Marilyn, fifty times and then dousing her with a flammable liquid and setting her on
fire); David Enders, Convicted Killer Sentenced in 3 More, S. BEND TRIB., July 4, 2001, at
D4 (reporting that Navy sailor John Eric Armstrong was convicted in state court of killing at
least five prostitutes); Navy Man Pleads Not Guilty in Deaths, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at
B2 (noting that Sailor Eric Charles Lockhart was prosecuted in state court for the murder of
two prostitutes in San Diego on June 20, 1992); Glenn Smith, Killer Gardner Executed,
CHARLESTON POST & COURIER (Dec. 6, 2008), http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2008/
dec/06/killer_gardner_executed64233/ (reporting that on December 5, 2008, South Carolina
executed a sailor for the 1992 rape, torture, and murder of a twenty-five-year-old woman);
Ian Urbina, Retired F.B.I. Agents Join Cause of 4 Sailors Convicted in ’97 Rape-Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at A14 (discussing state prosecution of four sailors for rape and
murder).
80
If one views the civilian-style murder cases in which prosecution was waived by the
military to civilian courts to be considered part of our universe of death-eligible cases, we
have no basis for believing that our eighty-five case sample of civilian-style cases that were
actually prosecuted by the military is not a random sample of the entire universe of civilianstyle death-eligible cases.
81
In two of the cases, Turner and Gibbs, the convening authority waived the death
penalty in a pretrial agreement in the early stages of the second prosecution.
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Additionally, because military sentencing is done by court-martial
members, there is little or no risk of a lack of independence in their
decisions. For this reason, we included the second prosecution in one case82
in our analysis of the imposition of death sentences in capital sentencing
hearings.
Our final sample consisted of ninety-seven death-eligible cases, thirty
of which advanced to a capital sentencing hearing; of these, fifteen resulted
in a death sentence. Eighty of the ninety-seven death-eligible cases
involved one or more white victims.83
3. Data Collection and Entry
For every case identified as death-eligible and included in the study,
we sought access to the accused’s full file from the National Records Center
in Suitland, Maryland. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps judge advocates
facilitated this effort and permitted our interns to copy relevant portions of
the files in their offices in Washington, D.C. Air Force judge advocates
facilitated our access to their files through the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). Without the support of these officers, for which we are grateful,
we could not have conducted this study.
For each full case file that we accessed, law student interns in the
District of Columbia copied the relevant portions of the case files. This
copying process was directed by a protocol prepared by the investigators of
this study. Moreover, the investigators trained the interns who did the
copying in Washington, D.C., at the outset of their internships. They also
received long-term on-the-job training from the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps judge advocates in whose offices they copied the cases. For the Air
Force cases that were copied through our FOIA request, we submitted the
same copying guidelines for the personnel copying the cases.
We could not locate full files for certain cases at the National Records
Center or otherwise. For those cases, we relied on the information found in
military judicial opinions and the information that we could find online in
the media, including military newspapers, such as the Army Times, and
local newspapers. Law students at the University of Iowa College of Law
coded the data on each case into a fifty-three-page detailed data collection
instrument (DCI) prepared by the investigators.84 This process produced a
82

Dock.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction between the 105
“potentially death-eligible” case sample and 97 “factually death-eligible” case sample); infra
note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of sample size issues in this
study).
84
Copies of the Data Collection Instrument (DCI) are available from the authors upon
request.
83
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machine-readable database for all of the cases in the study. With this
information, we created recoded variables that are suitable for statistical
analysis. Appendix A reports the distribution of our data for each of these
recoded variables for each of the ninety-seven death-eligible cases in our
sample. The coders also prepared a detailed narrative summary of each
case.
B. ANALYSIS

This Section provides details on each method of analysis and each
measure of culpability used in the study.
1. Overview
We estimated racial disparities in the imposition of death sentences
among all death-eligible cases. We then focused separately on (1)
convening authority decisions advancing cases to a capital court-martial, (2)
members’ unanimous capital murder convictions advancing cases to a
capital sentencing hearing, and (3) members’ death-sentencing decisions in
capital sentencing hearings. All of these decisions combine to produce the
racial disparities documented in the first step, the threshold analysis of
death sentencing among all death-eligible cases. The threshold analysis
considers only whether a case ultimately received a death sentence.
2. Unadjusted Disparities
We commenced each phase of the analysis with estimates of
unadjusted racial disparities that take no account of the differential
culpability levels of the accused. These analyses focus on minority-accused
disparities, white-victim disparities, and minority-accused/white-victim
disparities.85
3. Adjusted Disparities
We principally used three different methods to control for the
culpability of cases: logistic regression, a regression-based scale, and a
salient factors scale. This section explains these three alternative measures
of offender culpability.
i. Logistic Regression Analysis
For each stage in the analysis, our first set of controls was a logistic
regression model based on legitimate non-racial variables and race
85

The unadjusted disparities at various points in the system are reported in Figures 2 and
3, and in Column C of Tables 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 12.
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variables.86 At each stage, we considered a large number of candidate
variables for inclusion in the model. In screening variables for inclusion,
our goal was to produce a legally acceptable model to verify whether any
unadjusted racial disparities persisted, declined, or disappeared upon
adjustment for measures of criminal culpability.87
These models document the linear effect of each variable, meaning the
enhanced or diminished probability that, on average, the applicable
charging or sentencing outcome will occur when a variable is present in the

86
We developed three core models that focus on specific outcomes. The first model
(Table 4) focused on death-sentencing outcomes among all death-eligible cases. The second
model (Table 6) focused on the decisions of convening authorities advancing death-eligible
cases to a capital court-martial with the government seeking a death sentence. The third
model (Table 10) focused on the advancement of death-eligible cases to a capital sentencing
hearing, an outcome that is the product of convening authority charging decisions and
members’ court-martial guilt decisions. For the first two models, we commenced the
analysis with a four-variable, legally coherent “threshold” model informed by what we
learned in a quantitative analysis of the statutory aggravating factors, a close reading of
narrative summaries of each case, and the perceptions of judge advocates. For each analysis
the point of departure was a model consisting of the number of statutory aggravating factors,
multiple victims, great danger to non-decedent victims, and an accused/victim relationship
salient factor. We then produced an index that, for each case, carried the information on the
four threshold variables. With this in place, we screened hundreds of additional candidate
variables, listed in Appendix A, for possible entry into the core model. For this purpose, we
conducted a partial correlation analysis, which controlled for the index, and screened the
candidate variables to identify any that demonstrated a statistical relationship with the
outcome variable at the .10 level or beyond after controlling for the index. For the deathsentencing screen, we identified eleven variables that met this test, and for the analysis of the
convening authority decisions, we identified thirty-three such variables. In this process, we
limited consideration of race-neutral candidate variables to those whose impact was in the
expected direction, i.e., aggravating factors that increased the likelihood of an adverse
outcome and mitigating factors that reduced the likelihood of an adverse outcome. We then
entered the candidate variables that met this test along with the four variables included in the
threshold index into a stepwise regression analysis to identify the variables that continued to
show a significant relationship with the outcome variable at the .15 level or beyond after
controlling for the other variables in the model. For the third model, which focused on the
advancement of cases to a capital sentencing hearing, we started with the variables contained
in the first two models and screened the database for additional variables that could enter the
model with a p value of .10 and could remain in the analysis at the .15 level. For our
analysis of the members’ thirty capital sentencing decisions, we used the model estimated for
death sentencing among all death-eligible cases to control for accused culpability.
87
See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Empirical Studies of Race and Geographic
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key
Methodological Issues, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 153, 174–75 (Charles
S. Lanier, William J. Bowers & James R. Acker eds., 2009) (stating that the variable
screening process “should be viewed as a method of verifying whether racial and/or
geographic disparities derived from models selected a priori on the basis of the law of the
jurisdiction . . . are not accounted for by other variables”). We consider this subject further
below. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.

2012]

RACE AND THE MILITARY DEATH PENALTY

1255

case, after controlling for all other variables in the model.88 For example,
our core analysis of death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases
indicates that, on average, accused in multiple-victim cases had an adjusted
18-percentage-point higher probability of being sentenced to death than
accused in single-victim cases.89
Logistic regression analysis produces another measure of impact
estimating the extent to which the presence of individual case
characteristics enhance or diminish the odds rather than the probability that
a given outcome will occur. For example, in the multiple-victim analysis
noted above, the adjusted 8.3 “odds ratio” or “odds multiplier” estimated
that, on average, the odds of a death sentence being imposed were 8.3 times
higher in multiple-victim cases than they were in single-victim cases. We
also report the odds ratios.90
ii. Regression-Based Scale
On the basis of these logistic regression results, we created our second
culpability measure—three five-level scales.91 Although these scales are
88

In this procedure, we used the fully specified regression models to estimate a
“culpability index” that reflected the probability (denoted p-hat, or ̂ ) of an adverse outcome
on the basis of “race purged” legitimate variables for each member of the relevant racial
subgroups. We took three steps to purge the index of race effects. First, we estimated the
models with both racial and race-neutral variables included in the model. Second, we
omitted the coefficients for the race variables in the construction of the culpability index.
However, we used coefficients for the race-neutral variables that had been estimated in a
model that included the race variables. This assures that the race-neutral variables will have
no indirect racial effect on the index if they are highly correlated with the race variables.
On the basis of this culpability index, the average estimated probability of a death
sentence was 23% for minority accused, while the average estimated rate for white accused
was 11%. These predictions for each racially defined group of cases are known as
“standardized” estimates because they have been adjusted to account for the culpability level
of each case as determined by the culpability index produced by the regression analysis. The
12-point difference between the standardized estimates for the two groups (23% compared to
11%) is the “adjusted” linear racial disparity based on the race of the accused.
89
The adjusted linear race effects for four models are reported in Column C of Tables 4,
6, 8, and 10. They are also reported in Column D of Tables 3, 5, 9, 11, and 12.
90
The odds multipliers for our three core models are reported in Column D of Tables 3,
5, and 9. Because many readers lack familiarity with odds-based disparities, in this Article
we rely principally on the linear-based measures of impact estimated in logistic regression
analyses and secondarily on odds multipliers.
91
The scaling process begins with the culpability index produced by the logistic model
mentioned above. We sorted the cases into five levels based on the culpability index score
estimated for each case. We then estimated a racial disparity within each cell and combined
those disparities to compute a weighted average of the disparities across all of the cells.
Mantel–Haentzel is the procedure we use to create these overall estimates. See Nathan
Mantel & William Haenszel, Statistical Aspects of the Analysis of Data from Retrospective
Studies of Disease, 22 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 719 (1959) (establishing this methodology).
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substantially based on regression results, the process by which race effects
are estimated with these scales is more transparent than the regression
analysis. Also, the validity of the estimated disparities is more verifiable
through close analysis of the facts of the cases that we define as similar in
terms of accused culpability. Each of these scales discriminates well in
predicting charging and sentencing outcomes.92
iii. Salient Factors Scale
Our third measure of accused culpability is a six-level scale based on
three salient case factors that bear on offender culpability.93 This
The assumption that the cases in each cell are comparable can be tested by qualitative
assessments of the facts of the cases in each cell. If misclassifications are detected they can
be corrected with the estimation procedure repeated to see if the “corrections” make a
difference in the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated racial disparities.
92
For the scale based on the imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible
cases, the death-sentencing rate among the two least aggravated levels of the scale was 0%
(0/42) and for the two most aggravated levels on the scale the rate was 42% (14/34). For the
scale based on the advancement of cases to a capital court-martial, the advancement rate was
0% (0/23), 13% (3/23) for the two least aggravated case categories, and 71% (15/21) and
100% (18/18) for the two most aggravated case categories. For the advancement of cases to
a capital sentencing hearing the scale rates ranged from 5% (1/20) for the least aggravated
cases to 83% (15/18) for the most aggravated cases.
93
We created three salient-factor-based measures designed to capture what we perceive
to be military perceptions of criminal culpability based on the statistical evidence, discussion
with military officers, and our reading of the narrative summaries and records of the cases
and their charging and sentencing outcomes. We describe them as (1) the vileness factor, (2)
the accused/victim relationship factor, and (3) the high aggravation factor.
The vileness salient factor has three levels: low, medium, and high. The default is
low. An offender receives a medium classification if the case involves a rape, robbery,
sodomy, or burglary, or a racial animosity motive. If, in addition to a homicide, a case
involves multiple victims, an ambush, or a serious threat of death or bodily injury to nondecedent victims, then the case receives a high classification. For the purpose of creating the
six-level overall measure, the three levels are scored 0, 1, 2.
The accused/victim relationship salient factor has three levels—(1) victim is a family
member or acquaintance of the accused, (2) victim is a stranger to the accused, and (3) the
victim is a military police or commissioned officer. The third category is broader than the
aggravating factor based on an officer victim because it includes officer-victim cases
whether or not they were acting in the execution of their office. The data and the opinions of
officers with whom we have spoken suggest that killing an officer is a highly aggravated
military offense whether or not the officer is acting in the “execution” of his or her office.
For the purpose of creating the six-level overall scale three levels of this factor are also
scored 0, 1, 2.
The third salient factor distinguishes between cases with a single statutory aggravating
factor and multiple aggravating factors. For the purpose of creating the six-level overall
scale, the two levels of this salient factor are scored 0 and 1.
The six-level salient factors scale is based on the sum of the scores for the three salient
factors. The procedure for creating the scale is modeled after one based on three comparable
salient-factor variables developed by Arnold Barnett with Georgia data from the 1970s.
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culpability measure is completely independent of the regression results. It
also lends itself to validation through qualitative assessments of the cases
deemed to be comparable by the procedure.94 The measure also
discriminates very well in explaining charging and sentencing outcomes.95
Our assessment of the risk of systemic race effects overall and at each
stage of the process depends on the magnitude, statistical significance, and
consistency of the estimated racial disparities. Particularly important in this
regard is the consistency of the disparities estimated with controls for the
salient factors scale and the disparities estimated with controls for the two
regression-based measures of criminal culpability.96
4. Other Approaches
We conducted a comparable analysis of death-sentencing disparities
among the sixteen multiple-victim cases in the database, which have an
unusually high death-sentencing rate (50%) and account for 53% (8/15) of
the death sentences imposed since 1984.97 In this analysis, we applied an
additional measure of offender culpability based on the qualitative
assessments of five law students who analyzed the comparative culpability
of the sixteen multiple-victim cases.98
We also conducted case-specific quantitative and qualitative analyses,
in which we assessed the risk of racial prejudice in the ten minority-accused
cases that resulted in a death sentence. This analysis is based on an analysis
of charging and sentencing outcomes in cases with levels of criminality that
are comparable to each death-sentenced minority defendant.99 Finally, we
estimated race effects in sentencing outcomes among the sixty-six deatheligible cases that did not advance to a capital sentencing hearing as a basis
for comparing those racial effects with the racial effects documented among
the cases that did advance to a capital sentencing hearing.100
BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI, supra note 41, at 94–95, 575–77.
94
We produced the overall racial estimate with this measure by computing a weighted
average of racial disparities across the six levels of this scale in exactly the same way that we
apply the five-level regression-based scales.
95
The death-sentencing rate among the cases in the two least aggravated categories was
6% (3/47), although it was 50% (4/8) and 80% (4/5) respectively in the two most aggravated
case categories of cases.
96
In Tables 5, 9, 11, and 12, the disparities estimated with the regression-based
coefficients and scale are reported in Columns D and E and the disparities based on the
salient-factors scale are reported in Column F.
97
The results of the multiple-victim analysis are presented in Part IV.G.
98
The procedure is described in more detail later in the Article. See infra text
accompanying note 173.
99
The results of this analysis are presented in Part V.
100
In this analysis, reported in Part VI, we first estimated racial disparities in the
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We conducted generally accepted diagnostics for the six logistic
multiple-regression models that are the centerpiece of our analysis of racial
disparities. If a regression diagnostic suggested a possible problem, we
took corrective measures to determine if the suggested modification
affected the magnitude and statistical significance of our core findings.101
5. Methodological Issues
In this Section we consider methodological issues that may be of
interest to social science methodologists and statisticians.
i. Adjustment and Modeling
The first issue concerns the importance of adjusting the unadjusted
racial disparities that we estimate in this Article with multivariate statistical
analyses that control for offender culpability. We agree with Professor
John Tukey’s argument in an influential paper102 addressed to professional
statisticians that in an observational study, which focused on the impact of
an anesthetic (halothane) on surgical mortality rates, “adjusting for a variety
of covariates was essential. Otherwise, the results of the analysis [of
anesthetics] might have been dominated by the practices of
anesthesiologists, rather than by the effects of different anesthetics. Here
defense is not at all a casual matter: it is vital.”103 Similar concerns
convinced us of the importance of adjusting all of our important racial
disparities for the criminal culpability of the accused involved in each
analysis.
The second issue concerns the behavioral accuracy of the models and
measures of offender culpability on which we based our adjusted racial
disparities. In this regard, it is important to recognize that we are not
attempting to construct a behaviorally correct model of the military
charging and sentencing system. Instead we are investigating the simpler
question of whether unadjusted racial disparities can be explained away by
sentences of life imprisonment versus a term of years. Among those sentenced to a term of
years, we estimated racial disparities in the length of those sentences.
101
A typical diagnostic recommendation is that the removal of certain cases from the
analysis would improve the “fit” of the model. Adjustments of this type based on the
extensive diagnostics that we conducted had no material effects on our substantive findings.
102
John W. Tukey, Use of Many Covariates in Clinical Trials, 59 INT’L STAT. REV. 123
(1991). One example mentioned in this paper is the 1969 National Halothane Study, which
investigated the disparity in death rates between patients receiving the anesthetic halothane
and those receiving other forms of anesthesia.
103
Id. at 133. At another point Tukey states: “The main purpose of allowing for
covariates [in the halothane study] . . . is defensive: to make it clear that analysis has met its
scientific obligations . . . . If we must lose some sensitivity, so be it.” Id. at 136.
“Sensitivity” here means a small margin of error. Id. at 131.
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the presence or absence of some combination(s) of legally relevant,
legitimate case characteristics.104
With respect to adjustment methodology, Tukey urges restraint, but
not abstention, in using regression methods for statistical adjustment.105 He
also strongly recommends using composite covariates as a complement to
and a check on regression methods, advice we endorse and have followed in
the analysis reported in this paper. Tukey proposed two broad methods for
constructing such composites: weighted sums and “smear and sweep.”106
We used weighted sums.107
ii. The Identification of Non-Racial Control Variables to Include in the
Logistic Regression Analysis
In addition to meeting potential statistical challenges, we believe that
capital charging and sentencing studies must also meet standards of legal
acceptability.108 In our screening of candidate variables for inclusion in the
logistic regression models and the creation of our salient factors scale, we
did two things to meet this requirement. First, we based the foundations of
the culpability measures on legally mandated case characteristics. We also
constructed a composite that we call the “salient factors scale,” based
entirely on statutory relevance and expert knowledge of how the charging
and sentencing system does and should operate.109
Second, experience indicates that exclusive reliance on tests of
statistical significance as a basis for screening variables for inclusion in
regression models can produce erroneous substantive results.110 With this
104

Baldus et al., supra note 87. The following two quotes from Tukey are of particular
relevance to this issue: “There is no sense in which such a composite need be supposed to be
‘correct’ when it is used for adjustment. We are not using regression to help reveal
behavior (still less to reveal mechanism)! We are using it for adjustment . . . .” Tukey,
supra note 102, at 129. “[W]e are likely to be able to find a very useful composite without
coming close . . . to the truly behavior-describing composite.” Id. at 131 (emphasis omitted).
105
Tukey, supra note 102, at 127–28.
106
Id. at 132–36.
107
Tukey mainly discusses binary covariates representing the presence or absence of a
case characteristic. For these he suggested giving the presence of a characteristic a “score,”
or “weight,” in the range -4 to +4, with the weight derived from the p-value of that
characteristic as a predictor of the outcome variable. Our “regression-based” composite
measure is based on a very similar method. Id. at 124.
108
The theme of “sociological” acceptability in the creation of logistic regression models
is developed in Adrian E. Raftery, Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research, 25 SOC.
METHODOLOGY 111, 157 (1995) (“Theory is essential and should be used to the greatest
extent possible to define the model to be used.”).
109
See supra text accompanying note 93.
110
Raftery, supra note 108, at 155–56 (“When there are many candidate independent
variables, standard model selection procedures [based strictly on p-value assessments] are
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in mind, we assessed candidate variables not only on the basis of their
impact on the goodness of fit of the models, but also on the basis of our a
priori understanding of military law and how the system should operate and
did operate in fact. So guided, we rejected candidate variables that were
statistically significant in the model but had a “perverse” sign (e.g., a
statutory aggravating circumstance with a negative sign suggesting that it
had a mitigating effect in the system) and included some statistically
insignificant variables whose effect was substantial and consistent with
theory.111
iii. Sample Size Limitations on the Number of Control Variables Included
in the Logistic Regression Analysis
Although our sample includes the entire universe of death-eligible
cases prosecuted in the Armed Forces during the period of our study, the
total sample (n = 97) is small compared to similar studies of state court
capital charging and sentencing. Also, death sentences were imposed in
only fifteen (15%) of the cases, and the estimated race-of-victim effects are
based on a sample of only seventeen (17%) non-white-victim cases.
The small number of military death sentences imposes limits on the
number of racial and non-racial variables (covariates) that may be included
in a logistic regression analysis. Professor Tukey reports a broad spectrum
of opinion among statisticians, from “optimist” to “pessimist” in terms of
the number of covariates that may be included in a logistic regression
model. He summarizes this opinion to the effect that each additional
covariate added to a regression model in effect reduces the “equivalent
number of rarer endpoints” by from “one or two” to “at least 10 rarer end
points for each parameter fitted.”112 In our military study, the “rare
endpoint” is the more punitive outcome at each decision point.113 Thus,
under the two “rare endpoints” test per covariate, the appropriate number of
explanatory variables for our model of death sentences imposed among all
death-eligible cases would be 7.5 (15/2). We share these concerns and, in
the construction of our regression models, strived to follow the guidelines
referred to by Tukey. In those models, the ratio of death sentences to

misleading and tend to find strong evidence for effects that do not exist.”).
111
See Table 4 (number of statutory aggravating circumstances found or present in the
case), Table 6 (accused hid a dying victim), Table 8 (defense of self or other invoked by the
accused), and Table 10 (murder had military implications).
112
Tukey, supra note 102, at 124.
113
In particular, the rarer endpoints are: (1) fifteen death sentences imposed among all
ninety-seven death-eligible cases, and (2) among these death-eligible cases, thirty advanced
to a capital sentencing hearing.
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covariates ranged from 1.9 to 5.2.114 Because our models fall on the low
end of the guidelines accepted by statisticians, we place particular weight
on our composite culpability scales, one of which—the salient factors
scale—is completely independent of multiple regression results.
The comparatively small number of non-white-victim cases (n = 17)
also affects the number of non-racial explanatory variables that may be
included in a multiple regression analysis with the white-victim variable
included. The potential of the non-racial variables (covariates) to explain
away the white-victim effect has the same implications for the total number
of variables included in the model as the capacity of the model to predict an
outcome variable with a small number of adverse outcomes, such as the
imposition of capital punishment. The same concern applies to the
application of our offender-culpability scales to the extent they could
explain away the race-of-victim effect.115 Therefore, statistical practice, as
reported by Tukey, suggests at a minimum no more than one non-racial
explanatory variable per two non-white-victim cases, a test all of our
regression models met.
The effect of the unbalanced distribution of non-white-victim cases is
to increase the standard deviation (margin of error) of the racial disparity
estimate. However, this is not a hidden flaw because the increased standard
deviation announces itself through the level of statistical significance (p
value) reported for the white-victim disparity. The magnitude of the
p value for the race-of-victim effect bears directly on the strength of the
evidence that the race of victim is a factor in the relevant charging and
sentencing decisions.
IV. EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMIC RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL CHARGING
AND SENTENCING DECISIONS
In our analysis of racial disparities in the system, we focus first on
evidence of systemic race disparities in the imposition of death sentences
among all death-eligible cases. This is a disparate treatment inquiry, in
which the focus is on evidence of a pattern and practice of purposeful

114
Specifically for our model of death sentencing among all death-eligible cases (Table
4), the ratio of death sentences to parameters fitted was 1.9 (15/8). For the model of
charging decisions (Table 6), the ratio was 4.4 (41/10); for the model of unanimous guilt trial
verdicts (Table 8), the ratio was 5.0 (30/6); and for the advancement of cases to a capital
sentencing hearing (Table 10), the ratio was 3.3 (30/9).
115
This would occur under a culpability scale if, at each level of the scale, the white- and
non-white-victim cases were treated the same or there were only white- or only non-whitevictim cases at each level of the scale. In fact, this did not occur for our three culpability
scales, with the exception of one level of the six-level salient-factors scale that contained a
total of five cases but no non-white-victim cases.
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differential treatment of similarly situated accused. There is no suggestion
here that any participant in the military criminal justice system consciously
and knowingly discriminated on the basis of the race of the accused or the
victim. However, there is substantial evidence that many actors in the U.S.
criminal justice system are unconsciously influenced by the race of
defendants and their victims.116
Although the mechanism by which unconscious discrimination affects
capital changing and sentencing outcomes is not fully understood, Justice
Byron White in Turner v. Murray expounded one theory with particular
relevance to this research.117 His argument is straightforward: the risk of
racial prejudice against black and minority defendants in capital cases is
substantially enhanced when the victim is white and the case is highly
aggravated.118
116

We define purposeful discrimination in this study as the differential treatment of
similarly situated defendants that cannot be explained by race-neutral case characteristics.
The literature suggests that these racial disparities are the product of stereotypes and other
racially based preconceptions that unconsciously influence decisionmaking. See Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988);
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Racial
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 201 (2001); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom:
Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1367 (2000). Unconscious racial discrimination is also recognized in the courts. For
example, in a memorandum prepared for the other members of the United States Supreme
Court in connection with McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), Justice Scalia refers to
the “unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial” on
prosecutorial and jury decisionmaking. David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A.
Pulaski, Jr., Reflections on the “Inevitability” of Racial Discrimination in Capital
Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 359, 371 n.46 (1994) (emphasis added).
117
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
118
Id. at 35. In Justice White’s view, racial bias in such cases takes two forms. First, it
can inflate aggravation—by erroneously and improperly increasing the risk that a fact-finder
will find that a defendant was more culpable than was factually the case. Second, it can
deflate mitigation—by erroneously and improperly decreasing the weight that a fact-finder
places on the mitigation that is factually present in the case. Id. This form of bias is
consistent with stereotypical perceptions of minorities, such as the violence-prone and
moral-inferiority stereotypes mentioned by Justice White. The second form of bias
(deflating mitigation) is also consistent with stereotypical perceptions of minorities, whereby
the race of the defendant and victim may affect the empathy of fact-finders toward each.
Moreover, Caucasian charging and sentencing authorities may be more likely to identify
sympathetically with white defendants than with black defendants and to identify more
strongly with white victims than with black victims, thereby producing a more punitive
response in the white-victim cases. See CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN 205 (2005)
(explaining that in experiments conducted by the author and colleagues, student jurors
“rendered significantly more death sentences if the defendant was African American and if
his victim was white. When we tried to determine how and why this occurred by asking
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At each stage of our analysis of racial disparities, we first consider
“unadjusted” disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes that ignore
differential levels of accused criminal culpability. When such disparities
appear, we test two rival hypotheses. The first is that the disparity is a
product of chance operating in a race-neutral system. We test the
plausibility of this hypothesis by measuring the disparity’s statistical
significance, which indicates the probability that the documented race effect
could arise by chance in a race-neutral system.
Because our sample includes virtually all death-eligible cases
prosecuted in the system between 1984 and 2005, some may argue that the
study includes the “universe” and therefore that tests of statistical
significance are irrelevant. From this perspective, the only relevant
consideration is the magnitude of the racial disparities. We agree that
statistical tests are less important when the database includes the universe of
cases than when the database is a random or stratified sample of a clearly
defined universe. However, we view the military cases that provide the
basis for this study as a sample of the operation of the military system over
time or as a sample of cases that could have been prosecuted during the
relevant time period.119 We also believe that highly discretionary
decisionmaking in a military criminal justice system is subject to random
and unpredictable impacts whose potential effects can be assessed with tests
of statistical significance. For both these reasons, we believe that tests of
statistical significance provide important evidence in assessing racial
disparities. However, we reject the view that disparities that do not meet a
.05 or .10 level of statistical significance are irrelevant. In studies such as
this, involving the universe of cases during a prescribed period of time,
causal inference should be based on both the magnitude of the estimated
effects and their statistical significance.
The second rival hypothesis is that the race disparity in the treatment
of racially defined groups of cases is the product of differential culpability
levels in different cases rather than the race of the accused and their victims.
To test this hypothesis, we compute adjusted racial disparities that control
participants in each condition to explain their sentencing decisions, we found that white
participants interpreted aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently as a function of
the racial characteristics of the case. In particular, they tended to weigh aggravating
circumstances more heavily when the defendant was African American. Similarly, they
were reluctant to attach much significance at all to mitigating circumstances when they were
offered on behalf of an African American defendant.”). We test the plausibility of this
theory in the military system in our analysis of sixteen multiple-victim cases presented in
Section G of this Part.
119
See RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVE L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION § 2.06 (2010). Federal courts generally apply statistical tests in assessing
disparities based on the “universe” of cases.
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for the comparative levels of accused culpability and deathworthiness
among the cases in each analysis.
A. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH SENTENCES
AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES

This Section presents our analysis of what we have called the
“threshold inquiry,” death sentencing among all death-eligible cases. This
analysis considers the combined impact of all decisionmaking as reflected
in the imposition of a death sentence.
1. Unadjusted Racial Disparities
Figures 2 and 3 present an overview of potential race effects as the
cases advance through the system. They document at successive stages in
the process the representation rates for each subset of cases, meaning the
proportions of minority-accused, white-victim cases, and minorityaccused/white-victim cases at each stage of the process.120 For example,
Part I of Figure 2 indicates that minorities comprised 41% of the accused in
all death-eligible cases (Column B), while they comprised 67% of the
fifteen death-sentenced offenders (Column E). This 26-point difference in
representation rates (reported between Column B and E) indicates that as
they move through the different stages of the charging and sentencing
process, which are indicated in Columns C through E, minority accused
face a higher risk of unfavorable outcomes than do white accused. Part II,
which focuses on white-victim disparities, reports a smaller 11-percentagepoint disparity between Columns B and E. In contrast, Part III reports a
substantial 34-percentage-point minority-accused/white-victim disparity. A
comparison of the 26-point minority-accused disparity reported in Part I
and the 11-point white-victim disparity reported in Part II suggests that the
34-point minority-accused/white-victim disparity reported in Part III is
principally the product of the 26-point minority-accused disparity reported
in Part I.

120

A “representation rate” is the proportion or percentage of a population with a given
characteristic that has received a favorable or unfavorable outcome, e.g., minorities account
for 67% (10/15) of death-sentenced accused in this study. In contrast, a “selection rate”
indicates the proportion of a defined subpopulation that receives a favorable or unfavorable
outcome, e.g., 26% (10/39) of death-eligible minorities in this study were sentenced to death.
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Figure 2
Evidence of Racial Disparities in Capital Charging and Sentencing
Among All Death-Eligible Cases: U.S. Armed Forces, 1984–2005121

Three items in Figures 2 and 3 should be underscored. First, of the
thirty cases that advanced to a capital sentencing hearing, all but one
included one or more white victims.122 Second, of the fourteen minorityaccused cases that advanced to a capital sentencing hearing, all but one, or
93% (13/14), involved one or more white victims. 123 Every deathsentenced case at risk of execution as of August 2010 had one or more
white victims.124

121

The percentage-point measure between Columns C and D for each part indicates the
increase in the rates of representation between Columns B and F. For example, the “26
points” notes in Part I indicates that the proportion of minorities among those sentenced to
death (Column E) is 26 percentage points higher than the proportion of minorities among all
death-eligible accused, i.e. 67% in Column E v. 41% in Column B.
122
Figure 2, Part II, Column D.
123
Figure 2, Part I, Column D indicates that fourteen minority accused advanced to a
capital sentencing hearing and Part III, Column C indicates that thirteen of those cases
involved a white victim.
124
Figure 3, Part II, Columns D and E.
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Figure 3
Racial Characteristics of Accused and Victims in Death-Sentenced Cases
Broken Down by Risk of Execution as of August 2010: United States
Armed Forces, 1984–2005125

Column C of Table 3 presents the unadjusted racial disparities based
on death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible cases estimated for six
racially defined subgroups of cases. Part I, Row (c) of Column C reports a
16-percentage-point independent minority-accused disparity in the risk of
receiving a death sentence, with a 2.8 relative risk (Part I, Row (d)) that is
statistically significant at the .05 level. Part II, Rows (c) and (d) report an
11-point white-victim disparity and a relative risk of 2.8 that are not
statistically significant at the .10 level. Part III, Rows (c) and (d) report a
28-point minority-accused/white-victim disparity and a relative risk of 4.5
that are statistically significant at the .01 level.

125

The percentage-point measure between Columns C and D for each part indicates the
increase in the rate of representation between Columns B and E. For example, the “47
points” in Part I indicates that the proportion of minorities among those whose appeals are
exhausted (Column E) is 47 percentage points higher than the proportion of minorities
among the accused sentenced to death, i.e. 100% in Column E v. 53% in Column B. In each
part, the cases in Column B are distributed across Columns C, D, and E depending of the
level of risk of execution. Column C consists of Turner, Gibbs, Curtis, Dock, Gray,
Kreutzer, Simoy, and Thomas. Column D consists of Akbar, Murphy, Parker, Quintanilla,
Walker, and Witt. Column E consists of Loving.
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Table 3
Unadjusted and Adjusted Racial Disparities in the Imposition of Death
Sentences Among All Death-Eligible Cases: United States Armed Forces,
1984–2005126
A

B

C
Unadjusted
Disparities

D

E
F
Adjusted Disparities

(applying alternate measures of culpability)

Non-Racial
Case
Characteristics in a
Logistic
Regression
Analysis

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Five-Level
RacePurged
Regression
Based
Culpability
Scale127

PART I: MINORITY-ACCUSED DISPARITY
Minority Accused 25% (10/40)
23%
20%
White Accused
9% (5/57)
11%
12%
Disparity
16 pts.**
12 pts.
8 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
Relative Risk
2.8
2.1
1.7
(Row a/Row b )
PART II: WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
White-Victim
17% (14/80)
18%
Cases
Other Cases
6% (1/17)
6%
Disparity
11 pts.
12 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
Relative Risk
2.8
3.0
(Row a/Row b )

Six-Level
Salient
Factors
Based
Culpability
Scale

21%
10%
11 pts.
2.1

18%

17%

4%
14 pts.**

6%
11 pts.

4.5

2.8

126
As a point of reference, the average death-sentencing rate for all cases is 15% (15/97).
In Columns D, E, and F, the death-sentencing rates reported in rows (a) and (b) of each Part
are standardized rates estimated after adjustment for the culpability levels of the cases.
127
This scale is based on the culpability index that underlies the analysis presented in
Column D.
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E
F
Adjusted Disparities

(applying alternate measures of culpability)

Part III: MINORITY-ACCUSED/WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
Minority36% (9/25)
26%
23%
23%
Accused/WhiteVictim Cases
(b) Other Cases
8% (6/72)
12%
11%
10%
(c) Disparity
28 pts.***
14 pts.*
12 pts.**
13 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
(d) Relative Risk
4.5
2.2
2.1
2.3
(Row a/Row b )
Level of significance of disparity: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01.
(a)

The 11-point unadjusted white-victim disparity documented in Part II
of Table 3 and the 28-point minority-accused/white-victim disparity
reported in Part III of Table 3 are consistent with the findings of many
studies of civilian death-penalty systems.128 However, the 16-percentagepoint independent minority-accused disparity reported in Part I sharply
distinguishes the military system from the typical civilian system. We
know of no comparable post-Furman study from a state system that reveals
an independent minority- or black-defendant disparity of this magnitude
among all death-eligible cases. With two exceptions, in every civilian
system on which comparable data exist, the unadjusted analysis of death
sentencing among all death-eligible cases reports a lower death-sentencing
rate for the minority- or black-defendant cases than it does for the whitedefendant cases.129 This counterintuitive outcome in the typical state
system is the product of a strong white-victim disparity that suppresses the
death-sentencing rate among the black- and minority-defendant cases. This
occurs in state systems because defendants in the vast majority of black128
For example in the 1973–1979 Georgia research on which the petitioner based his
claims in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the unadjusted white-victim disparity
was 10 percentage points. BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI, supra note 41, at 315 tbl.50,
pt. I.
129
For one exception, see David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1676, 1677 tbl.1 (1998), reporting an
unadjusted independent 7-percentage-point black-defendant disparity in the imposition of
death sentences among all death-eligible cases. See also Scott Phillips, Status Disparities in
the Capital of Capital Punishment, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 824 tbl.3, 829 tbl.5 (2009)
(reporting 2.12 and 1.85 (tbl.3) and 1.92 and 1.78 (tbl.5) odds ratios for the black-defendant
and white-victim variables in analysis of prosecutors seeking death and death sentences
imposed among all death-eligible cases).

2012]

RACE AND THE MILITARY DEATH PENALTY

1269

and minority-victim cases in those systems are also black or minorities. As
a result, the very low death-sentencing rate in black- and minority-victim
cases dramatically reduces the civilian death-sentencing rate in black- and
minority-defendant cases.130 Table 3, Part I, Row (c) of Column C, which
reports an unadjusted statistically significant 16-percentage-point minorityaccused disparity in the imposition of death sentences among all deatheligible cases, indicates that this effect does not occur in the military
system.
2. Adjusted Racial Disparities
The Figure 2 and the Table 3 (Column C) findings considered above
reflect no controls for the criminal culpability of the accused that properly
bear on charging and sentencing decisionmaking within the system. To
account for accused culpability, we computed disparities after adjustment
for four different culpability measures. Our core analysis, reported in Table
4, estimates race disparities in the imposition of death sentences among all
death-eligible cases in a logistic regression analysis that holds constant all
of the variables for non-racial case characteristics included in the analysis.
The non-racial variables include the number of aggravating factors in the
cases and other conceptually important or statistically significant factors
that have a demonstrable impact on death-sentencing outcomes. These
factors, shown in Part A, were identified in a systematic screen of all of the
culpability-related variables in the database.131 The measures of principal
interest in Table 4 are the adjusted racial disparities reported in Part B,
Columns C and D. The Column C measures indicate, on average, the
impact of the presence of each case characteristic listed in Column B on the
probability that an accused with these characteristics will be sentenced to
death, while holding constant all of the other variables listed in Column B.
For example, Row 2 of Part A indicates that after adjustment for all of the
other factors listed in Column B, on average, the risk of a death sentence
being imposed is enhanced by 18 percentage points when the case involves
multiple victims.132
130
See BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI, supra note 41, at 315 tbl.50 (noting a 10percentage-point (11% v. 1%) white-victim disparity results in a -3 percentage-point blackdefendant disparity (4% for black defendants v. 7% for white defendants) in the imposition
of death sentences among all death-eligible cases).
131
See Appendix A for a list of the variables and their values in the military cases; see
also supra text accompanying note 86 for a description of our variable screening and
selection process.
132
This standardized measure of impact is the difference between (a) the average of the
individual race-purged predicted probabilities of a death sentence for all multiple-victim
cases, and (b) the average of the individual race-purged predicted probabilities of a death
sentencing for all single-victim cases after adjustment for all of the variables in the analysis.
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Table 4
Race-of-Accused and Race-of-Victim Disparities Controlling for
Conceptually and Statistically Important Case Characteristics Associated
with the Imposition of Death Sentences Among All Death-Eligible Cases:
United States Armed Forces, 1984–2005
A

B
Case Characteristics

C
Adjusted Linear
Effect
(percentage-point
disparity)

Part A: Non-Racial Variables
1 Number of aggravating
factors in the case
2 Multiple deceased
victims
3 Accused/victim
relationship factor
4 Bizarre weapon, e.g.,
ice pick
5 Accused had a hate or
revenge motive
6 Accused provided
financial or personal
support for his/her
family
Part B: Racial Variables133
1 Minority accused
2 White victim
R2 = .63

D
Odds
Multiplier

E
Regression
Coefficient
(p-value)

4

3.0

1.1 (.08)

18

8.5

2.1 (.08)

10

4.5

1.5 (.03)

32

26.8

3.3 (.02)

19

11.2

2.4 (.02)

-9

0.2

-1.6 (.24)

11
12

5.2
12.5

1.6 (.15)
2.5 (.11)
(n = 97)

Column D presents each variable’s adjusted odds multiplier, which
indicates how the case characteristics listed in Column B affect the
estimated odds that a death sentence will be imposed after controlling for
all of the other variables in the analysis.134 For example, the odds multiplier
for the multiple-victim variable indicates that, on average, the odds of
receiving a death sentence are enhanced by a factor of 8.5 in multiple133

In an alternative model with the minority-accused/white-victim variable as the sole
racial variable in the analysis in addition to the Part A non-racial variables, the adjusted
linear effect for that variable was 15 points with a 6.6 odds multiplier significant at the .09
level. The R2 for that analysis was .62.
134
The relationship between odds (O) and probabilities (P) is:
and

.
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victim cases compared to the odds of a death sentence being imposed in
single-victim cases. Column E reports the magnitude of the estimated
logistic regression coefficient and the level of statistical significance of the
estimated coefficient for each variable.135
Part B of Table 4 reports the independent impact of the racial variables
on the death-sentencing outcomes. Part B, Row 2 of Column C indicates
that accused in white-victim cases are 12 percentage points more likely to
be sentenced to death than are similarly situated accused in cases with no
white victims present, an estimate that is significant at the .11 level.
Further, the 12.5 odds multiplier in Column D indicates that defendants in
white-victim cases face odds of receiving a death sentence that are 12.5
higher than the odds faced by similarly situated defendants with no white
victims. As a point of comparison, in the Georgia research presented to the
United States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp the odds multiplier for
the white-victim variable was 4.3.136
Table 4 also documents a substantial independent minority-accused
disparity. Row 1, Column C of Part B indicates that, on average, minority
accused were 11 percentage points more likely to be sentenced to death than
white accused. In terms of the odds-based disparity, Column D reports that
minority accused faced odds of being sentenced to death that were 5.2 times
higher than similarly situated white accused. As a point of comparison, the
Georgia research considered by the United States Supreme Court in
McCleskey indicated that, statewide, black defendants faced odds of being
sentenced to death that were 0.94 of the odds faced by white defendants, a
finding of no effect at all.137

135
The logistic regression “coefficient” reported in Column E is not easily interpreted. It
provides the basis for estimating the linear effect reported in Column C and the oddsmultiplier reported in Column D. A positive regression coefficient means that the presence
of the case characteristic enhances the probability and odds that a death sentence will be
imposed, although a negative coefficient indicates that the presence of the case
characteristic, on average, reduces the odds and probability that a death sentence will be
imposed.
136
481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987). See BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI supra note 41, at
319–20 tbl.52, row 30. The 4.3 white-victim odds ratio in the McCleskey research was
statistically significant at the .001 level, while the 12.6 white-victim odds ratio reported in
Table 3 was significant at the .11 level.
137
The 0.94 black-defendant odds multiplier reported in BALDUS, WOODWORTH &
PULASKI, supra note 41, at 319 tbl.52, was estimated with all forty-one of the variables in the
table included in the analysis, while the exhibit before the Court with the 1.1 odds multiplier
was limited to the race-neutral variables in the model that were statistically significant. The
black-defendant effect in the McCleskey research was concentrated among the most
aggravated 492 cases in which the black defendants, after adjustment for offender
culpability, faced odds of receiving a death sentence that were 2.4 points higher (p = .01)
than similarly situated white defendants. Id.
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The combined effect of both accused and victim race is reported in
footnote 133 of Table 4. It documents that minority-accused/white-victim
cases are 15 percentage points more likely to be sentenced to death among
all death-eligible cases than accused in all other cases with different
accused/victim racial combinations.138
Table 3 summarizes our findings on the risk of racial prejudice in the
imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible cases. As noted
above, Column C reports the unadjusted racial disparities. Columns D, E,
and F present the disparities adjusted with three alternative measures of
offender culpability. Also, as noted above,139 our assessment of the extent
to which race is a factor in the system is influenced by the magnitude,
consistency, and statistical significance of the racial disparities computed
with alternative measures of criminal culpability. Column D presents the
disparities estimated in our core regression model reported in Table 4, while
Column E presents disparities after adjustment for criminal culpability
measured with the five-level race-purged scale based on the core model.
Column F presents racial disparities after adjustment for the salient factors
scale.
When the magnitude, consistency, and statistical significance test is
applied to the findings in Part I of Table 3, we see that the 16-percentagepoint statistically significant unadjusted minority-accused disparity reported
in Column C declines upon the introduction of controls for accused
culpability. Although not statistically significant, the magnitude and
consistency of the disparities reported in Columns D, E, and F support a
conservative estimate of the impact of accused race in the 8- to 11percentage-point range, with relative risk ranging from 1.7 to 2.1.140
Parts II and III of Table 3 reveal consistently larger adjusted whitevictim and minority-accused/white-victim effects. Columns D, E, and F
report white-victim disparities in the 11- to 14-percentage point range and
measures of relative risk ranging from 2.8 to 4.5. Although only two Part
III adjusted disparity findings are statistically significant to at least the .10
level (Columns D and E), the magnitude and consistency of these findings
convince us that the minority-accused/white-victim effect is real.

138

The odds multiplier for this variable is 6.7. Both measures are statistically significant
at the .09 level. In the Georgia research presented in the McCleskey case, the blackdefendant/white-victim effect was statistically significant only in cases prosecuted in rural
Georgia judicial districts. Id. at 364 tbl.11 (noting a 5.36 black-defendant/white-victim odds
multiplier).
139
See supra text accompanying note 118.
140
The lack of statistical significance calls for interpretative caution. However, since we
are dealing with virtually the entire population of death-eligible cases, we have confidence
that we are seeing real effects in the system.
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The observed overall 15% (15/97) death-sentencing rate among all
death-eligible cases highlights the practical effect of these systemic racial
disparities. The analysis presented in Column D of Part I in Table 3
suggests that if all accused prosecuted since 1984 had been racial
minorities, the system would likely have produced twenty-two instead of
fifteen death sentences and if all accused during that period of time had
been white, the system would likely have produced eleven instead of fifteen
death sentences.141 Looked at another way, after adjustment for the
criminal culpability of the accused (Column D), the death-sentencing rate
was 2.1 times higher (Part I, Row (d)) in minority-accused cases than it was
in white-accused cases, and the rate was 3.0 times higher (Part II, Row (d))
in white-victim cases than it was in cases with no white victims. Finally,
the death-sentencing rate was 2.2 times higher (Part III, Row (d)) in
minority-accused/white-victim cases than it was in cases with all other
accused/victim racial combinations.142
In comparable studies of state systems, adjusted white-victim
disparities and black-defendant/white-victim disparities of this magnitude
are not unusual.143 However, the substantial independent adjusted minorityaccused disparities reported in Tables 3 and 4 are much larger than the
independent adjusted black-defendant effect reported in any study of a state
system of which we are aware.144

141

The 23% adjusted minority-accused death-sentencing rate shown in Part I, Column D,
Row (a) yields the twenty-two (23% of 97) death sentences estimate while the adjusted
white-accused death-sentencing rate shown in Part I, Column D, Row (b) yields the eleven
(11% of 97) death sentences estimate.
142
These measures of relative risk are the ratios of adjusted death-sentencing rates
reported in Row (d), Column D, of each part.
143
See Donahue, supra note 60, at 112–13 tbls.16 & 17, 132–33 tbls.20 & 21 (reporting
statistically significant unadjusted and adjusted black-defendant/white-victim disparities in
the imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible cases (Connecticut, 1970–2007));
Paternoster et al. supra note 51, at 61 tbl.3 (Test #5), 65 tbl.4C (Test #5) (reporting
statistically significant 3.5 (14%/4%) ratio of rates (Maryland, 1978–1999) in blackdefendant/white-victim cases versus all other cases in death sentencing among all deatheligible cases).
144
The closest thing to the military results in a civilian system are discussed in Baldus et
al., supra note 129, at 1688–89 (reporting an adjusted independent black-defendant effect
with a statistically significant 29.0 odds multiplier in an analysis of 175 jury penalty trial
death-sentencing decisions based on a weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
(Philadelphia County, 1983–1993)), and Phillips, supra note 129 (reporting an adjusted 1.5
independent black-defendant odds multiplier for the imposition of death sentences among all
death-eligible cases (Houston, Tex., 1992–1999)).
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B. SOURCES OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH
SENTENCES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES

This Section summarizes the results of the quantitative argument
developed in Part IV, Sections C through F of this Article concerning the
extent to which the racial disparities documented in the imposition of death
sentences among all death-eligible cases are the product of charging
decisions, guilt trial decisions, or capital sentencing decisions. Specifically,
we estimated racial effects in: (1) convening authority decisions that
advanced 42% (41/97) of the death-eligible cases to a capital court-martial,
(2) the unanimous verdicts of capital murder that advanced 73% (30/41) of
the capitally charged cases to a capital sentencing hearing, and (3) the
capital sentencing decisions of members, which imposed a death sentence
50% (15/30) of the time.
White-victim disparities in the typical state system are principally the
product of prosecutorial charging decisions with only a small contribution
from penalty decisions by juries at trial. In the military system, the
decisions of both convening authorities and members contribute to the
overall white-victim effect. Convening authorities contribute to the effect
in their charging decisions.145 Members contribute to the white-victim
effect not through death-sentencing decisions (only one minority-victim
case advanced to a penalty trial), but through their unanimous decisions that
advance cases to a capital sentencing hearing.146 As we document in
Section E below, the combined effect of these two decisions produces a
large and statistically significant adjusted race-of-victim disparity in the
rates that cases advance to capital sentencing hearings.147
By contrast, the principal source of the independent minority-accused
disparity among all death-eligible cases in the military is the members’
death-sentencing decisions in capital sentencing hearings. As we document
in Section F below, their sentencing decisions contribute to the independent
minority-accused disparity because, in white-victim cases (which constitute
97% of the cases that advanced this far in the process), court-martial
members sentenced minority accused to death at a much higher rate than
similarly situated white accused.148 In addition, members’ unanimous guilt
trial decisions, advancing cases to capital sentencing hearing, reveal a
moderate disparity based solely on the race of the accused.149 In contrast,
the decisions of convening authorities reveal very little if any minority145
146
147
148
149

Infra note 154 and accompanying text.
Infra note 158 and accompanying text.
Infra note 164 and accompanying text.
Infra Table 11 and accompanying text.
Infra Table 8 and accompanying text.
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accused race effect in their charging decisions.150
Finally, both convening authorities and members contribute to the
minority-accused/white-victim disparity in death sentencing among all
death-eligible cases. There is a modest minority-accused/white-victim
disparity in (a) the convening authorities’ advancement of cases to capital
guilt trials,151 and (b) in the members’ unanimous guilt trial decisions
advancing cases to a capital sentencing hearing.152 In addition, in whitevictim cases, courts-martial members contribute to the overall effect by
sentencing minority accused to death at a substantially higher rate than
white accused.153
C. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CONVENING AUTHORITY DECISIONS
ADVANCING CASES TO A CAPITAL COURT-MARTIAL

This Section explores charging and plea bargaining decisions of
convening authorities as a possible source of the racial disparities among all
death-eligible cases documented in Section A above.
1. Unadjusted Disparities
Table 5, Column C reports unadjusted racial disparities in convening
authority decisions that advance cases to a capital court-martial with the
government seeking a death sentence.154 Part I, Row (c) reports a 14percentage-point minority-accused disparity. The 20-percentage-point
white-victim disparity reported in Part II, Row (c) is larger but not
statistically significant, while the 29-percentage-point minorityaccused/white-victim disparity reported in Part III, Row (c) is large and
statistically significant, suggesting that convening authority charging
decisions may be a source of this racial disparity among all death-eligible
cases.

150

Infra Table 5 (Part I) and accompanying text.
Infra Table 5 (Part III) and accompanying text.
152
Infra Table 8, note 161, and accompanying text.
153
Infra Table 11 and accompanying text.
154
The advancement of a case to a capital court-martial requires a capital referral by the
convening authority and a refusal of the convening authority to withdraw the capital referral
unilaterally or as part of a plea bargain. DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 6-1, 9-2, 16-3(A) (7th ed. 2008).
151
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Table 5
Unadjusted and Adjusted Racial Disparities in Convening Authority
Decisions to Advance Death-Eligible Cases to a Capital Court-Martial:
United States Armed Forces, 1984–2005155

A

B

C
Unadjusted
Disparities

D

E

(applying alternate measures of culpability)

Non-Racial
Case
Characteristics in a
Logistic
Regression
Analysis

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

F

Adjusted Disparities

Part I: MINORITY-ACCUSED DISPARITY
Minority Accused 51% (23/45)
47%
White Accused
37% (22/60)
40%
Disparity
14 pts.
7 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
Relative Risk
1.4
1.2
(Row a/Row b )
Part II: WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
White-Victim
46% (40/86)
46%
Cases
Other Cases
26% (5/19)
32%
Disparity
20 pts.
13 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
Relative Risk
1.8
1.4
(Row a/Row b )

Five-Level
RacePurged
Regression
Based
Culpability
Scale156

Six-Level
Salient
Factors
Based
Culpability
Scale

46%
40%
6 pts.

53%
36%
17 pts.

1.1

1.5

46%

47%

30%
16 pts.*

25%
22 pts.*

1.5

1.8

Part III: MINORITY-ACCUSED/WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
Minority64% (18/28)
48%
47%
56%
Accused/WhiteVictim Cases
(b) Other Cases
35% (27/77)
41%
41%
38%
(c) Disparity
29 pts.**
7 pts.
6 pts.
18 pts.*
(Row a – Row b )
(d) Relative Risk
1.8
1.2
1.2
1.5
(Row a/Row b )
Level of significance of disparity: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01.
(a)

155

As a point of reference, 43% (45/105) of the death-eligible cases advanced to a capital
court-martial with the government seeking a death sentence.
156
See supra note 127.
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Table 6
Race-of-Accused and Race-of-Victim Disparities in the Rates that
Convening Authorities Advance Death-Eligible Cases to a Capital CourtMartial Controlling for Non-Racial Case Characteristics: United States
Armed Forces, 1984–2005
A

B
Case Characteristics

Part A: Non-Racial Variables
1 Number of aggravating
factors in the case
2 Multiple victims
3 Victim’s throat was
slashed
4 Forensic evidence
linking accused to the
murder, e.g., DNA,
fingerprints
5 Accused hid dying
victim making rescue
unlikely
6 Accused took
responsibility for his
crime
7 Accused’s principal
defense was to
challenge the
sufficiency of the
evidence
8 Case had significant
military implications
Part B: Racial Variables157
1 Minority Accused
2 White Victim
R2 = .71

157

C
Adjusted Linear
Effect
(percentage-point
disparity)

D
Odds
Multiplier

E
Regression
Coefficient
(p-value)

13

4.6

1.5 (.01)

29
28

17.3
13.9

2.8 (.01)
2.6 (.01)

26

12.6

2.5 (.01)

45

>100

5.0 (.06)

-31

0.03

-3.4 (.02)

26

11.2

2.4 (.01)

19

6.2

1.8 (0.3)

8
13

2.1
4.1

0.8 (.35)
1.4 (.14)
(n = 105)

In an alternative analysis that included the minority-defendant/white-victim variable
in lieu of the minority-accused and white-victim variables, the Column C linear effect was 7
points, with a 2.0 odds multiplier, significant at the .39 level.
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2. Adjusted Disparities
Table 6 presents the results of our core logistic regression model of
convening authority charging decisions. Column C, Part B, Row 1 of the
table reports a 8-percentage-point minority-accused disparity, while Part B,
Row 2 reports a 13-point white-victim disparity that is not statistically
significant. Moreover, the footnote in Table 6 reports a 7-point disparity
for the minority-accused/white-victim interaction term, suggesting some
impact for that accused/victim racial combination.
Columns D, E, and F of Table 5 summarize all of the adjusted
disparities. The minority-accused (Part I) disparity from the Table 6
regression model reported in Column D (7 points) is quite consistent with
Column E, but inconsistent with the 17-point disparity in Column F.
However, the white-victim effects in Part II, Row (c) of Columns D, E, and
F (13, 16, and 22 points) are large and more consistent, providing
persuasive evidence that the race of the victim affects convening authority
decisions. In addition, two of the three are statistically significant at the .10
level.
Part III, Row (c) of Column F reports an 18-percentage-point minorityaccused/white-victim disparity, but, like in Part I, that estimate is
inconsistent with the 7-point disparity reported in Column D for the core
regression model and the 6-point disparity in Column E. The inconsistency
of these findings draws into question the hypothesis that the accused/victim
racial combination is a significant factor in convening authority charging
decisions.
D. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN UNANIMOUS CAPITAL MURDER
CONVICTIONS

We focus here on race effects in unanimous capital murder convictions
among the forty cases that advanced to a capital court-martial. In ten
courts-martial, the accused was convicted of premeditated or felony murder
by a vote of at least three-fourths of the court-martial members. As noted
above, this vote was enough to support a capital murder conviction, but
because the vote was not unanimous, the case could not advance to a capital
sentencing hearing.158 The lack of unanimity on the capital murder verdict
is evidence of the kind of ambiguous situation in which inappropriate
factors such as the race of the accused or of the victim could have an
effect.159
158

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1) (2006) (“No person may be convicted of an offense for
which the death penalty is made mandatory by law, except by the concurrence of all the
members of the court-martial present at the time the vote is taken.”).
159
A vote with less than three-quarters support for the finding of premeditation would
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1. Unadjusted Disparities
Table 7 reports the unadjusted racial disparities for the unanimous
liability decisions. Part I, Row (c) reports a minus 6-point minority-accused
effect and Part III, Row (c) reports a 13-percentage-point minoritydefendant/white-victim disparity that is not statistically significant because
of the small numbers involved. However, Part II, Row (c) reports a 53percentage-point white-victim disparity that is statistically significant at the
.05 level.
Table 7
Unadjusted Racial Disparities in Courts-Martial Unanimous Murder
Convictions that Advance Cases to a Capital Sentencing Hearing: United
States Armed Forces, 1984–2005160
A

B
Case Characteristics

C
Unadjusted Disparities

Part I: MINORITY-ACCUSED DISPARITY
(a) Minority Accused
(b) White Accused
(c) Disparity (Row a – Row b )
(d) Relative Risk (Row a/Row b )

70% (14/20)
76% (16/21)
– 6 pts.
0.9

Part II: WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
(a) White-Victim Cases
(b) Other Cases
(c) Disparity (Row a – Row b )
(d) Relative Risk (Row a/Row b )

78% (29/37)
25% (1/4)
53 pts.**
3.1

Part III: MINORITY-ACCUSED/WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
(a) Minority-Accused/White-Victim Cases
81% (13/16)
(b) Other Cases
68% (17/25)
(c) Disparity (Row a – Row b )
13 pts.
(d) Relative Risk (Row a/Row b )
1.2
Level of significance of disparity: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01.

have resulted in an acquittal on that charge. § 852(b)(2) (“No person may be sentenced to
life imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten years, except by the concurrence of
three-fourths of the members present at the time the vote is taken.”).
160
The outcome measure in this table was a unanimous murder verdict. As a point of
reference, 73% (30/41) of the courts-martial with the government seeking a death sentence
resulted in a unanimous capital murder conviction that advanced the case to a capital
sentencing hearing.
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2. Adjusted Disparities
An analysis of the impact of non-racial factors at this point in the
process revealed that our measures of the overall criminal culpability of the
accused had little relationship to the members’ unanimous votes. However,
unanimous votes for capital murder are highly correlated with (a) the
absence of evidence of long-range planning for the murder (a 39-point
mitigating effect (p = .10)), (b) the accused’s claims of self defense or
defense of others (a 56-point mitigating effect (p = .05)), and (c) a claim of
insufficient evidence to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt
(a 28-point mitigating effect (p = .10)). In contrast, a mens rea defense
based on mental illness or intoxication actually enhanced the probability of
a unanimous verdict for capital murder by 28 percentage points (p = .10).
Table 8
Race-of-Accused and Race-of-Victim Disparities in Unanimous CourtsMartial Findings of Liability for Premeditated Murder Controlling for
Accused Defenses and Mitigating Evidence: United States Armed Forces,
1984–2005
A

B
Case Characteristics

Part A: Non-Racial Variables
1 Defense of self or other
2 No evidence of a long
range plan to kill
3 Defense of insufficient
evidence to prove
§ 118 (1) culpability
4 Defense of lack of mens
rea for § 118(1) because
of mental illness or
intoxication
Part B: Racial Variables161
1 Minority Accused
2 White Victim
R2 = .36

161

C
Adjusted Linear
Effect
(percentage-point
disparity)

D
Odds
Multiplier

E
Regression
Coefficient
(p-value)

-38
-24

0.1
0.2

-2.1 (.21)
-1.4 (.31)

-23

0.2

-1.5 (.23)

19

4.6

1.5 (.24)

10
25

2.1
4.2

1.0 (.47)
1.6 (.38)
(n = 41)

In an alternative model that substitutes the minority-accused/white-victim variable for
the race-of-accused and victim variables, the adjusted linear effect for that variable was 11
points with a 2.3 odds multiplier (p =.40).
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Table 8 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis that
includes these four non-racial variables and variables for the race of the
accused and of the victim. Part A indicates that the effects for the four nonracial variables are substantial and in the expected direction, but none is
statistically significant. Part B presents the racial disparities. Row 1
reports a 10-point minority-accused disparity and Row 2 reports a 25-point
white-victim disparity, neither of which is statistically significant. These
data suggest that the presence of a minority accused or white victim in a
case has an aggravating effect on the capital murder vote that approximates
or exceeds the aggravating effect of a mens rea defense based on a claim of
mental illness or intoxication (shown in Row 4 of Part I).
E. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES
ADVANCE TO A CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING

We also estimated race effects in the rates that all death-eligible cases
advance to a capital sentencing hearing. This analysis reflects the combined
effects of convening authority charging decisions and members’ unanimous
guilt trial decisions advancing cases to a capital sentencing hearing.
1. Unadjusted Disparities
Table 9, Column C presents the unadjusted disparities. Part I, Row (c)
reports a 7-point minority-accused effect that is not significant. However,
Part II, Row (c) and Part III, Row (c) report, respectively, 30- and 28-point
disparities that are statistically significant beyond the .05 level.
2. Adjusted Disparities
Table 10 presents the results of the core logistic regression analysis of
this decision point with seven non-racial variables that have a substantial
relationship with the advancement of cases to a capital sentencing hearing.
The racial disparities presented in Part II of the Table show a modest 7point minority-accused disparity that is not statistically significant, and a
very large 27-point white-victim effect that is statistically significant (p =
.03).
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Table 9
Unadjusted and Adjusted Racial Disparities in Convening Authority and
Unanimous Courts-Martial Decisions that Advanced Death-Eligible
Cases to a Capital Sentencing Hearing: United States Armed Forces,
1984–2005162

A

B

C
Unadjusted
Disparities

D

E

(applying alternate measures of culpability)

Non-Racial
Case
Characteristics in a
Logistic
Regression
Analysis

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

162

F

Adjusted Disparities

Part I: MINORITY-ACCUSED DISPARITY
Minority Accused 35% (14/40)
35%
White Accused
28% (16/57)
29%
Disparity
7 pts.
6 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
Relative Risk
1.2
1.2
(Row a/Row b )
Part II: WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
White-Victim
36% (29/80)
36%
Cases
Other Cases
6% (1/17)
9%
Disparity
30 pts.**
27 pts.**
(Row a – Row b )
Relative Risk
6.0
4.0
(Row a/Row b )

Five-Level
RacePurged
Regression
Based
Culpability
Scale163

Six-Level
Salient
Factors
Based
Culpability
Scale

36%
28%
7 pts.

35%
27%
8 pts.

1.3

1.3

36%

35%

6%
31 pts.***

6%
29 pts.**

6.0

5.8

As a point of reference, 31% (30/97) of the death-eligible cases advanced to a capital
sentencing hearing.
163
See supra note 127.
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C
Unadjusted
Disparities

D

E
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F

Adjusted Disparities
(applying alternate measures of culpability)

Part III: MINORITY-ACCUSED/WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
Minority52% (13/25)
42%
42%
40%
Accused/WhiteVictim Cases
(b) Other Cases
24% (17/72)
27%
27%
26%
(c) Disparity
28 pts.***
15 pts.
15 pts.*
14 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
(d) Relative Risk
1.9
1.6
1.6
1.5
(Row a/Row b )
Level of significance of disparity: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01.
(a)

When we substituted the minority-accused/white-victim variable for
the minority-accused and white-victim variables, the disparity for that
variable was 15 points (p = .13).164
As noted above, Table 9, Column C reports the impact of race without
adjustment for the culpability of the accused. Columns D, E, and F report
those disparities after adjustment for the three alternative measures of
culpability. The results in Part I, Row (c) are modest but consistent,
ranging from 6 points in the core model to 7 and 8 points in the Columns E
and F scales, which may suggest that the race of the accused has a modest
independent effect. Part III, Rows (c) and (d) also indicate that the
introduction of controls for accused culpability (Columns, D, E, and F)
diminishes the magnitude and statistical significance of the minorityaccused/white-victim disparity reported in Column C.

164

Because the liability votes of court-martial members contributed to the advancement
of cases to capital sentencing hearings, we conducted an alternative logistic regression
analysis that added to the analysis the four control variables based on the defenses of the
accused discussed above. In that analysis the logistic regression coefficient for the whitevictim variable (on which the odds multiplier is based) enlarge from 3.3 (p = .03) to 5.7
(p = .01). See infra Table 10 & note 165.
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Table 10
Race-of-Accused and Race-of-Victim Disparities in the Rates that DeathEligible Cases Advance to a Capital Sentencing Hearing Controlling for
Non-Racial Case Characteristics: United States Armed Forces, 1984–
2005
A

B
Case Characteristics

Part A: Non-Racial Variables
1 Number of aggravating
factors in the case
2 Multiple victims
3 Bizarre weapon, e.g.,
ice pick
4 Forensic evidence
linking accused to the
murder, e.g., DNA,
fingerprints
5 Accused hid dying
victim making rescue
unlikely
6 Accused took
responsibility for his
crime
7 The murder had military
implications
Part B: Racial Variables165
1 Minority Accused
2 White Victim
R2 = .60

C
Adjusted Linear
Effect
(percentage-point
disparity)
3

D
Odds
Multiplier

E
Regression
Coefficient
(p-value)

1.4

0.3 (.47)

34
57

12.8
140.5

2.5 (.01)
4.9 (.01)

16

3.6

1.3 (.10)

41

26.5

3.3 (.14)

-27

0.04

-3.2 (.02)

15

3.4

1.2 (.15)

7
27

1.8
28.1

0.6 (.48)
3.3 (.03)
(n = 97)

The story is most clear in Part II, Rows (c) and (d) of Columns D, E,
and F where we see strong and statistically significant disparities that are
comparable to the unadjusted 30-point white-victim disparity reported in
165
In an alternative analysis that included the minority-defendant/white-victim variable
in lieu of the minority-accused and white-victim variables, the Column C linear effect was
15-points, with a 3.4 odds multiplier, significant at the .13 level. In a model that also
included the four non-racial factors in Table 8 that showed a significant unadjusted
association (p values of less than .10) with the members’ unanimous guilty verdict, the
white-victim logistic regression coefficient increased from 3.3 (p = .03) to 5.7 (p = .01) and
the R2 for the overall model increased from .60 to .70.
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Column C. In terms of its magnitude and statistical significance, these
adjusted white-victim effects are the strongest evidence documented in this
study that the race of the victim influences decisions of the convening
authority and the court-martial members and that these decisions are the
principal source of the white-victim effects documented in the imposition of
death sentences among all death-eligible cases. The findings in Part III also
suggest that these decisions contribute in a small but distinct way to the
minority-accused/white-victim disparity documented in the imposition of
death sentences among all death-eligible cases.
F. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT DEATH SENTENCES ARE
IMPOSED IN CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARINGS

Thirty death-eligible cases advanced to a capital sentencing hearing—
the final stage in the process. As noted above, all but one of these cases
involved a white victim, an outcome that nearly meets the “inexorable zero”
standard, which, in other contexts, gets the attention of the courts.166 In the
twenty-nine white-victim cases, there were sixteen white and thirteen
minority accused. The core issue, therefore, concerns the differential
treatment of minority and white accused in white-victim cases.
1. Unadjusted Disparities
Table 11, Row (c), Column C, documents a 40-percentage-point
unadjusted minority-accused disparity in death-sentencing rates in capital
sentencing hearings that is significant at the .10 level. In a comparable
unadjusted logistic regression analysis, the unadjusted odds multiplier for
the minority-accused variable is 5.5, significant at the .03 level.
2. Adjusted Disparities
Columns D, E, and F of Table 11 report in Rows (c) and (d) the
minority-accused disparities estimated after adjustment for three measures
of accused culpability. Adjustment for these culpability measures reduces
the 40-point unadjusted disparity by half or more to 18, 17, and 21 points
respectively and with relative risk measures of 1.4, 1.4, and 1.6, none of
which is significant because of the small samples involved. However,
because of the magnitude and consistency of the minority-accused
disparities, we believe that these findings reflect real and systemic effects of
race in the members’ death-sentencing decisions. These results also clearly
identify the members’ death-sentencing decisions as the principal source of
166

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977) (“As the
Court of Appeals remarked, the company’s inability to rebut the inference of discrimination
came not from a misuse of statistics but from ‘the inexorable zero.’” (emphasis added)).
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the independent minority-accused disparity documented in the imposition
of death sentences among all death-eligible cases.167
We know of only two comparable studies in a state court system that
report independent, black-defendant effects of this magnitude in penalty
trial decisionmaking.168 Studies of penalty trial decisions in most states
report no independent effects, or effects that are quite modest by
comparison.169
Table 11
Minority-Accused Disparities in the Outcomes of Capital Sentencing
Hearings: United States Armed Forces, 1984–2005170

A

B

C
Unadjusted
Disparities

D

E

(applying alternate measures of culpability)

Non-Racial
Case
Characteristics in a
Logistic
Regression
Analysis171

(a)
(b)
(c)

Five-Level
RacePurged
Regression
Based
Culpability
Scale

Minority Accused 71% (10/14)
44%
59%
White Accused
31% (5/16)
26%
42%
Disparity
40 pts.*
18 pts.
17 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
(d) Relative Risk
2.3
1.4
1.4
(Row a/Row b )
Level of significance of disparity: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01.

167

F

Adjusted Disparities
Six-Level
Salient
Factors
Based
Culpability
Scale

56%
35%
21 pts.
1.6

In contrast to these death-sentencing findings, there are much weaker minorityaccused effects in the analysis of convening authorities’ and members’ decisions advancing
cases to penalty trial. See supra Table 9 and accompanying text.
168
See supra text accompanying note 143.
169
See supra text accompanying note 143.
170
As a point of reference, the average death-sentencing rate in capital sentencing
hearings was .50 (15/30).
171
When this analysis is limited to the three non-racial variables in the Column D
analysis that had a relationship to the death-sentencing outcomes that was statistically
significant beyond the .10 level, the minority-accused effect is 14 points, with a 3.0 odds
multiplier, significant at the .39 level.
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G. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES
AMONG HIGHLY AGGRAVATED WHITE-VICTIM CASES—THE
HEREIN OF DECISIONMAKING IN SIXTEEN MULTIPLE-VICTIM
DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES

By any measure, multiple-victim cases play an important role in the
military system, as they do in most state court systems. They account for
53% (8/15) of the death sentences imposed during the period of this study.
The death-sentencing rate in multiple-victim cases is 50% compared to 9%
in single-victim cases. Multiple victims play a prominent role in all of our
core logistic regression models and our two principal measures of
deathworthiness.
Multiple-victim cases also have important racial implications. Seventy
percent (7/10) of the minority accused who were sentenced to death killed
two or more victims, while only 40% (2/5) of the white accused who were
sentenced to death had multiple victims. However, minority accused are
overrepresented in multiple-victim cases, which may explain this disparity.
Minority accused accounted for 56% (9/16) of the multiple-victim cases,
compared to 41% (40/97) of all death-eligible cases. Similarly, minorityaccused/white-victim cases account for 41% (7/16) of the multiple-victim
cases, compared to 25% (24/97) of all death-eligible cases.172 In a raceneutral system, such an overrepresentation of minority accused in multiplevictim cases might explain the overrepresentation of minority-accused,
multiple-victim cases on death row.
Case law and the literature suggest alternative explanations for the
high risk of racial prejudice in black-defendant/white-victim capital
cases. One theory focuses on the reaction of decisionmakers to the
“intergroup conflict” nature of interracial murder.173 Another theory
developed by Justice Byron White in Turner v. Murray (1986), a blackdefendant/white-victim capital case from Virginia, perceives a high “risk of
racial prejudice infecting” death-sentencing decisions in highly aggravated
black-defendant/white-victim capital cases.174 Justice White explained the
172

However, the 81% (13/16) proportion of white-victim cases among multiple-victim
cases is comparable to the 82% (80/97) proportion of white-victim cases among all deatheligible cases.
173
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of
Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 385 (2006)
(suggesting one explanation for the elevated risk or racial prejudice in black-on-white
murder cases is that the defendant-victim racial combination “renders race especially salient.
Such crimes could be interpreted or treated as matters of intergroup conflict” whereas a
black-on-black murder may “lead jurors to view the crime as a matter of interpersonal rather
than intergroup conflict.”).
174
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986) (holding that the interracial nature of
the offense entitled the defendant to question prospective jurors “on racial prejudice,” since a
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basis for the Court’s concern as follows:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing,
there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected.
On the facts of this case, a juror who believes that blacks are violence prone or
morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether
petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating factors specified under Virginia law. Such
a juror might also be less favorably inclined toward petitioner’s evidence of mental
disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More subtle, less consciously held racial
attitudes could also influence a juror’s decision in this case. Fear of blacks, which
could easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner’s crime, might incline a
175
juror to favor the death penalty.

The risk of prejudice is further exacerbated in extremely violent cases,
such as multiple-victim cases, where the facts of the case heighten the
salience of the perception of blacks as violence-prone.176 In short, multiplevictim cases with minority accused and white victims are racially charged
cases and provide an ideal vehicle to test Justice White’s hypothesis.
1. Unadjusted Disparities
Table 12, Column C presents unadjusted race disparities in deathsentencing rates among the multiple-victim cases. Part I, Row (c) of
Column C reports a 64-percentage-point minority-accused disparity and a
relative risk of 5.6, both of which are statistically significant at the .05 level.
Part II, Row (c) reports a 62-point white-victim effect that is not statistically
significant, while Part III, Row (c) reports an 89-point minoritydefendant/white-victim disparity, with a relative risk of 9.1, that is
statistically significant at the .01 level. These unadjusted race effects are
much larger than the unadjusted racial disparities that we have seen
documented among any subgroup of cases in comparable empirical studies
of post-Furman civilian courts.

failure to permit such questioning created an unacceptable risk of “racial prejudice infecting”
the jurors’ sentencing decision).
175
Id. at 35.
176
The quote from Turner in the text above notes that fear of blacks could easily be
“stirred up” by violent facts and incline a juror “to favor a death penalty.” See generally
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race
and Juries: A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997,
1008 (2003).
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Table 12
Disparities in Death-Sentencing Rates Among Sixteen Multiple-Victim
Cases: United States Armed Forces, 1984–2005

A

B

C
Unadjusted
Disparities

D

E

(applying alternate measures of culpability)

Salient
Factors
Based
Culpability
Scale

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

F

Adjusted Disparities

Part I: MINORITY-ACCUSED DISPARITY
Minority Accused
78% (7/9)
59%
White Accused
14% (1/7)
11%
Disparity
64 pts.**
48 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
Relative Risk
5.6
5.4
(Row a/Row b )
Part II: WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
White-Victim
62% (8/13)
55%
Cases
Other Cases
0% (0/3)
0%
Disparity
62 pts.
55 pts.
(Row a – Row b )
Relative Risk
Infinite
Infinite
(Row a/Row b )

Regression
Based
Culpability
Scale

Law
Student
Rank Order
Culpability
Levels177

67%
28%
39 pts.

83%
12%
71 pts.**

2.4

6.9

59%

62%

0%
59 pts.

0%
62 pts.

Infinite

Infinite

Part III: MINORITY-ACCUSED/WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITY
Minority100% (7/7)
87%
94%
100%
Accused/WhiteVictim Cases
(b) Other Cases
11% (1/9)
8%
19%
12%
(c) Disparity
89 pts.***
79 pts.
75 pts.**
88 pts.**
(Row a – Row b )
(d) Relative Risk
9.1
10.8
4.9
8.3
(Row a/Row b )
Level of significance of disparity: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01.
(a)

What are the sources of these racial disparities? One of the seven
white accused shown in Part I, Row (b) of Table 12 avoided the risk of a
177

Law students assessed the culpability level of the accused based on a detailed
summary of each case.
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death sentence by virtue of a convening authority decision not to advance
his case to a capital court-martial.178 Two avoided the risk because the
members did not unanimously find them guilty of premeditated murder.179
Three other white accused received a life sentence in a capital sentencing
hearing.180 This evidence is consistent with the conclusion of Sections B
and F above that the minority-accused effects in the system are principally
the product of court-martial sentencing decisions. In Part II, Row (b) of
Table 12, the three accused with non-white victims avoided the risk of a
death sentence by virtue of a convening authority decision not to advance
their cases to a capital court-martial.181 These findings are consistent with
the conclusion of Part IV, Sections B, C, and E above that the white-victim
effects in the system are principally the product of the charging decisions of
convening authorities.
2. Adjusted Disparities
Our first approach was to estimate separately in a single logistic
regression analysis, which included all death-eligible cases, a minorityaccused disparity among the multiple-victim cases and a comparable
disparity among the single-victim cases. We did this by introducing
“interaction terms” that can provide such estimates into our core analysis of
death sentencing among all death-eligible cases.182 To put the results in
context, recall our core analysis of death sentencing among all deatheligible cases in Table 4 where the logistic regression coefficient for
minority accused was 1.6, which generated an odds multiplier of 5.2,
significant at the .15 level. In our replication of that analysis among the
same ninety-seven death-eligible cases, the estimated minority-accused
disparity among the multiple-victim cases was a 7.1 (p = .01) logistic
regression coefficient, which generated a jumbo odds multiplier of 999.0.
The six controls for legitimate case characteristics had very little effect in
explaining away or reducing the level of statistical significance of the
minority-accused effect among the two-victim cases. In contrast, those
same control variables were quite effective in reducing the magnitude and
statistical significance of the minority-accused disparity among the singlevictim cases. Specifically, the comparable statistic among the single-victim
cases was a non-significant logistic regression coefficient of 1.1 (p = .43),
178

Fuhrman.
K. Curry and Reliford. See id.
180
Clark, Meeks, and Strom. See id.
181
Fuhrman, Morgan, and Patterson.
182
In lieu of a minority-accused variable, we introduced two binary variables: (1) one for
minority accused in single-victim cases, and (2) one for minority accused in multiple-victim
cases.
179
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which generated an odds multiplier of 3.1.
Because of the strong concentration of minority-accused effects among
the multiple-victim cases, we tested their robustness with further analyses
limited to those sixteen cases. With a sample of only sixteen cases, logistic
multiple regression analysis was off the table. However, we were able to
conduct three analyses which estimated adjusted racial disparities among
those sixteen cases, controlling for three different measures of criminal
culpability, two of which we used in previous sections.183
Table 12 presents the results of these analyses. In Column C, for
purposes of comparison, we present the unadjusted minority-accused
disparities, white-victim disparities, and minority-accused/white-victim
disparities. The adjusted disparities are reported in Columns D, E, and F.
As noted earlier, we believe that the salient factors scale applied in Column
D closely approximates military assessments of criminal culpability and
deathworthiness. For this reason, we place the greatest weight on those
estimates.184 The estimates in Column E control for the regression-based
culpability scale that is based on our core model of death sentences imposed
among all death-eligible cases,185 while the estimates in Column F control
for a qualitative culpability measure based on assessments by law students
of the comparative culpability of the sixteen accused, which we believe
approximate civilian rather than military assessments of criminal
culpability.186
183

Salient factors and regression-based scales are applied in Columns E and F of Tables
3, 5, 9, 11, and 12.
184
However, the estimates in Column D are based on less information than the estimates
in Columns E and F. The disparities in each Part of the table are based solely on the
disparities estimated in cells of the scale, which contain members of each racially defined
group of accused. The facts and outcomes of cases that do not meet this test contribute no
information to the estimated disparities in each Part of the table. In Parts I and III, the
Column D disparities are based on nine cases in cells of the scale with accused from both
racial groups, while in Part II the disparities of Column C are based on eleven cases in cells
with accused from both racial groups. In contrast, the disparities in Columns E and F are
based on cases in cells that, respectively, contain fifteen and sixteen cases from both racial
groups.
185
See supra Table 3, Column E & Table 11, Column E.
186
The raters were five research assistants at the University of Iowa College of Law who
based their culpability assessments on the facts presented in two- to four-page detailed
narrative summaries of the cases that had been purged of all racial and procedural
information that could influence coder assessments of accused culpability. Four of these
students had exposure to the military cases, having coded from ten to fifteen of the cases in
this study over the preceding year. The students ranked the sixteen multiple-victim cases in
terms of their criminal culpability and deathworthiness based upon a weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of each case. We believe that, as civilians without
any experience in the military, the judgments of the law students reflect a distinctly civilian
rather than military assessment of offender culpability. We used the average rank-order
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The key findings in Parts I, II, and III are found in Rows (c) and (d) of
Columns D, E, and F, which should be compared with the unadjusted
disparities reported in Rows (c) and (d) of Column C. After adjustment for
accused culpability, the adjusted minority-accused/white-victim disparities
reported in Part III, Rows (c) and (d) are the largest and most statistically
significant in the table. They range from 75 to 88 percentage points and the
measures of relative risk range from 4.9 to 10.8, with the disparities in
Columns E and F statistically significant at the .05 level.187
The adjusted minority-accused disparities in Part I, Rows (c) and (d)
range in Columns D, E, and F from 48 to 71 percentage points, although the
Column D and E disparities are not statistically significant. The adjusted
white-victim effects in Part II, Rows (c) and (d) range in columns D, E, and
F from 55 to 62 percentage points, but none is statistically significant
beyond the .10 level. These findings suggest that the very strong minorityaccused/white-victim effects documented in Part III are equally the product
of the independent minority-accused disparity shown in Part I and the
independent, white-victim disparity shown in Part II.188
Overall, these findings document a significant risk of racial prejudice
in the application of the death penalty in the multiple-victim cases,
especially in those cases where the accused is a minority and the victim is
white. Our findings further demonstrate that the multiple-victim cases are
the principal source of the minority-accused disparities documented among
all death-eligible cases. Viewed broadly, these findings of the military
experience since 1984 support both the aggravation and mitigation prongs
of Justice White’s hypothesis that the risk of racial prejudice is particularly
high in highly aggravated, interracial capital cases in which sentencing
authorities are prone to “inflate aggravation” and “deflate mitigation.” 189
score for each case to rank it from low to high in terms of accused culpability. We
conducted an inter-rater reliability analysis of the student rank order decisions. The results
met the general test of reliability of a correlation coefficient greater than .70.
187
The Part III, Column D disparity is not statistically significant because only nine of
the sixteen cases were in cells of the scale that included both minority-accused/white-victim
cases and other cases, whereas Columns E and F of Part III contained respectively fifteen
and sixteen cases in cells that included both groups of cases.
188
An examination of detail in the analyses on which Table 12 is based (not reported
here) indicates that in Columns D and E, the levels of the scales, which include members of
both racial groups of cases (on which the disparities are based), have low-to-midrange levels
of criminal culpability. In contrast, in Column F, the racial disparities are uniform across all
levels of the scale.
189
See supra note 181 and accompanying text. We document an exception to this rule in
Part V below in which we focus on a form of aggravation that trumps multiple victims in
terms of their perceived deathworthiness—the murder of commissioned officers and
substantial lethal attacks on U.S. troops on duty. Among cases with this level of military
implication, there is little or no evidence of race effects. See also infra note 196 and
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For example, the evidence suggests that the presence of multiple victims in
a case has a much larger aggravating effect in minority-accused cases than
it does in white-accused cases. Specifically, when the accused is a racial
minority, the imposition of a death sentence is 7.8 (78% compared to 10%)
times more likely in multiple-victim cases than it is in single-victim cases,
whereas in white-accused cases, the risk of a death sentence is only 1.7
(14% compared to 8%) times more likely in cases where the multiple
victims are white than it is in cases where the multiple victims are minority.
This interaction also holds for white-victim cases. Specifically, the risk of a
death sentence is 6.8 (61% compared to 9%) times higher in multiplevictim cases than it is in single-victim cases. The races of both accused and
victim, as well as the number of victims, persist in multivariate analyses.190
Our findings also support the mitigation prong of Justice White’s
hypothesis, which is that racial prejudice undervalues mitigating evidence
in minority-accused cases. In our core model, the single mitigating
circumstance (the accused provided support for his or her family) is given
substantially more weight in white-accused cases than in black-accused
cases.191
H. CONCLUSION

The findings presented in Part V document systemic racial disparities
in the administration of the military death penalty across the sixteen
multiple-victim cases. These disparities cannot be explained by legitimate
case characteristics or the effects of chance in a race-neutral system. Also,
a comparison of the findings presented in Table 12 for the sixteen multiplevictim cases with comparable findings presented in Table 3 for all ninetyseven cases in the sample clearly identifies multiple-victim cases as a
particularly important source of racial disparities in the system.

accompanying text.
190
When the core model for the imposition of death sentences (Table 4) is estimated
separately for minority accused and white accused, the logistic regression coefficient for the
multiple-victim variable was 20.6 for the minority-accused cases and 1.2 for the whiteaccused cases, neither of which was statistically significant. Similarly, in the white-victim
cases, the logistic regression coefficient for multiple victims was 3.5 compared to 2.8 among
all cases. (There were too few minority-victim cases to sustain a comparable multiple-victim
estimate among those cases.).
191
The core model based on all cases is reported in Table 4. In the white-accused cases,
the adjusted regression coefficient for this mitigator is -11.3 compared to -1.6 in the blackaccused cases.

1294

DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL.

[Vol. 101

V. A CASE-SPECIFIC QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF
THE RISK OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN TEN MINORITY-ACCUSED
DEATH-SENTENCED CASES
A. INTRODUCTION

The statistical evidence of minority-accused and white-victim
disparities presented in Parts IV.C through IV.F (for all cases) and Part
IV.G (for multiple-victim cases) documents a systemic risk of race-ofaccused and race-of-victim discrimination. But that evidence does not
assess the magnitude of the risk of conscious or unconscious racial
prejudice in individual cases. In this Section, we develop case-specific
quantitative and qualitative assessments of that risk for the ten deathsentenced minority-accused in our study and compare those assessments to
the inferences suggested by the statistical analyses of all cases (n = 97) and
multiple-victim cases (n = 16). This inquiry recognizes the limits of
systemic statistical models as a basis for estimating the impact of race in
individual cases. The ten death-sentenced minority-accused cases are listed
in Table 13.
The bottom-line question for each case is the likelihood that the
outcomes would have been a sentence less than death (a) if the race of the
accused had been white rather than minority, and (b) in the nine cases with
one or more white victims, if all of the victims had been racial minorities.
For each case, we first consider a case-specific quantitative measure of the
risk of race effects in the case. This measure is reported in Column G of
Table 13. It is the difference between (a) the case-specific predicted
likelihood of a death sentence among all death-eligible cases estimated with
our core logistic regression model (Table 4) with race effects included
(Column E of Table 13), and (b) the case-specific predicted likelihood of a
death sentence for each case with race effects purged from the analysis
(Column F of Table 13). For example, for case number 2 in Column D,
Jessie Quintanilla, the 13-point measure of the risk of racial prejudice in
Column G is the difference between a 96% predicted likelihood of a death
sentence for the case reported in Column E, when the race of the accused
and victim are included in the analysis, and the 83% predicted likelihood of
a death sentence for the case shown in Column F, when the impact of race
on the predicted likelihood of a death sentence has been purged from the
analysis.
We next developed a qualitative risk of racial prejudice in each case
based on a detailed factual analysis of each death-sentenced case and all
factually similar comparison cases. For each death-sentenced case in Table
13, therefore, we report both a quantitative estimate of risk in Table 13,
Column G, and a qualitative estimate of the risk of racial prejudice for the
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case in Appendix B.
Table 13
Death-Sentenced Minority-Accused Rank-Ordered According to
Qualitative Estimate of Culpability (from High (1) to Low (10)) (Col. D)
and Reporting on Estimated Quantitative Risk of Racial Prejudice in the
Case (Col. G): United States Armed Forces, 1984–2005
A

B
C
D
E
F
Quantitative Estimate of the Risk of Racial Prejudice
(Col. E – Col. F)
Predicted Likelihood of A Death Sentence with Race Effects
Purged192
Predicted Likelihood of A Death Sentence with Race
Effects Included
Qualitative Estimate of Criminal Culpability
(1 High to 10 Low)
Race of Victim(s)193
Race of the Accused194
Name of Accused
(Year of Sentencing)
1
Hassan Akbar (2005)
B
W/W
1
99%
98%
2
Jessie Quintanilla
Pacific
W
2
96%
83%
(1996)
Islander
3
Ronnie Curtis (1987)
B
W/W
3
94%
74%
4
Ronald Gray (1988)
B
W/W
4
87%
56%
5
Dwight Loving
B
W/W
5
78%
42%
(1989)
6
Kenneth Parker (1993)
B
W/B
6
78%
42%
7
James Murphy (1987)
B
W/W/B
7
48%
16%
8
Wade Walker (1993)
B
W/B
8
48%
16%
9
Jose Simoy (1992)
Filipino
W
9
41%
13%
10 Melvin Turner (1985)
B
B
10
27%
26%

G

1 pt.
13 pts.
19 pts.
31 pts.
36 pts.
36 pts.
32 pts.
32 pts.
28 pts.
1 pt.

An important background question in this analysis is whether the
degree of risk of racial prejudice in individual cases is associated with the
level of criminal culpability and deathworthiness of the accused. A
threshold step, therefore, was to rank-order with two different measures the
ten subject cases in terms of their criminal culpability. We document the

192

These estimates are computed with the core model of death-sentencing outcomes
among all death-eligible cases shown in Table 5 with the race effects purged from the
analysis.
193
The race of the accused and the race of the victims, e.g., “B” in Column B with
“W/W” in Column C, means a black accused with two white victims.
194
See supra note 193.
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process for rank-ordering the cases in Table 13. The first measure, in
Column D, is based on a case-specific qualitative comparative analysis of
their facts. The second measure, in Column F, is based on the quantitative
analyses presented above and shows the predicted likelihood of a death
sentence in the case with race effects purged from the analysis.195 The data
in Columns D and F indicate that, with the exception of Melvin Turner
(ranked tenth in Column D of Table 13), the quantitative rank-order
classifications of criminal culpability, shown in Column F, are identical to
the qualitative rank-order estimates shown in Column D.
B. THE RESULTS

1. Commissioned Officer Murder and Lethal Attacks on United States
Troops While on Duty
Column C of Table 13 indicates that seven of its ten cases involved
multiple victims. The quantitative results reported in Table 12 documented
strong systemic race effects among the sample of sixteen multiple-victim
cases and created a threshold inference of racial prejudice in the
decisionmaking for all seven multiple-victim cases reported in Table 13,
Column C. However, case-specific quantitative and qualitative analyses of
three of those cases, involving lethal assaults on U.S. troops while on duty
(Hassan Akbar) or commissioned officer victims (Hassan Akbar, Ronnie
Curtis, and Jessie Quintanilla), reveals a zero-to-low risk of racial prejudice
in those cases.196 The reason is that such cases constitute the most highly
aggravated category of military homicides.197 However, we qualify this
finding of a low risk of prejudice estimate with respect to race-of-victim
effects in these minority-accused cases by noting that each of the
commissioned officer victims in these three cases was white.
These findings provide some support for the “liberation hypothesis,”
which posits that decisionmakers in both the most highly and least
aggravated cases are likely to be in the “grip of fact” and less likely to be
influenced by arbitrary and irrelevant case characteristics. In contrast,

195

See supra text accompanying note 88 for a discussion of how we created the racepurged variables.
196
In Part 1 of Appendix B, we present the details of our qualitative analysis supporting
the inference of a zero-to-low risk of racial prejudice in the commissioned officer victim
cases.
197
For example, in the six officer-victim cases in our sample, the convening authority
sought a death sentence in each case, and of the five cases that advanced to a capital
sentencing hearing members returned a death verdict 80% (4/5) of the time. As a
consequence, the predicted likelihood of a death sentence without regard to race for these
cases reported in Column G of Table 13 is greater than 70%.
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decisionmakers in cases in the mid-range of aggravation are less likely to be
in the “grip of fact,” which “liberates” their decisionmaking and makes it
more susceptible to the influence of arbitrary and irrelevant case
characteristics.198 This theory has some application here because there is
little or no evidence of prejudice among the most aggravated military cases.
However, the strong evidence of prejudice among the five other highly
aggravated multiple-victim cases in Table 13 (Ronald Gray, Dwight Loving,
Kenneth Parker, James Murphy, and Wade Walker) and the substantial risk
of prejudice in the two comparatively low culpability single-victim cases
described below (Jose Simoy and Melvin Turner) weakens overall support
for the liberation hypothesis in the military.
2. Other Multiple-Victim Cases
As noted above, the next five cases in Table 13 (Ronald Gray, Dwight
Loving, Kenneth Parker, James Murphy, and Wade Walker) involved
multiple-victim murder with one or more white victims. The results of our
case-specific qualitative analysis for Ronald Gray and Kenneth Parker
reported in Part 2 of Appendix B suggest a lower risk of racial prejudice
than the estimates reported in Table 13, Column G, and the systemic race
effects reported in Table 12 for all multiple-victim cases. However, our
qualitative analyses of Dwight Loving, James Murphy, and Wade Walker
are consistent with the estimates of racial prejudice reported in Table 13,
Column G and suggested by the systemic race effects reported in Table 12
for all multiple-victim cases.
3. Single-Victim Cases
Jose Simoy and Melvin Turner, the final two cases in Table 13,
involved single-victim civilian-style murders, although Jose Simoy had
some military implications because the murder was committed on an Air
Force base. The victim was white in the Jose Simoy case and black in the
Melvin Turner case. The results of our qualitative analysis of these two
cases reported in Part 3 of Appendix B suggest a substantial risk of race-ofaccused and race-of-victim prejudice in Jose Simoy, which is consistent
with the case-specific 28-point estimated risk of prejudice reported in Table
13, Column G. For Melvin Turner, our qualitative estimate of the racial
198
BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI, supra note 41, at 145 (citing H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 164–67 (1966)). A frequently cited example is the evidence
before the United States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp. 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (referencing the complete absence of white-victim effects among
both the least and most aggravated cases in Georgia between 1973 and 1979). We found a
similar pattern of black-defendant disparities in the jury death-sentencing decisions in
Philadelphia County between 1983 and 1993. Baldus et al., supra note 129, at 1696 fig.3.
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prejudice risk is much larger than the 1-point estimate reported in Column
G of Table 13.
C. CONCLUSION

The statistical evidence reported for all cases in Parts IV.C through
IV.G and for all multiple-victim cases in Part IV.F of this paper documents
a systemic risk of discrimination based on the race of the victim and the
accused. In Part V, we presented case-specific quantitative and qualitative
estimates of the risk of racial prejudice in ten death-sentenced minorityaccused cases, which vary somewhat from the inferences suggested by the
systemic risk of discrimination documented in Part IV.
For the three most highly aggravated cases, which involved lethal
attacks on U.S. troops while on duty or a commissioned officer victim,
there appears to be little or no risk of racial prejudice.
Among the other five multiple-victim cases in Table 13, our casespecific qualitative analysis of Ronald Gray and Wade Walker suggests less
risk of racial prejudice than the systemic evidence in Table 12 (for all
multiple-victim cases) and the case-specific quantitative estimates reported
in Table 13, Column G do. However, our case-specific qualitative analyses
of Kenneth Parker, Dwight Loving, and James Murphy suggest a risk of
racial prejudice that is consistent with both the quantitative estimates in
Table 13, Column G, and the data in Table 12.
For the two single-victim cases, the qualitative and quantitative casespecific analyses produced consistent results for Jose Simoy (a moderate
risk of prejudice) but inconsistent results for Melvin Turner. Our
qualitative analysis for that case suggests a substantially higher risk of
racial prejudice than the 1-point estimate reported in Table 13, Column G.
VI. THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF SYSTEMIC RACE EFFECTS IN NONCAPITAL SENTENCING OUTCOMES
The literature suggests that the risk of racial discrimination in charging
and sentencing decisions is higher in capital murder cases than it is in noncapital cases, especially when interracial aspects of the cases have the
potential to stir up stereotypes and empathies that are not implicated in noncapital cases.199 To test that hypothesis for this study and to provide a point
of comparison for the evidence of race effects documented in Part III, we
estimated race effects in sixty-seven cases that did not advance to a capital
sentencing hearing. In each of these cases, the accused appealed to the
199

See WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 106
(1987) (reviewing papers alleging that race effects are more likely to appear in capital cases
than others).
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sentencing authority for a reduction of his or her life sentence to a term of
years. The request was denied 69% (46/67) of the time. For these
decisions, we estimated race effects based on the race of the accused and
the victim and the accused/victim racial combination exactly as we did in
our analysis of capital charging and sentencing outcomes in Part III of this
Article. We did not identify any racial disparities in these convening
authority decisions.200
For the twenty-nine cases that did result in a term of years, we also
estimated racial disparities in the length of those sentences. These
sentences are the product of decisions by the convening authority, by the
military judge, and by members in which the accused received the lesser of
the sentence imposed by the court-martial sentencing authority or approved
by the convening authority. Our analysis of these disparities showed only
weak racial effects, none of which are statistically significant.201
The results of both of these analyses are exactly what one would
200
We analyzed unadjusted race disparities in decisions by the convening authority
denying requests to reduce life sentences to a term of years either before or after trial and
identified no race effects at all. These findings stand in sharp contrast to the unadjusted
racial disparities in the rates that death-eligible cases (a) advance to a court-martial with the
government seeking a death sentence (a 20-point white-victim disparity and a 28-point
minority-accused/white-victim disparity), and (b) advance to a capital sentencing hearing (a
56-point white-victim disparity and a 19-point minority-accused/white-victim disparity) that
are documented in Part IV of this Article. We also estimated racial disparities in the rates
that requests for a reduction of a life sentence to a term of years were denied after adjustment
for the level of criminal culpability of the accused. The results were comparable. When we
included in the analysis the fifteen life sentences imposed in a capital sentencing hearing the
results were comparable.
201
In terms of white-victim effects, the data document a five-year longer median
sentence in the white-victim cases (a thirty-year median sentence in twenty-two cases) than
in the minority-accused cases (a twenty-five-year median sentence in seven cases). There
was a ten-year disparity in the average sentences (thirty-six years for the white-victim cases
versus twenty-six years for the minority-victim cases). As for minority-accused effects, the
median sentence was ten years shorter in the minority-accused cases (a twenty-five-year
median sentence in eleven cases) than it was in the white-accused cases (a thirty-five-year
median sentence in eighteen cases). There was a six-year difference in the average sentences
(thirty years for the minority-accused cases versus thirty-six years for the white-accused
cases). With regard to minority-accused/white-victim disparities, the median sentence was
seven years longer in the minority-accused/white-victim cases (a thirty-two-year median
sentence in six cases) than it was in the other cases (a twenty-five-year median in twentythree cases). There was also a seven-year difference in the average sentences (thirty-nine
years for the minority-accused/white-victim cases versus thirty-two years for the other
cases). In a multiple regression analysis of these data that controls for the race of the
accused and victim, without adjustment for offender culpability, the average sentence was
8.0 years longer for the white-victim cases than for the minority-victim cases and three years
shorter for the minority accused than it was for the white accused. None of these disparities
is close to statistical significance (p = .34 and .65 respectively) and the introduction of
controls for accused culpability does not change the results.

1300

DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL.

[Vol. 101

expect to see in a decisionmaking process that is race-neutral. The sharp
contrast they present to the substantial systemic disparities documented in
Part III for charging and sentencing decisions that implicate the death
penalty further supports the inference that those systemic disparities are
real.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this study indicate that the 1984 executive order
designed to bring military law into conformity with Furman failed to purge
the risk of racial prejudice from the administration of the death penalty in
the United States Armed Forces from 1984 through 2005.202 Our database
includes military prosecutions in all potentially death-eligible cases known
to us (n = 105) during that period of time, in which fifteen death sentences
were imposed.
The data document white-victim and minority-accused/white-victim
disparities in the imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible
cases that are consistent with findings in numerous state systems on which
comparable data are available.203 On average, after adjustment for nonracial case characteristics, the probability that a death sentence would be
imposed in white-victim cases was 12 percentage points higher (p = .11)
than it was in similarly situated minority-victim cases.204 In addition, on
average, the probability that a case would result in a death sentence was 15
percentage points higher (p = .09) in minority-accused/white-victim cases
than it was in all other cases with different accused/victim racial
combinations.205
The data also document an independent minority-accused disparity in
the imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible cases of a
magnitude that is rarely seen in comparable studies of state court
systems.206 On average, after adjustment for non-racial case characteristics,
the probability of a death sentence being imposed among all death-eligible
cases was 11 percentage points higher (p = .15) in minority-accused cases
than in white-victim cases.207
Because of the small sample of ninety-seven death-eligible cases in
202

Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3169 (Jan. 24, 1984).
See supra text accompanying note 143.
204
Supra Table 4, Part B, Row 2, Column C. When the racial disparity is stated in terms
of odds enhancement, the adjusted odds multiplier for the white-victim cases was 12.5.
205
When the racial disparity is stated in terms of odds enhancement, the adjusted odds
multiplier for the black-accused/white-victim cases was 6.6.
206
See supra text accompanying note 144.
207
When the racial disparity is stated in terms of odds enhancement, the adjusted odds
multiplier for the minority-accused cases was 5.2.
203
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which only fifteen death sentences were imposed, few of the racial
disparities estimated overall and at three different decision points are
statistically significant beyond the .05 level.208 Nevertheless, because of
their magnitude and consistency, we believe these findings support an
inference of real race effects in the system.
The principal source of the white-victim disparities in the system is the
combined effect of convening authority charging decisions and courtmartial members’ guilt trial decisions that advance cases to capital
sentencing hearings. Specifically, after adjustment for non-racial case
characteristics, on average, the probability that a white-victim case will
advance to a capital sentencing hearing is 27 percentage points higher
(p = .03) than the probability that a similarly situated minority-victim case
will advance that far in the process.209 This is the strongest race effect that
we documented in the system and it is consistent after adjustment for all
three of our measures of offender culpability.210
When the convening authority and member decisions that jointly
advance cases to a capital sentencing hearing are analyzed separately, the
white-victim effect is substantial in each analysis but in neither is it
statistically significant.211
With respect to race-of-accused disparities, there are no such effects in
convening authority decisions advancing cases to a capital guilt trial.212 In
contrast, there are accused race effects in two sets of members’ decisions.
First, when panel members decide on guilt in capital trials, there is a
moderate, though not statistically significant, minority-accused effect in
their unanimous guilt decisions.213 Second, the minority-accused effect is
much more substantial in the members’ death-sentencing decisions.
Specifically, there is an unadjusted 40-percentage-point minority-accused

208
The three different decision points were capital charging decisions by convening
authorities, guilt trial decisions by courts-martial members, and death-sentencing decisions
by members in a capital sentencing hearing.
209
See supra Table 10 & note 165. When the racial disparity is stated in terms of odds
enhancement, the adjusted odds multiplier for the white-victim cases was 28.1.
210
See supra Table 9, Part II, Row (c) (reporting statistically significant disparities of 28
points, 31 points, and 29 points).
211
The analysis of the convening authority decisions that advance cases to a capital
court-martial, reported in Table 6, documents a 13-percentage-point white-victim disparity,
significant at the .14 level. The analysis of the members’ unanimous guilt trial decisions that
advance cases to a capital sentencing hearing, reported in Table 8, documents a 37percentage-point white-victim disparity, significant at the .18 level.
212
In the core convening authority regression model, reported in Table 6, there is an 8percentage-point minority-accused disparity, significant at the .35 level.
213
In the guilt trial regression model, reported in Table 8, there is a 10-percentage-point
minority-accused disparity, significant at the .47 level.
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disparity in members’ death-sentencing rates (71% for minority accused
versus 31% for white accused) that is statistically significant at the .10
level.214 Upon adjustment with a variety of culpability measures, the
minority-accused disparities decline from 17 to 21 percentage points
(depending on the measure of accused culpability used in the analysis) and
were not significant because of the small sample sizes.215 These
independent race-of-accused disparities are substantially larger than the
race-of-defendant effects documented in any comparable study of jury
death sentencing of which we are aware.
The data reveal no white-victim effects in the members’ capital
sentencing decisions because only one black-victim case advanced this far
in the system. However, the substantial white-victim effects documented in
the members’ unanimous guilt trial decisions216 provide a basis for an
expectation of white-victim effects if a substantial number of black-victim
cases had advanced this far in the process.
What might explain the different records of the convening authorities
and members in the differential treatment of minority and white accused?217
As documented above, the record of the convening authorities is exemplary,
while the record of the members leaves much to be desired. First, the
convening authorities are experienced field grade officers (generals and
admirals) with training in the exercise of discretion in general and in the
military justice system in particular, in a profession that prides itself on
diversity and race-neutral decisionmaking. In contrast, members more
closely resemble civilian jurors in terms of their decisionmaking experience
in and out of the military justice system. Second, convening authorities are
heavily influenced by their chief legal advisors218 who are likely to have
had experience as a military prosecutor and as defense counsel representing
both minority and white accused. In contrast, members are on their own in
their decisionmaking and normally have had no reason to consider issues of
equal justice.
The sixteen multiple-victim cases are a major source of racial
disparities in the system, particularly minority-accused/white-victim
disparities. Among these sixteen cases, after adjustment for offender
culpability, the minority-accused/white-victim disparity is between 75 and
88 percentage points with a relative risk ranging from 4.9 to 10.8; two of

214

Supra Table 11, Column C.
Supra Table 11, Columns D–F.
216
See supra text accompanying note 158.
217
Among the 105 cases processed by convening authorities, 43% (45/105) involved
minority accused and 35% (37/105) involved African-American accused.
218
Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
215
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three disparities are significant beyond the .10 level.219 These findings are
consistent with theory and research suggesting that the risk of racial
prejudice in the imposition of death sentences is substantially enhanced in
highly aggravated cases with minority or black defendants and white
victims. The racial disparities documented among these sixteen cases are
the largest disparities that we have seen documented in any factually
defined subgroup of cases in an American death-penalty system over the
last twenty-five years.
Among the ten cases with a minority accused sentenced to death
between 1984 and 2005 (reported in Table 13), there is a distinct
relationship between the military implications of the murders and the risk of
racial prejudice. The results of a qualitative and quantitative analysis of
those cases documents a zero-to-low risk of racial prejudice in the three
cases with very strong military implications because they involved
commissioned officer victims or assaults on American troops. The other
seven cases, which had only weak or no military implications, involved a
risk of racial prejudice that is consistent with the statistical evidence of
racial disparities documented in Part III of this Article.
We also estimated racial disparities in sentencing decisions among the
sixty-seven death-eligible cases in our sample that did not advance to a
capital sentencing hearing. These sentencing decisions are also the
responsibility of convening authorities and court-martial members. This
analysis revealed no racial disparities beyond what one would expect to see
in a race-neutral system. Accordingly, these sentencing decisions confirm
the widespread perception that the risk of racial prejudice is substantially
higher in the administration of the death penalty than it is in
decisionmaking that does not implicate capital punishment.
The policy implications of our findings are comparable to those in the
Georgia findings presented to the United States Supreme Court in
McCleskey v. Kemp.220 That research teaches that the risk of systemic
discrimination can be eliminated or drastically curtailed by limiting death
eligibility to the most aggravated cases, in which there are few if any race
disparities.
In the military system, this objective could be accomplished by
limiting death eligibility to the most culpable murders committed by
members of the U.S. Armed Forces. After more than twenty years of
capital charging and sentencing experience, convening authorities and
courts-martial members alike perceive those to be: (a) the premeditated
murder of a commissioned officer under any circumstances, and (b) a
219
220

Supra Table 12 and accompanying text.
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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premeditated attack on U.S. troops resulting in the loss of life. Between
1984 and 2005, such cases account for 11% (11/97) of the death-eligible
cases and 33% (5/15) of all death sentences imposed. Between 1990 and
2005, they account for 57% (4/7) of the death sentences imposed.
Moreover, since that date, among the forty-six death-eligible civilian
murders with no military implications at all, only one death sentence has
been imposed.221 Our findings indicate that a narrowing of death eligibility
under military law to the most aggravated cases would greatly reduce or
entirely eliminate the risk of racial discrimination in the system.222
Such a limitation of death eligibility under military law would also
simplify the costs and complexity of the current system without impairing
the charging and sentencing authorities’ ability to protect vital military
interests through the use of the death penalty. For civilian murders with no
military implications, the option of life imprisonment with or without parole
would serve the interests of military justice. In fact, since 1990, a life
sentence or less has been the outcome of 98% (45/46) of the civilian-style
death-eligible murders with no military implications.
A formal narrowing of the military death penalty to the most
aggravated cases could come by way of an executive order or an act of
Congress. A de facto narrowing may now exist, given the charging
practices of sentencing authorities since 1990, which have substantially
limited capital prosecutions to death-eligible cases with significant military
implications. We urge the leadership of the United States Armed Forces,
Congress, and the President to consider revising the Uniform Code of
Military Justice to formalize this de facto practice or making other revisions
to address the racial disparity documented in this Article.

221
Witt (a highly aggravated two-victim, white-accused murder with five statutory
aggravating factors).
222
Our findings indicate that a further limitation of death eligibility to the premeditated
murder of commissioned officers and lethal attacks on troops would reduce even further the
risk of racial prejudice in the system.
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APPENDICES
A. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CASE CHARACTERISTICS USED IN
THE MILITARY DEATH-PENALTY STUDY: 1984–2005
A
Variable Label and Name

B
Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223

I. Victims
A. General Characteristics
1. Child Victim (CHILDVIC)
2. Commissioned Officer Victim (COM_OFF_VIC)
3. Prior to 11/1/99 Victim Was Less Than 15 Years
of Age (VIC_LT15)
4. Defendant Killed 2 or More Victims (TWOVIC)
5. Victim a Commissioned Officer or Police Officer
(OFF_VIC)
6. Pregnant Victim (PREGVIC)
7. Age of Victim #1 (in Years) (VIC1AGE)
(Median = 25)
B. Relationship to Accused
1. Spouse, Ex, or Paramour Victim (SPOUSEVIC)
2. Spouse, Ex, Paramour, or Child Victim
(SPOUSE_CHILDVIC)
3. Personal Relationship Between Accused and
Victim (D_V_REL_M)
4. Victim Was Accused’s Spouse, Child, or Parent
(PV265A)

5 (5)
6 (6)
5 (5)
15 (16)
7 (7)
0 (0)
5 (5)

29 (30)
33 (35)
29 (31)
30 (32)

II. The Crime
A. Place, Date, Type
1. Crime Committed Overseas (C_OVERSEAS)
2. Offense Date Later Than 1990 (AFTER_1990)
3. Military Implicated Murder (MIL_IMPLICATED)
4. Five-Year Intervals (FIVE_YEARS)
1984–1989 (1)
1990–1994 (2)

47 (49)
56 (59)
18 (19)
35 (34)
29 (28)

223
The reported values differ between the binary (0/1) variables and the multi-level (e.g.
1–5 levels) variables. For the binary variables, the “Percent” and “Number” are the percent
coded “1,” while for the multi-level variables, the “Percent” and “Number” refer to the cases
at the median level of the scale, which is indicated in parentheses.
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Variable Label and Name
1995–1999 (3)
2000–2005 (4)
B. Statutory Aggravating Factors for Premeditated Murder
1. Serious Contemporaneous Felony: 7B
(PM_AGG2)
2. Motive to Receive Money or Thing of Value: 7C
(PM_AGG3)
3. Accused Murder by Another by Means of
Coercion, Promise, or Thing of Value: 7D
(PM_AGG4)
4. Motive to Avoid or Prevent Apprehension or
Effect an Escape: 7E (PM_AGG5)
5. Victim Was an Officer in Execution of Office: 7G
(PM_AGG6)
6. Intent to Obstruct Justice: 7H (PM_AGG7
7. Intentional Infliction of Physical Harm: 7I
(PM_AGG8)
8. Multiple Victims: 7J (PM_AGG9)
9. Victim Under 15 Years of Age After 11/1/99
(PM_AGG10)
10. Great Risk to Others: R.C.M. 1004C (4)
(PM_AGG11)
11. Rape or Sodomy Involved (RAPE_SODOMY)
12. Robbery or Burglary Involved (ROB_BURG)
C. Statutory Aggravating Factors for Felony Murder
1. Accused Was the Actual Perpetrator (FM_AGG1)
2. Accused Was a Major Participant in Felony
Murder with Reckless Indifference (FM_AGG2)
3. Endangered Others Beyond Victim (FM_Agg3)
D. Non-Statutory Aggravating Features of the Offense – In
General
1. Brutal Clubbing or Other Unnecessarily Painful
Method of Attack (NS_AGG_TYPE2)
2. Brutal Stomping or Beating With Hands or Feet
(NS_AGG_TYPE3)
3. Multiple Gunshot Wounds (NS_AGG_TYPE5)
4. Single Shot to Head (NS_AGG_TYPE6)
5. Slashed Throat (NS_AGG_TYPE8)
6. Multiple Stabbing (NS_AGG_TYPE9)

[Vol. 101
B
Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223
21 (20)
14 (15)

32 (34)
11 (12)
3 (3)
2 (2)
10 (11)
11 (11)
56 (59)
14 (15)
3 (3)
9 (10)
10 (11)
26 (27)

8 (8)
4 (4)
2 (2)

17 (18)
18 (19)
12 (13)
9 (9)
10 (11)
23 (24)
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7. Extremely Bloody (NS_AGG_TYPE11)
8. Victim or a Nondecedent Bound or Gagged
(NS_AGG_TYPE13)
9. Victim or a Nondecedent Forced to Disrobe or
Disrobed by Perpetrator (In Whole or in Part)
(NS_AGG_TYPE14)
10. Attempt to Dispose of or Conceal Body After
Death (NS_AGG_TYPE15)
11. Multiple Victims (NS_AGG_TYPE16)
12. Bodily Harm to One Other Than a Decedent
(NS_AGG_TYPE17)
13. Luring, Ambushing, or Lying in Wait
(NS_AGG_TYPE19)
14. Victim Killed in Presence of Family Members or
Close Friends (NS_AGG_TYPE20)
15. Deceased Victim With 10 or More Stab Wounds
or Shots, Except When Murder Weapon Was a
Penknife or Other Small Cutting Instrument
(NS_AGG_TYPE21)
16. Accused Searched For and Selected Victim Based
on Identifiable Characteristics (NS_AGG_TYPE23)
17. Victim Strangled (NS_AGG_TYPE24)
18. Other (NS_AGG_TYPE25)
19. Source of Severe Physical Pain Was From
Unusual Method or Weapon, Place of Wounds,
Number of Wounds or Blows, or Duration of Attack
(PTV319A)
20. Mode of Mistreatment That Caused Severe
Physical Suffering Immediately Prior to Death, Not
Including Stabbing (PTV311A)
21. All Sources of Severe Physical Pain (DV319A)
22. Great Danger Aggravating Factors Recode for
PM and FM (HI_DANGER)
23. No Special Aggravating Circumstance
(NOSPAGG)
24. Accused Used Force to Enter Place of Homicide
(DV268A)
25. Accused Entered Place of Homicide Uninvited
and Unforced (PV268A)
26. File States or Indicated Accused Had History of
Previous Assaultive Conduct Toward Victim
(DV366A)

1307
B
Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223
20 (21)
5 (5)
8 (8)
19 (20)
10 (11)
7 (7)
13 (14)
11 (11)
13 (14)

7 (7)
23 (24)
4 (4)
55 (58)

52 (55)
56 (59)
11 (12)
4 (4)
4 (4)
6 (6)
11 (12)
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27. Accused Killed 2 to 7 Victims While Physically
Participating in the Killing or as the Triggerman
(DV373A)
28. File Stated or Implied Accused Showed No
Remorse For Homicide (PTV356A)
29. File Stated or Implied Accused Abandoned Dying
Victim Under Circumstances in Which It Was
Apparent the Victim Might Survive If Medical Help
Was Sought (PTV369A)
30. Homicide Planned For More Than 5 Minutes
(PV304A)
31. Record States or Implies Execution-Style
Homicide Against Subdued or Passive Victim
(PV306A)
32. Case Involved Contemporaneous Felony and
Homicide Was Unnecessary to Complete the Crime
(P3V307A)
33. Sexual Perversion Other Than Rape (P3V310A)
34. Mistreatment Lasted Longer Than Uninterrupted
Time Period It Took to Cause Death or
Unconsciousness (P3V317A)
35. Accused Continued or Resumed a Painful Attack
on a Decedent Victim After It Was Apparent the
Victim Was Dying (P3V371A)
36. Evidence in Record That Accused Used Alcohol
Within the 24 Hours Prior to Offense (P4V176A)
37. One or More Injured Non-Decedent Victims
(P4V374A)
38. Torture Involved (TORTURE)
39. Defenseless Victim (VDEFSLES)
40. Kidnapped Victim (VKIDNAP)
41. Threat of Interracial Conflict
(CONFLICT_RACE)
42. Additional Crime After Murder (ADDCRIME)
43. BODY_ PART_TYPEX (median = 1)
44. Accused Hid Dying Victim, Making Rescue
Unlikely (DHIDVIC)
45. No Special Aggravating Circumstances
(NOSPAGG)

[Vol. 101
B
Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223
15 (16)
17 (18)
13 (14)

37 (39)
13 (14)
4 (4)
4 (4)
7 (7)
15 (16)
43 (45)
11 (12)
3 (3)
0 (0)
0 (0)
6 (6)
21 (22)
35 (37)
4 (4)
4 (4)

2012]

RACE AND THE MILITARY DEATH PENALTY
A
Variable Label and Name

E. Aggravating Factors - Before the Crime
1. Accused Previously Attempted To Kill the Victim
(VAR365)
2. History of Assaultive Conduct (VAR366)
3. Previous Attempt to Kill and History of Assaultive
Conduct Combined (DVIOL_HIST)
4. Count of Previous Attempt to Kill and History of
Assaultive Conduct (DVIOL_HISTX ) (Median = 0)
5. Prior Announced Intent to Kill Victim to Third
Party (VAR368)
F. Accused’s Motive for the Murder
1. Motive to Facilitate Contemporary Offense
(FACILCOF)
2. Motive to Avoid Apprehension (AVAPREH)
3. Separation or Threat of Separation Motivated
Murder (DD_SEP)
4. Hatred or Revenge Motive (HATE_REV)
5. Insurance Motive: 4D (INSURANC)
6. Pecuniary Motive: Broad (PECUNMOT)
7. Immediate Rage or Frustration Motive (RAGE)
8. Sexual Motive (SEXMOT)
9. Retaliation for Sexual Refusal, Sexual Rivalry, or
History of Previous Assaultive Conduct
(SEX_ASSL)
10. Motive to Silence Witness to Contemporary
Offense (SILENCEW)
11. Motive to Silence Witness to an Earlier Crime
(SILPASTW)
12. Thrill Kill Motive (THRILKIL)
13. File Strongly Suggests that Racial Animosity
Was a Motive (PV385A)
G. Accused’s Role in the Crime
1. Accused Harmed No Victim (A_NOHARM)
2. Accused Did Not Participate in the Violence
(A_NOT_VIOL)
3. Accused Is Not the Trigger Person (PT373M)
H. Type of Attack
1. Victim Bound or Gagged (BOUNDGAG)
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5 (5)
11 (12)
14 (15)
86 (90)
23 (24)

19 (20)
3 (3)
11 (12)
24 (25)
9 (9)
12 (13)
24 (25)
12 (12)
16 (17)
4 (4)
4 (4)
5 (5)
8 (8)

7 (7)
6 (6)
7 (7)

5 (5)
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2. Luring or Ambush (AMBUSH)
3. Accused Ambushed Victim (DAMBUSH)
4. Brutal Clubbing (CLUB)
5. Slashed Throat (SLASH)
6. Brutal Stomping or Beating (STOMP)
7. Victim Was Strangled with Hands, Rope, Etc.
(STRANGLE)
8. Multiple Gunshot Wounds (Other Than to Head)
(MULSHBOD)
9. Multiple Gunshot Wounds (MULSHOT)
10. Multiple Stabbing (MULSTAB)
11. Single Shot to Head (V1HEADSH)
12. Execution-Style Homicide (EXECUTION)
13. Victim Mutilated or Dismembered (MUT_DISM)
14. Victim Otherwise Mutilated (OTHMUT)
15. Painful Method of Attack (PAINATK)
18. Sexual Abuse Beyond Rape (SEXPERV)
19. Multiple Stab Wounds (WOUND_1)
I. Parts of the Body That Were Wounded in the Attack
1. Head (BODY_PART_TYPE1)
2. Neck (BODY_PART_TYPE2)
3. Torso (BODY_PART_TYPE3)
4. Genitals (BODY_PART_TYPE4)
5. Limbs (BODY_PART_TYPE5)
6. Injuries to Genitals or Limbs (PV345A)
7. Sum of Injuries to the Victim
(BODY_PART_TYPEX) (Median = 2)
8. Head Wound (P4V345A)
J. Attacks that Caused Severe Physical Suffering
Immediately Prior to Death
1. Punching or Kicking (ATTACK_TYPE1)
2. Stabbing (ATTACK_TYPE2)
3. Beating with Baseball Bat (ATTACK_TYPE3)
4. Beating with Other Blunt Object
(ATTACK_TYPE4)
5. Shooting (ATTACK_TYPE5)
6. Sexual Attack (ATTACK_TYPE7)
7. Imprisonment (ATTACK_TYPE9)

[Vol. 101
B
Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223
13 (14)
19 (20)
17 (18)
10 (11)
18 (19)
21 (22)
5 (5)
12 (13)
23 (24)
9 (9)
13 (14)
5 (5)
5 (5)
49 (51)
4 (4)
28 (28)

48 (50)
49 (51)
44 (46)
7 (7)
12 (13)
19 (20)
24 (25)
40 (42)

20 (21)
23 (24)
4 (4)
10 (11)
8 (8)
8 (8)
16 (17)
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8. Sum of Methods of Attacks (ATTACK_TYPEX)
(Median = 1)
K. Source of Severe Physical Pain
1. Unusual Method or Weapon
(PAIN_SOURCE_TYPE1)
2. Place of Wounds (PAIN_SOURCE_TYPE2)
3. Number of Wounds or Blows
(PAIN_SOURCE_TYPE3)
4. Number of Persons Taking Part in the Attack
(PAIN_SOURCE_TYPE4)
5. Duration of the Attack (PAIN_SOURCE_TYPE5)
6. Other (PAIN_SOURCE_TYPE6)
7. Not Applicable (PAIN_SOURCE_TYPE8)
8. Unknown (PAIN_SOURCE_TYPE9)
9. Sum of Pain Sources (PAIN_SOURCE_TYPEX)
(Median = 1)
L. Murder Weapon
1. Handgun (HANDGUN)
2. Shotgun (PTV277A)
3. Knife Stabbing (KNIFE)
4. Bizarre Weapon, e.g. Sword or Razor Blade
(BIZWEAP)
5. Beating By a Blunt Object or Other Item, Not
Including a Baseball Bat, Fists, or Feet (PTV277A2)
M. Circumstances Surrounding the Victim’s Death
1. Extremely Bloody Crime (BLOODY)
2. Additional Crime or Dismemberment
(DADCRIMX)
3. Defendant Arrived Armed (DARMED)
4. Defendant Attacked Dying Victim (DATKDIEV)
5. Victim or Nondecedent Forced to Disrobe or
Disrobed by Perpetrator (In Whole or in Part
(DISROBE)
6. Defendant Showed No Remorse (DNOREMOR)
7. Defendant Expressed Pleasure (DPLEASUR)
8. Possible Indicators of Domestic Violence
Combined (DVIOL)
9. Count of Possible Indicators of Domestic Violence
(DVIOLX) (Median = 1)
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43 (45)

6 (6)
30 (31)
45 (47)
7 (7)
6 (6)
5 (5)
27 (28)
11 (11)
58 (61)

20 (21)
6 (6)
28 (29)
5 (5)
11 (12)

20 (21)
24 (25)
44 (46)
19 (20)
8 (8)
17 (18)
12 (13)
60 (62)
47 (49)
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10. Entry Without Consent (ENTRYNO)
11. Defendant Created Grave Risk to Nondecedent
Victim(s) (GRAVERSK)
12. Severe Pain from Duration of Attack
(LONGATAK)
13. Severe Pain from Multiple Wounds
(MULWOUND)
14. Attack on Victim More Than 15 Minutes
(PV317A)
15. Unnecessary Killing (UNECESAR)
16. Victim Pled for Life (VICPLEAD)
17. Victim Not Clothed at Death (VNUDE)
18. Victim a Stranger (VSTRANGR)
19. Accused Came to Crime Scene With Murder
Weapon (P4V269A)
20. Killing Planed More Than 5 Min. (PREMED)
21. Accused Planned Homicide For More Than 5
Minutes (VAR304)
N. Defendant’s Actions After the Crime
1. Additional Crime After Murder (ADDCRIME)
2. Defendant Hid Victim, Reducing Chance of Help
(DHIDVIC)
3. Attempt to Dispose of or Conceal Body
(HIDEBODY)
4. Defendant Abandoned Dying Victim
(DABANVIC)
5. Victim’s Body Burned or Placed in Trash or Dump
(PV351A2)
6. Defendant Actively Resisted Arrest (DRESIST)
7. Defendant Interfered with Judicial Process
(DTHRWIT)
8. Defendant Resisted Arrest (RESARRST)
O. Abuse of the Victim’s Body
1. Dismembered (Abuse_Type1)
2. Otherwise Mutilated (Abuse_Type2)
3. Sexually Attacked (Abuse_Type3)
4. Burned (Abuse_Type4)
5. Placed in Trash or Dump (Abuse_Type6)
6. Thrown in Body of Water (Abuse_Type7)

[Vol. 101
B
Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223
10 (11)
14 (15)
6 (6)
50 (47)
4 (4)
15 (16)
16 (17)
13 (14)
11 (12)
44 (46)
51 (53)
51 (53)

21 (22)
4 (4)
19 (20)
13 (14)
6 (6)
12 (13)
5 (5)
12 (13)

6 (6)
16 (17)
4 (4)
5 (5)
4 (4)
9 (9)
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7. No Indication of Abuse (Abuse_Type8)
8. Sum of the Types of Abuse (Abuse_TypeX)
(Median = 1)
9. Accused Dismembered or Otherwise Mutilated
Corpse After Death (DV351A)
10. Accused Was a Drug Addict or Substance Abuser
(DV185A)
11. Accuser Was Addicted to More Than One
Substance (DV185A2)
12. Victim Was Child, Parent, or Other Relative of
the Accused (DV265A)
13. Accused Used Force to Enter Place of Homicide
(DV268A)
14. Accused Strangled with Rope or Other Cord
and/or Burned or Suffocated in Arson (DV277A)
15. Victim Suffered Severe Physical Suffering from a
Variety of Sources (DV311A)
16. One or More Sources of Severe Physical Pain
(DV319A)
17. File States or Indicates that the Accused Had
History of Previous Assaultive Conduct Toward
Victim (DV366A)
18. Accused Killed 2 or 3 Victims as Trigger Person
or While Physically Participating in the Killing
(DV373A)
19. Accused Killed to Silence a Witness to a
Recently Committed or Attempted Crime by Either
the Accused or a Co-Perpetrator (DV401A)
20. Accused Killed to Silence a Witness Sought Out
Subsequent to the Commission of an Earlier Crime
(DV402A)
21. Victim Was Accused’s Spouse or a Sexual
Paramour (PTV265A)
22. Source of Severe Physical Pain Was From
Unusual Method or Weapon, Place of Wounds,
Number of Wounds or Blows, or Duration of Attack
(PTV319A)
23. File Stated or Implied Accused Showed No
Remorse For Homicide (PTV356A)
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69 (72)
70 (74)
18 (19)
65 (68)
9 (10)
5 (5)
4 (4)
9 (10)
43 (45)
56 (59)
11 (12)
15 (16)
4 (4)
4 (4)
29 (30)
55 (58)

17 (18)
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24. File Stated or Implied that the Accused
Abandoned Dying Victim Under Circumstances in
Which It Was Apparent the Victim Might Have
Survived If Medical Help Was Sought (PTV369A)
25. Accused Entered Place of Homicide Uninvited
and Unforced (PV268A)
26. Accused or Co-Perpetrator Came to the Crime
Scene Not Armed With the Weapon Used to Kill the
Victim (PV269M)
27. Homicide Planned For More Than 5 Minutes
(PV304A)
28. Record States or Implies Execution-Style
Homicide Against Subdued or Passive Victim
(PV306A)
29. Victim’s Body Dismembered or Mutilated
(PV351A)
30. Victim’s Body Burned or Placed in Trash or
Dump (PV351A2)
31. File Strongly Infers or Provides a Rational Basis
For Belief That Accused Had Long-Term Hatred of
Victim (PV380M)
32. File Strongly Infers Motive Was Racial
Animosity (PV385A)
33. Execution-Style Homicide (i.e. Homicide Against
Subdued or Passive Victim) (P3V306A)
34. Case Involved Contemporaneous Felony and
Homicide Was Unnecessary to Complete the Crime
(P3V307A)
35. Victim Was Not Clothed (In Whole or in Part) at
the Time of the Homicide (P3V309A)
36. Sexual Perversion Other Than Rape (P3V310A)
37. Mistreatment Lasted Longer Than Uninterrupted
Time Period It Took to Cause Death or
Unconsciousness (P3V317A)
38. Accused Continued or Resumed a Painful Attack
on a Decedent Victim After It Was Apparent the
Victim Was Dying (P3V371A)
39. File States Strongly Suggesting That Motive Was
to Facilitate the Commission of Another Crime
(P3V397A)
40. Evidence in Record That Accused Used Alcohol
Within the 24 Hours Prior to Offense (P4V176A)

[Vol. 101
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Cases)223
13 (14)

6 (6)
29 (30)
37 (39)
13 (14)
7 (7)
6 (6)
10 (11)
8 (8)
12 (13)
11 (12)
10 (11)
4 (4)
7 (7)
15 (16)
19 (20)
43 (45)
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41. Accused Came to Crime Scene with Murder
Weapon (P4V269A)
42. Strong or Some Evidence to Show Victim
Pleaded for Life (P4V308A)
43. Victim Dismembered After Death (P4V351A)
44. One or More Injured Nondecedent Victims
(P4V374A)
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Cases)223
44 (46)
16 (17)
6 (6)
11 (12)

III. Mitigating Factors
A. Mitigating Factors based on the Model Penal Code
Mitigating Circumstances:
1. No Significant History of Prior Civilian Criminal
Activity (MPC1)
2. Accused Under Extreme Emotional Disturbance
(MPC2)
3. Victim a Participant (MPC3)
4. Accused Was a Minor Accomplice (MPC5)
5. Accused Was Under Domination of Another
(MPC6)
6. Accused’s Capacity to Appreciate Criminality Was
Impaired (MPC7)
7. Youth of the Accused (MPC8)
8. A Catchall Mitigating Factor (MPC9)
B. Other Mitigating Factors
1. No Previous Arrests or Convictions
(ST_MIT_TYPE10)
2. Passionate Reasons for the Murder (Not Cold
Calculation) (ST_MIT_TYPE30)
3. Murder Committed During a Heated Argument
(ST_MIT_TYPE31)
4. Murder Committed During a Domestic Quarrel
(ST_MIT_TYPE32)
5. Accused’s Intent to Kill Was Formed During an
Argument with the Victim (ST_MIT_TYPE33)
6. Accused Acted in Emotional Rage
(ST_MIT_TYPE34)
7. Accused Was Defending Himself
(ST_MIT_TYPE36)
8. Accused Was Depressed (ST_MIT_TYPE39)

51 (53)
29 (30)
2 (2)
2 (2)
5 (5)
35 (37)
18 (19)
81 (85)

48 (50)
13 (14)
6 (6)
11 (11)
5 (5)
16 (17)
4 (4)
8 (8)
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9. Accused Had Difficulty Dealing With Stressful
Situations (ST_MIT_TYPE40)
10. Accused Had Substantial Psychological Stress
Not Created by the Accused’s Wrongful Act
(ST_MIT_TYPE41)
11. Accused Had Emotional Stress and Considered
Suicide After Murder (ST_MIT_TYPE42)
12. Accused is 18, 19, or 20 Years Old
(ST_MIT_TYPE51)
13. Accused Was Not the Trigger Person
(ST_MIT_TYPE64)
14. Accused Suffers from Psychotic Depression
(ST_MIT_TYPE82)
15. Accused Had a Substantially Impaired Capacity
to Appreciate the Criminality of His Conduct or
Conform His Conduct to the Requirements of the
Law (ST_MIT_TYPE89)
16. Accused Claimed He/She Was Intoxicated
During the Crime (ST_MIT_TYPE99)
17. Accused Was Drinking the Night/Day the
Homicide Was Committed (ST_MIT_TYPE101)
18. Accused Had a Mental and Emotional Handicap
(ST_MIT_TYPE103)
19. Other Accused Had Personality Disorder
(ST_MIT_TYPE114)
20. Accused Had Significantly Impaired Social
Judgment (ST_MIT_TYPE118)
21. Accused Had Antisocial Personality Disorder
(ST_MIT_TYPE120)
22. Accused Showed No Long Term Planning of the
Murder (CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE300)
23. Accused Showed Remorse for the Crime
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE301)
24. Accused Took Responsibility for the Offense
(e.g., Pled Guilty to a Non-Capital Murder)
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE302)
25. Accused Surrendered Within 24 Hours
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE303)
26. Accused Surrendered More Than 24 Hours After
the Homicides (CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE304)

[Vol. 101
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Cases)223
5 (5)
6 (6)
6 (6)
11 (12)
6 (6)
6 (6)
4 (4)

18 (19)
18 (19)
7 (7)
6 (6)
5 (5)
9 (9)
24 (25)
42 (44)
21 (22)
4 (4)
5 (5)
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27. Accused Cooperated with Authorities (e.g.
Testified for Prosecutors)
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE305)
28. Dispute Between Spouses or Ex-Spouses
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE339)
29. Lover’s Triangle (CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE341)
30. Accused Did Not Flee Crime Scene
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE347)
31. Accused Waived Miranda Rights
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE348)
32. Accused Confessed to the Crime
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE350)
33. Credibility Problems of Co-Accused
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE352)
34. Accused Had Good Behavior at the Trial
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE353)
35. Accomplice with Comparable Culpability
Received Less Severe Treatment
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE354)
36. Accused Is a Parent
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE400)
37. Accused Is a Good Parent
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE401)
38. Accused Is a Provider For His or Her Family
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE402)
39. Accused Is a Good Spouse
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE403)
40. Accused Is a Good Child
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE404)
41. Accused Loves His or Her Family
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE405)
42. Accused Has Family Who Loves Him or Her
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE406)
43. Accused Did Service to Community
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE502)
44. Accused Did Volunteer Work
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE507)
45. Accused Exhibited Kindness to Others
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE510)
46. Accused Leads a Stable Life
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE600)

1317
B
Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223
16 (17)
19 (20)
6 (6)
5 (5)
6 (6)
34 (36)
5 (5)
7 (7)
8 (8)
39 (41)
12 (13)
21 (22)
6 (6)
30 (31)
42 (44)
60 (63)
5 (5)
4 (4)
20 (21)
19 (20)
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47. Accused Possesses Good Character Traits
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE601)
48. Accused was a Non-Violent Person
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE602)
49. Accused Cooperated with Police
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE603)
50. Accused Cooperated with Prosecutors
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE604)
51. Accused Had Good Behavior While in Prison
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE605)
52. Accused Improved in Prison
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE606)
53. Accused Was Raised in Good Home
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE610)
54. Accused Had a Religious Background
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE611)
55. Accused Displayed Good Qualities as a Child
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE612)
56. Accused Was Intelligent
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE614)
57. Accused Had Strong Spiritual and Religious
Beliefs (CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE615)
58. Accused Was Devout in His or Her Faith
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE616)
59. Accused Had a Spiritual Conversion
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE618)
60. Accused Had a Potential to Contribute to Society
(CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE623)
61. Accused Had a Potential to Contribute to Prison
Life (CATCHALL_MIT_TYPE624)
62. Accused or Co-Perpetrator Came to the Crime
Scene Not Armed with the Weapon Used to Kill the
Victim (PV269M)
63. Accused Cooperated with Police or Prosecutors
(D_HELP_PROS_M)
64. Accused Is a Parent (D_PARENT_M)
65. Accused Is a Provider (D_PROVID_M)
66. Accused Has Rehabilitation Potential or Engaged
in Self-Help Activities (D_SELF_HELP_M)
67. Accused Showed Remorse for Crime
(REMORSE_M)

[Vol. 101
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Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223
31 (33)
27 (28)
5 (5)
9 (9)
20 (21)
5 (5)
19 (20)
9 (9)
9 (9)
9 (10)
9 (10)
6 (6)
10 (11)
20 (21)
8 (8)
29 (30)
10 (11)
39 (41)
21 (22)
27 (28)
42 (44)
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68. Personal Relationship Between Accused and
Victim (D_V_REL_M)
69. Accused Has Family Who Love Him/Her
(FAM_LOVE_D_M)
70. Accused Took Responsibility for Offense
(TOOK_RESP_M)
71. No Evidence of Long-Range Planning for the
Murder (NO_LONG_PLAN_M)
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of
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29 (31)
60 (63)
36 (38)
23 (24)

IV. Evidentiary Measures
A. Strong Evidence
1. Full Confession with Corroboration
(STRONG_EVID1)
2. Confession or Declaration Against Penal Interest
with Corroboration (STRONG_EVID2)
3. Confession or Other Overwhelming Evidence
(STRONG_EVID3)
B. Miscellaneous Evidentiary Variables
1. Full Confession to Law Enforcement Authorities
(EVID_STREN_L_1)
2. Qualified Confession (i.e. Accused Admitting
Only Some Elements of Capital Murder)
(EVID_STREN_L_2)
3. Declaration Against Penal Interest of Accused with
Eyewitness Testimony, Substantial Forensic
Evidence, or Circumstantial Evidence
(EVID_STREN_L_3)
4. Eyewitness(es) Without Creditability Problems
(EVID_STREN_L_4)
5. Eyewitness(es) with Credibility Problems But with
Either Overwhelming Forensic or Physical Evidence
or Substantial Circumstantial Evidence
(EVID_STREN_L_5)
6. Overwhelming Forensic or Physical Evidence
(EVID_STREN_L_6)
7. Full Confession to Law Enforcement Authorities
(EVID_STREN_SA_1)
8. Qualified Confession (i.e. Accused Admitting
Only Some Elements of Capital Murder)
(EVID_STREN_SA_2)

20 (20)
65 (68)
83 (87)

19 (20)
29 (30)
17 (18)

6 (6)
5 (5)

8 (8)
26 (27)
15 (16)
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9. Declaration Against Penal Interest of Accused with
Eyewitness Testimony, Substantial Forensic
Evidence, or Circumstantial Evidence
(EVID_STREN_SA_3)
10. Eyewitness(es) Without Creditability Problems
(EVID_STREN_SA_4)
11. Overwhelming Forensic or Physical Evidence
(EVID_STREN_SA_6)
12. Pretrial Identification of Accused Occurred
(EVID_TYPE_1)
13. Accused Identified By Someone Who Knew Him
or Her (EVID_TYPE_2)
14. Accused Identified By 2 or More Witnesses
(EVID_TYPE_4)
15. Accused Confessed to Murder (EVID_TYPE_5)
16. Accused Made Incriminating Statements, Less
Than a Full Confession (EVID_TYPE_6)
17. Co-Perpetrator Implicated or Testified Against
Accused (EVID_TYPE_7)
18. Weapon Found Linking Accused to Murder
(EVID_TYPE_8)
19. Scientific Evidence Linking Accused to Murder
(e.g. DNA or Fingerprint Evidence)
(EVID_TYPE_9)
20. Physical Evidence Linking Accused to Murder
(EVID_TYPE_10)
21. Testimony of Primary Witness Was Corroborated
(EVID_TYPE_11)
22. Accused Had a Motive to Commit Murder
(EVID_TYPE_12)
23. Accused Took out Insurance Policy on Deceased
Victim (EVID_TYPE_14)
C. Other Crimes Evidence
1. Death-Eligible Contemporaneous Offense
Conviction (DECO_CONVICT)
2. Death-Eligible Contemporaneous Offense Present
(DECO_PRESENT)
D. Accused Defenses
1. Insufficient Evidence to Prove § 118(1)
Culpability (DEFENSE_TYPE1)

[Vol. 101
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15 (16)

6 (6)
9 (9)
26 (27)
23 (24)
23 (24)
49 (51)
27 (28)
26 (27)
33 (34)
28 (29)
48 (50)
11 (12)
43 (45)
6 (6)

34 (36)
43 (45)

48 (50)
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2. Accident (DEFENSE_TYPE2)
3. Mistaken Identity (DEFENSE_TYPE4)
4. Defense of Self or Others (DEFENSE_TYPE8)
5. Lack of § 118(1) Mens Rea Because of Mental
Illness or Intoxication (DEFENSE_TYPE15)
6. Witnesses Not Creditable (DEFENSE_TYPE19)
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8 (8)
8 (8)
5 (5)
20 (21)
7 (7)

V. Accused Criminal Culpability Scales
1. Number of Statutory Aggravating Factors in the Case
(NUM_AGG) (Median = 1)
2. Number of Mitigating Factors in the Case (MITCIRX)
(Median = 2)
3. Five-Level Race-Purged Scale Based on Logistic
Regression Model of Death-Sentencing Outcomes Among
All Death-Eligible Cases (DTH_W6_SCL) (Median = 3)
4. Five-Level Race-Purged Scale Based on Logistic
Regression Model of Convening Authority Decisions
Advancing Cases to a Court-Martial Seeking a Death
Sentence (CAS_SCL_8) (Median = 3)
5. Six-Level Scale Based on 3 Salient Factors
(FACTORS_SCL2X)224 (Median = 2)
6. Highly Aggravated Case: 2 or More Statutory
Aggravating Factors (HI_AGG)

49
(52)
36 (33)
21 (20)
25 (26)

15 (16)
50 (53)

VI. Accused and Victim Race, Gender, and Ethnicity Variables

224

A. Race of the Accused
1. Accused is a Racial Minority (ACCUSEDRM)
2. Accused is African-American (ACCUSEDB)
3. Accused is Hispanic (ACCUSEDH)

43 (45)
37 (39)
9 (9)

B. Race and Gender of Victim(s)
1. White Victim (WV)
2. Female Victim (FEMVIC1)
3. Female White Victim (FEMWHITEVIC)
4. Minority Male Victim (MIN_MALEVIC)

82 (86)
54 (52)
31 (31)
8 (8)

The component variables of this salient factors scale are: (a) the vileness factor
(VILE_FAC); (b) the accused victim relationship factor (A_V_FAC); and (c) the two or
more aggravating factors variable (HI_AGG).

1322

DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL.
A
Variable Label and Name
5. One or More White Victims (WHITEVIC)
C. Defendant/Victim Racial/Gender Combinations
1. Racial Minority Accused and One or More White
Victims (MDWV)
2. Accused/Victim Racial Combination
(AVICRACE_2):
Minority Accused/White Victim (1)
White Accused/White Victim (2)
Minority Accused/Minority Victim (3)
White Accused/Minority Victim (4)
3. Minority Accused in One-Victim Cases
(ACCUSEDRM_ONEVIC)
4. Minority Accused in Multiple-Victim Cases
(ACCUSEDRM_TWOVIC)

VII. Outcomes
1. Case Advances to a Capital Court-Martial with the
Government Seeking a Death Sentence (CA_SEEK)
2. Capital Sentencing Hearing Held (CSH)
3. Capital Sentencing Hearing: Death Sentence Imposed
(CSHDTH)
4. Death Sentence Imposed Among All Death-Eligible
Cases (DEATH1)
5. DTH_LIFE_TERM
Death (2)
Life (1)
Term of Years (0)
6. Life Without Possibility of Parole Imposed (LWOP)
7. Unanimous Vote of Guilt for Premeditated Murder
(MEMBERS_GLT)
8. Life Versus Term of Years in a Non-Capital Sentencing
Hearing (NCSH_LIFE_TERM)
9. Non-Unanimous Guilty Verdict (NON_UNANIMOUS)

[Vol. 101
B
Percent
(Number
of
Cases)223
82 (86)

27 (28)

27 (28)
55 (58)
16 (17)
2 (2)
34 (36)
9 (9)

43 (45)
31 (30)
48 (15)
15 (15)
14 (15)
58 (56)
29 (25)
4 (4)
73 (30)
69 (46)
27 (11)
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B. CASE-SPECIFIC QUALITATIVE ANALYSES OF THE RISK OF RACIAL
PREJUDICE IN TEN MINORITY-ACCUSED DEATH-SENTENCED
CASES (1984–2005)

1. Commissioned Officer Murder and Lethal Assaults on U.S. Troops While
on Duty
The following qualitative analysis supports an inference of little or no
risk of racial prejudice in the commissioned officer victim cases.
i. Hassan Akbar
Akbar included two officer victims and a great risk of death to many
other military personnel because the accused, Hassan Akbar, attacked his
own unit. These facts highly aggravate his case by military standards and
explain why the predicted probability of a death sentence without regard to
race is 98% (reported in Column E of Table 13).225 The quantitative
assessment of the risk of prejudice in Column G is 1 percentage point.
There are no other cases with multiple victims who are officers with either a
white or minority accused for purposes of comparison. Kreutzer, a whiteaccused/white-victim case with a single, white officer victim, is the only
other case involving an attack on a military unit and a great risk of death to
many other military personnel.226 William Kruetzer also received a death
sentence. Given the high value placed on the lives of commissioned
officers in the military and the safety of troops, and the death sentence in
Kreutzer, it is difficult to perceive a significant risk that racial prejudice
infected Akbar’s charging and sentencing decisions. This qualitative
assessment of risk is consistent with the 1-point estimated risk of racial
prejudice reported in Table 13, Column G.
ii. Jessie Quintanilla
Jessie Quintanilla killed one commissioned officer and nearly killed
another officer in retaliation for perceived discriminatory treatment by his

225
At night in Kuwait four days before the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq,
Hassan Akbar, a thirty-one-year-old Army E5 with four years of military service, feigned an
attack on his unit by rolling live hand grenades into three tents with sleeping officers and
opened fire on the occupants as they fled their tents. He killed one officer with a shot in the
back. A second officer died of eighty-seven shrapnel wounds. Akbar injured fourteen other
non-decedent military victims, many seriously.
226
William J. Kreutzer, a white, twenty-six-year-old infantry weapons squad leader
Army E5, frustrated with his military unit, arrived in the middle of a drill formation of
multiple units in a stadium located on his post and opened fire on 1,300 fellow soldiers,
killing one, a major, and wounding several others, including at least one officer.
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victims. 227 Quintanilla is distinguishable from Akbar because Quintanilla’s
motive was a personal grievance toward his victims and he did not threaten
the lives of many other military personnel the way Akbar and Kreutzer did.
Nevertheless, Quintanilla’s decedent and non-decedent victims were
commissioned officers, which explains the 83% estimated probability of his
receiving a death sentence without regard to race, reported in Column E.
Colon and Garraway are life-sentenced cases with single-officer
victims in which the accused attacked an individual officer for personal
reasons. Ruben Colon, an extremely violent offender in a whiteaccused/white-victim case, was capitally referred but he avoided the risk of
a death sentence when the court-martial members failed to unanimously
find premeditation despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, an
outcome that enhances the perceived risk of racial prejudice in
Quintanilla.228 Garraway, a minority accused with a single, white-officer
victim, was charged capitally for a highly aggravated murder, but received a
life sentence in a capital sentencing hearing.229 Evidence that Garraway
suffered from a personality disorder and paranoia mitigates and thereby
may distinguish his case from Quintanilla.
Overall the perceived risk of racial prejudice in Quintanilla is higher
than the risk in Akbar, but it is low and consistent with the 13-point
estimated risk of racial prejudice reported in Column G of Table 13.
iii. Ronnie Curtis
Ronnie Curtis killed two white victims: an officer and his wife.230 The
presence of two white victims, one of whom is an officer, places this case at
a slightly greater risk of discriminatory treatment than Quintanilla.
227

In retaliation for perceived discriminatory treatment, Jessie Quintanilla, a twentyeight-year-old E4 with nine years of military service, killed his executive officer with a shot
in the back. The accused also attempted to kill his commanding officer with a nearly fatal
shot to his chest.
228
Ruben Colon, a white enlisted man with fifteen years of service in the Navy,
murdered and robbed the white disbursing officer on his ship. The victim was found gagged,
bound, strangled, and shot once through the head in a locker on the ship. Colon also stole
cash and U.S. Treasury checks from the victim’s office.
229
Mitchell Garraway, a minority, twenty-one-year-old Navy E4 with three years of
military service, brutally stabbed a white, thirty-five-year-old engineering officer aboard
their ship in retaliation for the victim’s alleged part in suspending his watch stander’s
qualifications and withholding his promotion, as well as for perceived racial injustice.
Garraway fled and another officer discovered the victim, who bled to death within an hour
after the attack.
230
Ronnie Curtis, a twenty-one-year-old Marine Corps E3 with three years of military
service, murdered his commanding officer in charge and the officer’s wife by stabbing them
multiple times in retaliation for perceived racial slights by the officer. He also burglarized
the victims’ homes and robbed them.
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Although Curtis, like Garraway, killed for personal reasons, Curtis is more
aggravated because he killed two victims. Our qualitative assessment of the
risk of racial prejudice in Curtis, therefore, is consistent with the 19-point
estimated risk reported in Column G of Table 13.
2. Other Multiple-Victim Cases
The following qualitative analysis supports an inference of substantial
risk of racial prejudice in the other multiple-victim cases.
The Gray and Loving cases are civilian-style, multiple-victim cases
with conflicting evidence on the risk of racial prejudice.
i. Ronald Gray
Ronald Gray’s crime involved two rape–murders with sodomy and a
third rape, each on separate occasions. He had also been convicted of an
additional premeditated murder in a North Carolina court.231 Gray’s crime
was racially charged and at risk of racial prejudice not only because he
killed two white victims but also because he raped three white women.232
There are no other multiple-victim cases with rape as a statutory
aggravating factor. However, Gray may be usefully compared to the case
of Rocky Reliford233 and Alan Clark,234 two white co-perpetrators in a
231
Ronald Gray, a twenty-one-year-old Army E4 with four years of military service,
abducted, raped, and sodomized his first victim and stabbed her multiple times. Several
weeks later, Gray bound, gagged, raped, and sodomized his second victim, a civilian cab
driver, and stabbed her seven times. He also attempted to kill a non-decedent rape victim
with multiple stab wounds to the neck and side after tying her hands behind her back. A
North Carolina court had earlier convicted Gray of a third unrelated premeditated murder.
232
See R.W. Hymes et al., Acquaintance Rape: The Effect of Race of Defendant and
Race of Victim on White Juror Decisions, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 627, 632 (1993) (finding
mock juries in 1990 more likely to convict a black defendant of rape when his victim was
white rather than black); Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and
the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 119, 129–30
(1973) (finding that between 1945 and 1965 in six southern states where rape was a deatheligible offense, the death-sentencing rate in black-defendant cases was 13% (110/823)
compared to 2% (9/442) in white-defendant cases. However, in black-defendant cases with
white victims, the rate was 36% (113/317) compared to 2% (19/921) in cases with all other
defendant/victim racial combinations).
233
Rocky Reliford, a white twenty-one-year-old Marine Corps E4 with four years of
military service, and two accomplices, including Alan Clark, robbed and murdered a fellow
white marine, a lance corporal, and his Asian wife, both of whom he knew. The perpetrators
cut the male victim’s throat with a utility knife they brought with them and then strangled the
wife before cutting her throat. They then stole items including a wallet, from which they
obtained identification that enabled them to access the victims’ banking and American
Express accounts.
234
Alan Clark was a white twenty-one-year-old Marine Corps E3 with two years of
military service. See supra note 233 and accompanying text for a discussion of the crime
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single-murder case involving a contemporaneous felony (robbery) and two
victims, one white and the other Asian. Reliford’s court-martial members
failed to unanimously convict him of premeditated murder, while Clark was
sentenced to life imprisonment in a capital sentencing hearing. Another
relevant case is Meeks, in which a white accused killed two white victims
and was sentenced to life imprisonment in a capital sentencing hearing.235
The Gray case is arguably more aggravated than Reliford and Clark by
the presence of a third premeditated murder (for which Gray was convicted
in a state court) and a third rape that did not result in a murder. In terms of
assessing the importance of the third rape as an aggravating circumstance, it
is worth noting that out of twelve other rape–murder cases (six with
sodomy) prosecuted in the military courts since 1984, none has resulted in a
death sentence.236
Gray’s case also involved substantial violence—the first victim was
stabbed and shot multiple times, and the second victim was stabbed seven
times. However, the cruelty in Gray does not exceed that of Reliford and
Clark.237 Nor does the cruelty in Gray exceed the cruelty in Meeks.238
As noted above, Reliford’s court-martial failed to reach a unanimous
vote on his premeditated murder charge, which took death off the table. On
its face, that decision would appear to mitigate Reliford and distinguish it
from Gray. However, that decision in Reliford appears to be against the
weight of the evidence, since he and his accomplice planned the crime as a
murder–robbery and they armed themselves with knives beforehand to
carry out their mission. There is a risk, therefore, that the dissenting votes
on premeditation in Reliford, taken with knowledge of their implications for
a death sentence, may have been influenced by the race of the accused
(white) and the race of one of his victims (Asian).
Meeks’s court-martial members may have empathized with him
because of his race and his jealousy motive. In addition, they may have
treated him less severely in deference to his eleven years of military service.
This potential mitigation does not apply to Reliford or Clark who, like
committed.
235
Jeffrey Meeks, a white twenty-eight-year-old Army E6 with eleven years of military
service, killed two white female friends when the two victims began to exclude him. He
entered the trailer-park residence of the second victim, bound and gagged both victims with
tape, stabbed them many times and slit their throats with a knife. He shot one victim one
time in the chest and inflicted post-mortem wounds on the second victim by beating her with
a fire poker. He then emptied the contents of the second victim’s purse, took her car keys,
and stole her car, which he later abandoned.
236
These were all single-victim cases: Fell, Franklin, Gates, Grandy, Graves, Mabie,
Miller, Mobley, Ronghi, Shiloh, P. Smith, and Whitehead.
237
Supra notes 233–234.
238
Supra note 235.
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Gray, had been in the military only four years. We believe that Reliford,
Clark, and Meeks support a concern about the risk of racial prejudice in
Gray. However, because of the extraordinary level of culpability in Gray,
our qualitative assessment of the risk of racial prejudice in the case is lower
than the 31-point estimate reported for his case in Column G of Table 13.
ii. Dwight Loving
Dwight Loving killed two white cab drivers in the course of two
different robberies and attempted to murder a third white cab driver in a
failed robbery attempt. The day before the murders he completed two
armed robberies against white victims.239
Clark, Reliford, and Meeks, discussed above in the Gray analysis, are
also relevant to Loving. Although Loving involved two separate robberies
and one attempted robbery in a single evening, his two murders—carried
out with shots to the victims’ heads from a handgun—lack the ferocity and
brutality of the Clark, Reliford, and Meeks murders.
It can be argued that Loving’s third unsuccessful armed robbery and
the two successful robberies he committed the day before the murders
aggravated his case vis a vis Clark, Reliford, and Meeks. In assessing that
claim, it is worth noting that in the twenty-one other cases of armed robbery
and murder prosecuted between 1984 and 2005, a death sentence was
imposed only four times—twice in single-victim cases (Dock240 and
Simoy241) and twice in multiple-victim cases (Parker and Walker).242

239

Dwight Loving, a twenty-year-old Army E1 with two years of military service,
murdered two cab drivers during two robberies. He killed the first driver with two shots to
the head, which yielded $30. On the same night, he killed the second driver with one shot to
the head, which again yielded about $30. He later tried to rob and kill a third driver who
escaped. The night before the two murders he successfully completed two additional
robberies.
240
Todd Dock, a white, nineteen-year-old armor crewman (Army E3) with three years of
military service, stabbed a German taxi driver in the neck until he lost consciousness. After
the cab came to a stop, Dock dragged the driver’s body from the car. At that point, the
driver regained consciousness and attempted to grab Dock’s arm. Dock then repeatedly
stabbed the victim in the abdomen and chest until he died. Dock stole the victim’s wallet
and fled the scene.
241
Jose Simoy, a twenty-eight-year-old Air Force E4 with three years of service, and
four co-perpetrators robbed individuals delivering proceeds to a bank on an airbase. In the
process, another co-perpetrator killed a police officer with pipe blows to the head and nearly
killed a witness trying to silence him. The accused was not the trigger person and did not
intend to kill the victim. However, he masterminded the robbery and directed an accomplice
to murder the witness.
242
The single-victim cases of armed robbery where the defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment or less are: Adams, Antle, Baer, F. Brown, Coleman, Colon, M. Curry, Hirsch,
Humiston, Jordan, McDonald, Pereira, Schroeder, and Stinson. The other two multiple-
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Among these four cases, the death sentences in Simoy, Parker, and Walker
are minority-accused/white-victim cases that themselves carry a risk of
racial prejudice. Dock’s conviction was reversed on appeal, and on remand
he was sentenced to life imprisonment in a capital sentencing hearing.
We believe that Reliford, Clark, and Meeks support a significant
concern about the risk of racial prejudice in Loving. This concern is
consistent with the 36-point quantitative assessment of risk of racial
prejudice reported for Loving in Column G of Table 13.
iii. Kenneth Parker
The Parker case had obvious racial aspects and was therefore racially
charged.243 It also had important military implications because it risked
exacerbating racial animosity and conflict within the ranks, thereby
threatening military order. It was also a classic case of intergroup conflict.
On its own, Parker’s second offense, committed on a separate occasion, was
a civilian-style murder of the spouse of a fellow soldier’s paramour. That
alone would have been unlikely to result in a capital prosecution.
Concern about deterring racial conflict likely influenced the capital
referral in Parker’s case. Capital sentencing members may have been
influenced by the belief that blacks are prone to violence or morally
inferior, and their empathy with the victim (who was both white and a
fellow marine) would be obvious. Those sentiments could have been
exacerbated by Walker’s senseless and totally unnecessary killing of the
spouse of a fellow soldier’s paramour.
It is relevant that only one of Parker’s five accomplices (Walker)
involved in the murder of the white marine was sentenced to death,244
suggesting that the second civilian-style murder in Parker may have made
the difference. Overall, our qualitative estimate of the risk of racial
prejudice in Parker is somewhat lower than the 36-point estimate reported
in Column G of Table 13.

victim cases with life sentences are Clark and Reliford. Case details for Parker and Walker
are presented infra notes 243 and 257.
243
Motivated by a perceived racial attack on a black marine by white marines, Kenneth
Parker, a twenty-one-year-old Marine Corps E3 with three years of military service, and five
co-perpetrators—including Wade Walker, infra note 257—kidnapped, robbed, and killed
with a shot to the heart the first white person they encountered who happened to be a fellow
marine. Parker was the shooter. Parker also killed the male spouse of Walker’s paramour
with a shotgun blast to the chest at Walker’s request.
244
For the four co-perpetrators not sentenced to death this was a single-victim case, but
for Parker and Walker it was a multiple-victim case. Three were permitted to plead guilty in
exchange for a life sentence. The only one who advanced to a capital sentencing hearing
was sentenced to life imprisonment.
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iv. James Murphy
Murphy is a three-victim case involving a physical altercation during a
marital dispute in which the accused brutally murdered his white wife and
two children—one white and one black.245 At the time of Murphy’s crime,
the premeditated murder of a child under fifteen years of age was not an
aggravating factor;246 the statutory aggravating factors in Murphy were
multiple victims and intentional infliction of pain and suffering.
There are three other cases involving multiple child victims that ended
with a life sentence or less (Morgan, K. Curry, and Fuhrman). Lillie
Morgan, a black woman, drowned her three-year-old son and two-monthold daughter in the bathtub.247 There was strong evidence of a psychotic
disorder in the case. Because Morgan was less cruel than Murphy and
accepted responsibility for her crimes, her case can be distinguished from
Murphy and does not suggest a white-victim effect in Murphy.
Kirklan Curry, a white accused, was charged with the premeditated
murder of his ten-month-old child in 1976 and his three-month-old child in
1987.248 The case was capitally prosecuted but the members failed to find
him guilty of premeditated murder. The eleven-year delay in prosecution of
the 1976 murder, the initial failure to identify the earlier case as a murder,
and the lengthy period between the two murders mitigates this case and
distinguishes it somewhat from Murphy.
James Fuhrman, a white accused who murdered his Asian wife and
adopted Asian son, is a comparison case that suggests possible minority-

245

James Murphy, a twenty-three-year-old Army E5 with six years of military service,
brutally murdered his wife with a hammer during a physical altercation and drowned her in a
bathtub. When his five-year-old stepson sought to protect his mother, Murphy knocked him
down, and after he killed the boy’s mother, he drowned the boy in the bathtub. He thereupon
drowned his own twenty-one-month-old child in the bathtub. He removed identification
from the victims to hinder the authorities from identifying the bodies, locked the apartment,
and proceeded to his new duty station.
246
This aggravating factor became effective November 1, 1999.
247
Lillie Morgan, a black twenty-two-year-old Army E4 with four years of military
service, drowned her three-year-old son and two-month-old daughter, both black, in the
bathtub, seeking revenge on her allegedly unfaithful husband. She then destroyed all of her
husband’s property, called him to tell him what she had done, and surrendered to the
authorities.
248
Kirklan Curry, a white thirty-three-year-old Marine Corps NCO (E7) violently shook
his three-month-old son in 1987, causing massive brain trauma and resulting in the child’s
death two days later from cardiac arrest. During the autopsy it was discovered that the
victim suffered three broken ribs at different stages of healing and a fractured tibia bone.
The investigation into the child’s death led investigators to re-open the file on the 1976 death
of Curry’s ten-month-old son; they concluded that that child had been intentionally
suffocated.
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accused and white-victim effects in Murphy.249 The level of brutality in
Fuhrman is unknown because he burned the bodies. Like Murphy,
Fuhrman attempted to cover up the crime. Unlike Murphy, there is no
evidence that Fuhrman was defending himself in a physical altercation with
his wife. The convening authority accepted Fuhrman’s offer to plead guilty
and was sentenced to fifty years by members in a non-capital sentencing
hearing.250
Murphy is arguably more aggravated than Fuhrman because of the
additional child victim in his case. In assessing the importance of the
additional child victim as an aggravating circumstance in Murphy, consider
that out of eight murder prosecutions involving a child victims under fifteen
years of age since 1984, Murphy is the only accused to have received a
death sentence that was approved by the convening authority.251 Because of
the race of the accused (white) and the victims (Asian) in Fuhrman,
empathy with the accused and a lack of empathy with the victims may have
influenced both the convening authority’s non-capital referral and the
members’ fifty-year sentence in lieu of a life sentence. However,
Fuhrman’s eighteen-year military career was three times longer than
Murphy’s, and that difference mitigated his case vis a vis Murphy.
Two other multiple-victim domestic homicides are relevant to Murphy.
Strom suggests a possible race-of-accused effect in Murphy, and Patterson
suggests a possible race-of-victim effect. Strom, a white accused, killed his
white wife and an innocent white bystander and seriously injured two other
bystanders.252 Strom was sentenced to life imprisonment in a capital
sentencing hearing. In the second case, Eddie Patterson, a black accused,
intentionally killed both his black girlfriend after assaulting her and a black
bystander who intervened.253 There was no capital referral in the case.
249

James Fuhrman, a white thirty-six-year-old Navy E6 with eighteen years of military
service, killed his intoxicated Asian wife during an argument. He also murdered his fouryear-old Asian adopted son. He burned the bodies and attempted to hide them.
250
The aggravating factor of murder of a child under fifteen years of age was not
effective on the date of his crime.
251
A death sentence imposed in a child-murder case in 1984 (Turner) was disapproved
by the convening authority. Beyond Murphy and Turner there were three child-victim cases
before the effective date (November 1, 1999) of this aggravating factor (K. Curry, P. Smith,
and Fuhrman) and three such cases after that date (Ronghi, Morgan, and J. Brown).
252
Mark Strom, a white twenty-nine-year-old Army E5 with four years of military
service and three young sons, went to an apartment where his wife was with three friends,
including a man with whom she was allegedly having an affair, and shot her in the head,
killing her instantly. He continued to fire on the corpse and then fired on the three other
people in the apartment, killing one who was white and seriously injuring the others.
253
Eddie Patterson, a black twenty-two-year-old Army E3 with five years of military
service, assaulted his girlfriend, who was black, and then obtained a gun and broke into the
barracks, where he fatally shot her twice in the head. He also shot and killed a black
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There are two relevant single-victim, white-accused/white-victim cases
(Gibbs and Thomas) that involved considerably less culpability than
Murphy and arguably diminish the inference of racial prejudice in Murphy,
even though both Gibbs and Thomas were sentenced to death. In 1989,
Gibbs, a white marine, nearly decapitated his very drunk white drinking
companion in a brawl.254 He was capitally charged and sentenced to death.
However, the convening authority reduced the death sentence to life
imprisonment on Gibbs’s post court-martial clemency petition, a decision
that speaks to Gibbs’s perceived deathworthiness. Thomas, a white marine,
brutally murdered his white wife with a tire iron to collect insurance
proceeds on her life.255 On appeal Thomas’s death sentence was vacated,
and on remand the convening authority waived the death penalty, which
speaks to his perceived deathworthiness.
There is also a 2005 multiple-victim case (Witt) in which a white
accused was sentenced to death, which arguably diminishes the inference of
racial prejudice in Murphy.
Witt, with substantial planning and
premeditation, stabbed to death a fellow airman who had harassed Witt with
phone calls alleging sexual misconduct on Witt’s part. He also killed the
wife of his target to eliminate her as a potential witness.256 The courtmartial members who sentenced Witt to death found five statutory
aggravating circumstances. If one views Witt as comparable to Murphy in
terms of criminal culpability, its outcome does diminish the perceived risk
of racial prejudice in Murphy. However, if one views Witt as substantially
bystander who tried to stop him.
254
Curtis Gibbs, a white twenty-six-year-old Marine Corps E3 with seven years of
military service, left a bar with a thirty-five-year-old white woman. He drove the victim into
the woods, attempted to force her to leave his car, and then became enraged and pummeled
her until she was no longer mobile. He then struck her with a Ninjato sword on her
collarbone, almost decapitating her, threw all of her belongings out of his car, and fled the
scene of the crime.
255
In 1987, to collect life insurance payment, Joseph Thomas, a white twenty-eight-yearold field wireman (Marine Corps E5) with ten years of military service, along with an
accomplice, killed his white wife with a tire iron. They moved the body into Thomas’s car,
drove the car off a cliff, and set it on fire.
256
After receiving thirty-two threatening or harassing phone calls alleging sexual
misconduct on his part, Andrew Witt, an Air Force avionics technician (E4) with two years
of military service, armed himself with a combat knife and drove to the victims’ home. He
entered the home without permission and was confronted by the first victim, a senior airman,
who told him to leave. The two began fighting, at which point the second victim (the senior
airman’s wife, who was in the bedroom talking on the phone) and another airman (also in the
bedroom) came to intervene. Witt stabbed but did not kill the non-senior airman in the chest
and then followed him out of the house and stabbed him an additional three times in the
back. Witt then stabbed the first victim, the senior airman, twice in the back before kicking
down the bedroom door to get to the second victim, whom he stabbed six more times, killing
her. He then stabbed the senior airman (the first victim) again in the heart, killing him.
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more aggravated than and therefore distinguishable from Murphy, it does
not materially diminish the inference of a risk of racial prejudice in Murphy.
We believe that these comparison cases, when viewed as a group,
suggest a risk of racial prejudice in Murphy that is consistent with the 32point quantitative assessment of risk of racial prejudice reported for his case
in Column G of Table 13.
v. Wade Walker
Wade Walker was one of Parker’s accomplices in the racially
motivated and charged murder of a white fellow marine.257 Walker was not
the actual killer in that crime. Nor was he the actual killer in Parker’s
murder of the husband of Walker’s paramour, but he was the sole instigator
of that offense. The analysis of Walker’s cases parallels the analysis of
Parker’s case except that Walker was not the triggerman in either murder.
There is nothing in this or any other case that appears to undercut the
validity of the 32-percentage-point estimate for the risk of racial prejudice
in the case reported in Column G of Table 13.
3. Single-Victim Murder
The following qualitative analysis supports an inference of a
substantial risk of racial prejudice in the final two single-victim cases in
Table 13.
i. Jose Simoy
Simoy’s victim was a military police officer with the rank of sergeant.
His crime occurred during an armed robbery of individuals delivering
proceeds to a bank on a Guam airbase.
Even though Simoy’s case implicated the policy underlying the 7G
“officer victim” statutory aggravating factor,258 his victim was not a
commissioned officer. Our database contains no other cases with a police
officer as the victim. However, it does contain four other cases like
Simoy’s with non-commissioned officer victims that resulted in a life
sentence or less. One such case that involved a minority accused and a
257

Wade Walker, a twenty-four-year-old Marine Corps E3 with two years of military
service, was a co-perpetrator of Kenneth Parker in both of his murders. See supra note 243.
While the accused recruited Parker to carry out the paramour murder, he was not a trigger
person in either of these murders.
258
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, RCM 1004(c)(7)(G) (2008). The
7G factor is implicated in a premeditated murder when the accused knowingly kills a
commissioned officer, a non-commissioned officer, or a law enforcement officer in the
execution of office. However, the aggravator was not charged because Simoy was convicted
of felony murder.
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white victim (Ameen) was highly aggravated, involving three additional
attempted murders.259 It advanced to a capital sentencing hearing and
resulted in a life sentence. Because it is a minority-accused/white-victim
case, Ameen’s outcome weakens the perceived risk of racial prejudice in
Simoy. The one case of a minority accused and a minority noncommissioned officer victim (Levell) advanced to a capital court-martial,
but capital punishment came off the table when the members failed to
convict unanimously on the premeditated murder charge.260 This outcome
suggests a possible race-of-victim effect in Simoy. In the two cases where
the accused were white and the non-commissioned officer victims were
white (Bowley and Jiminez), the convening authority waived the death
penalty before trial.261 The outcomes of these two white-accused cases
therefore suggest a possible minority-accused effect in Simoy. The
outcomes of these four cases also enhance the perceived risk of a minorityaccused effect in Simoy, because the two similarly situated minority
accused in Ameen and Levell were treated more punitively than the two
white accused in Bowley and Jiminez. Specifically, the two minorityaccused cases advanced to a capital court-martial while the two white
accused were not capitally charged.
In assessing the importance of an armed robbery in a single-victim
case, we observe that a death sentence has been imposed in only one other
case (Dock). On remand, Dock was sentenced to life imprisonment.262
Simoy was not the actual killer and there was no evidence that he
intended to kill the victim, who died three days later from head wounds
inflicted by an accomplice. This was an ordinary armed robbery and felony
murder case except for its high visibility as an assault on an air base, which
likely highlighted its racial aspects and therefore enhanced the risk that
Simoy’s race may have played a role in his charging and sentencing
decisions. This assessment of the risk of racial prejudice in Simoy is
consistent with the 28-point risk reported in Table 13.
259

Arif Ameen, a minority thirty-year-old seaman (Navy E3) with one year of military
service, killed a senior chief petty officer in an academic counseling session. He also
attempted to murder three other military personnel, whom he seriously injured in the
process. His defense was a psychotic episode and a total lack of recall of the incident.
260
Victor Levell, a minority twenty-year-old Marine Corps enlistee (E1), shot and killed
a non-commissioned officer who sought to break up an altercation outside a bar.
261
Jacob Bowley, a white twenty-year-old military policeman (Army E3), shot and killed
his white female platoon sergeant in an altercation over his and his friend’s drunken behavior
off post. Mark Jiminez, a white Hispanic twenty-two-year-old Marine Corps lance corporal
and two accomplices (also marines), while drunk, drowned a sergeant (after repeatedly
stabbing him over his entire body) in order to prevent him from testifying against Jiminez
and one of his accomplices for a prior assault on a fellow marine.
262
See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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ii. Melvin Turner
In January 1984, Turner brutally murdered his eleven-month-old
daughter with a razor blade in retaliation for his wife’s infidelity.263 The
estimated probability of a death sentence without regard to race reported in
Column F of Table 13 is 26%, and the quantitative risk of racial prejudice
reported in Column G is 1 percentage point.264 This is the only deathsentenced case with only black victims, which partly explains why the casespecific quantitative measure of the risk of racial prejudice is so low.
There are four comparison cases involving a single victim less than
fifteen years of age, a circumstance which became a statutory aggravating
factor on November 1, 1999.265 Two of the cases occurred before that date:
Smith (a white accused and a two-year-old white victim)266 and Thomas (a
white accused and a seven-year-old white victim).267 Despite the high level
of aggravation in both of these cases, the convening authority waived the
death penalty, suggesting a possible minority-accused effect in Turner.
There are two additional comparison cases prosecuted after the less
than fifteen years of age victim aggravating factor became effective (Ronghi
and Brown). Ronghi was a brutal white-accused/white-victim rape–murder
of an eleven-year-old Albanian girl.268 The convening authority waived the
263

Melvin Turner, a thirty-eight-year-old Marine Corps E7 with many years of military
service, brutally murdered his eleven-month-old daughter with a razor blade, slashing her
face, shoulders, and neck while she slept. He had been drinking heavily before the attack
and his motive was retaliation for his wife’s infidelity.
264
There is an issue in the case of the applicability of the 1984 executive order, which
became effective August 1, 1984, seven months after Turner’s offense. However, on its face
the executive order applies to cases tried and sentenced after its effective date, which
brought Turner within its terms. Exec. Order No. 12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17152 (Apr. 13,
1984) (“This Manual shall take effect on August 1, 1984, with respect to all court-martial
processes taken on and after that date.”). There is evidence that some military courts have
refused to apply the new rule to a crime that occurred before the effective date of the
executive order.
265
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, RCM 1004(c)(7)(K).
266
Patrick Smith was a white twenty-two-year-old multiple launch rocket system
crewmember (Army E4) stationed in Germany. After a night of drinking, he entered the
house of the victim, a white two-year-old girl, through an unlocked door. He took the girl
without authority and carried her to a nearby wooded area. He repeatedly hit her in the head
with his fists, rendering her unconscious. He then removed her clothes, raped her, and threw
her body into a thorny underbrush. It is unclear when she died, but the autopsy lists the
cause of death as blows to the head.
267
Fredrick Thomas, a white thirty-five-year-old aviation systems warfare operator
(Navy E6), had an argument with his wife. During the argument, he attempted to suffocate
their seven-year-old son with his bare hands and also choked his wife. He eventually drove
away with his son after his wife prevented the attempted murders. The next day, Thomas
suffocated his son with his bare hands.
268
Frank Ronghi, a white thirty-five-year-old weapons squad leader with ten years of
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death penalty, which enhances the perceived risk of a minority-accused
effect in Turner.
Brown was a minority-accused/minority-victim murder of a threeweek-old girl. The convening authority waived the death penalty and
accepted a plea to non-premeditated murder in exchange for a sentence of
not more than fifteen years.269 Brown is mitigated vis a vis Ronghi because
his liability for premeditated murder was questionable. For this reason we
believe Brown does not substantially implicate the perceived risk of a
minority-accused effect in Turner.
Turner involved the killing of one child, motivated by the wife’s
infidelity, a category of murder typically with very low priority in the eyes
of convening authorities and in which no other cases have been capitally
prosecuted since.270 Nevertheless, if Turner’s convening authority and
court-martial members perceived blacks as prone to violence, the brutality
of Turner’s crime could have provided an opportunity for racial prejudice to
operate. We perceive a substantial risk of racial prejudice in Turner’s
charging and sentencing decisions in the range of 30 points, which greatly
exceeds the 1-point estimate in Column G of Table 13.

military service (Army E6), while on patrol in Kosovo as part of a NATO Kosovo
peacekeeping force, entered an apartment complex with the purpose of finding a young
female to sexually assault. He found the victim, an eleven-year-old Albanian girl, and took
her to the basement. There he forcibly removed her clothes, digitally penetrated her vagina,
sodomized her (causing serious injury to her rectum), and pounded her face into the concrete
floor (causing bruising). He then strangled the girl with his bare hands before stepping on
her neck, killing her.
269
Jerry Brown, a minority twenty-two-year-old Army enlistee (E3), killed his threeweek-old daughter by striking her and slamming her against the kitchen countertop
repeatedly because she did not stop crying. His wife demanded that he take the girl to the
hospital, but he refused. After twenty minutes of argument his wife called 911, and the girl
died three hours later at the hospital.
270
This fact, in addition to his rank as an E7 and his many years of good service, likely
explains why the convening authority disapproved Turner’s death sentence on his post courtmartial clemency motion.
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